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My thesis explores the effect of natural resource dependence on income and local 
development indicators at the district level in Indonesia. The thesis is comprised of five 
chapters, where the middle three chapters are the main empirical investigations.  
Chapter One provides an introduction to the main questions of each chapter. Chapter 
Two starts the investigation of the resource curse in Indonesia by exploring the effect of 
resource dependence on district per capita income. Using annual fixed effects and first 
differenced regressions with and without newly constructed instruments, I find little evidence 
of a “resource curse”, but more a resource blessing. 
Chapter Three questions why resource dependence is positively associated with per 
capita income in Indonesia.  I test four potential causal mechanisms for this positive effect: 
spillovers to manufacturing, higher education provision, improvements in institutional 
quality, and investment in public capital.  I first confirm a positive overall effect of resource 
dependence on real per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product.  I then test the extent to 
which resource dependence positively affects manufacturing, education, district institutional 
quality, and public investment.  I finally test the extent to which these factors in turn 
contribute to per capita income.  I find that resource dependence aids income in part by raising 
measures of district institutional quality.  Resource dependence also raises one measure of 
education, net high school enrolment rates, though I do not find that this in turn raises per 
capita income.  Conversely, while higher capital spending by districts does raise income, I 
find no evidence that this share is affected by resource dependence.  In auxiliary analysis, I 
find little support for the hypothesis that resource dependence benefits per capita income 
more (or only) for districts that begin with higher institutional quality. 
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Chapter Four finalises the investigation by testing the effect of resource dependence 
not only on income per capita but also on some other key development outcomes, namely the 
poverty rate, educational attainment (as opposed to enrolment) and life expectancy. In this 
chapter I also focus on the spatial spillover effects of neighbour district resource dependence 
on home district outcomes. The results again confirm my initial finding on per capita income, 
but with no significant effects found for poverty rates. In contrast, I find that home resource 
dependence is negatively associated with education attainment and with life expectancy 
measures, and that the effects of neighbour district resource dependence matters, sometimes 
in opposite ways to home district resource dependence. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Natural resources play an important role in the development of a country. While 
resource-poor nations entrench productivity by specializing in producing manufactured 
goods, resource-rich countries use their natural resources-based sectors to drive their 
economy. This reasoning strengthens our belief that natural resources lead to a positive effect 
on a country's economy, as most economists have postulated (Rostow, 1959; North, 1982; 
Barbier, 2005). It was quite surprising therefore when an initial empirical study by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) found contrary evidence that resource dependence reduces growth in per 
capita income, a finding which later became known as the resource curse phenomenon. 
Subsequently, many such studies have used between-country data, and have provided 
relevant explanations of possible transmission channels that cause this negative relationship. 
Among them are crowding-out effects on the manufacturing sector, reducing human capital, 
weakening institutional quality, and worsening the quality of government spending. Yet the 
negative empirical findings regarding oil or mining, are not without critiques (van der Ploeg, 
2011; Brunnschweiler, 2008), while several studies have also found mixed results (e.g. 
Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008; Ouoba, 2016). Even more striking, other recent studies 
conducted at the regional level generally contradict the curse effect of resources on income 
(e.g. Fleming, Measham, Paredes, 2015; Weber, 2014). Researchers who conduct these 
studies often stress the importance of within country analysis. Many of these studies provide 
better resource dependence measures, perform instrumental variable estimation, and use data 
at county level or local government level to minimise unobserved heterogeneity. More recent 
studies also control for the spatial effects of natural resources from neighbouring regions. 
This spatial analysis has appeared in the resource curse literature from 2015 onwards. 
Indonesia on the other hand is a country rich in natural resources dominating resource 
output in the Southeast Asian region, and even Asia. However, a comprehensive study 
examining the effects of non-renewable natural resources on local per capita income in 
Indonesia is lacking. Moreover, studies exploring the effects of mining and oil, in particular, 
on broader development indicators sub-nationally such as poverty rates, education, and health 
are hard to find. 
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1.2 The Structure of the Thesis  
The main aim of this thesis is to contribute empirically to the resource impact literature 
at the regional level. While a small number of studies have attempted to test resource effects 
at the county-level, these have concentrated on developed countries. My thesis examines the 
case of Indonesia in its post decentralisation era, but it may shed light on resource effects on 
other representative emerging countries, especially in Asia. 
The thesis is comprised of three main chapters which are expected to satisfy the main 
objective of this research. CHAPTER TWO will first explain the natural resource curse 
hypothesis, providing a deep empirical review on the resource curse debate, including 
discussions regarding measurements of resource variables, possible endogeneity of resource 
dependence measures, and recent survey papers that emphasise the importance of within 
country analysis. By considering observations from 2005-2015 following the decentralisation 
era and using an instrumental variable strategy, the aim of this chapter is to provide empirical 
evidence of the impact of resource dependence measures on income in Indonesia. 
CHAPTER THREE analyses the transmission channels through which resource 
dependence affects income at the district level. The specific transmission channels I will 
examine are crowding out or crowding in of non resource-based activity, education 
enrollment levels, institutional quality, and government spending/investment in capital. 
Next, while my previous chapters focus on the association between resource 
dependence and per capita income, they say nothing about how resource dependence affects 
other measures of living standards or development. Thus, alternative outcome measures 
related to poverty, education and health will also be considered. In addition to considering 
the effects of resource dependence on alternative outcome measures, CHAPTER FOUR will 
also emphasise potential spatial spillover effects of resource dependence on adjoining 
districts. Controlling for spatial spillovers when estimating resource effects becomes more 
important as the unit of observation moves from nations (in between-country studies), to fine-
grained districts. It may be that the estimated resource effects are heightened or diminished 
after spillover effects are controlled. 
To conclude, CHAPTER FIVE summarizes this thesis by highlighting the core findings 
obtained in the main chapters. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 




In the 1960’s, there was a strong belief that a country’s natural resources determined 
the quality of its economic performance. A prominent proponent of this view was the 
development economist Walter Rostow, who argued that a country’s natural resource 
endowment played a crucial role in its “take-off” process, or its period of transition from 
being a traditional society based on a primary sector to a more industrialized society with 
high consumption (Rostow, 1959).  
Similarly, in the late 1980’s, neo-classical economists such as Douglas North stressed 
the significance of natural resource stocks as a driving component of a society’s long-term 
output (North, 1982).1 North argued that, historically, natural resources played an essential 
role in the United States’ transition to being a dominant economy by the early twentieth 
century. Natural resources have also been credited as the main factor behind the history of 
the great economic development of countries beyond the United States, such as Canada, 
Australia, and Finland, enabling them to outperform other countries’ development in the 
world (Lederman and Maloney, 2008). Thus, until the late 1980’s at least, natural resources 
were generally viewed by economists as an advantage that can sustain and promote economic 
growth without exception.  
By the early 1990’s, however, this positive view of the role of resources in development 
seemed to face an empirical challenge. Many nations with an abundance of natural resources, 
primarily located in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, have tended to have weak 
income levels and unstable growth rates and have obtained worse performance on broader 
development indicators when compared to resource-scarce countries elsewhere. Auty (1994) 
was the first to label this counter-intuitive result a “resource curse”. This term can be defined 
as the negative impact of natural resource wealth on economic growth or economic 
 
1 North modelled the influence of natural resources using a society’s aggregate production function 𝑌 =
𝐹(𝑁, 𝑇, 𝑅, 𝑃, 𝐻), where Y is output, N stands for the society’s stock of knowledge, T denotes its 
technological stock, R is its endowment of natural resources, and P and H refer respectively to its stock of 
labour and human capital (See North (1982), pages 15-16). 
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performance.2  In a more recent treatment, Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007) emphasize 
the resource curse phenomenon using broader outcome  measures than income or output, such 
as indicators of social development and good governance.  
The first empirical paper to test Auty’s “resource curse” was by Sachs and Warner 
(1995). Sachs and Warner conduct a large pooled cross-country study over twenty years 
(1970-1989) to test the relationship between what they called natural resource “abundance” 
and growth in income. They find an inverse association on average. Auty’s proposed resource 
curse, and Sachs and Warner’s confirmation of it, has sparked continuous attention from 
academics and practitioners. As of 2017, there have been hundreds of studies testing the 
relationship between natural resources and economic growth. These studies have been 
compiled and discussed in several surveys, which not only summarise some important 
findings in the previous empirical studies, but also criticize their methods and make 
suggestions for further analysis (Badeeb, Lean & Clark, 2017; Aragón, Chuhan-Pole and 
Land (2015); Cust and Poelhekke, 2015; Frankel, 2010; Papyrakis, 2016; van der Ploeg, 
2011; van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2016).  
Some studies have confirmed a negative and significant effect of natural resources on 
economic growth. In contrast, others have found a positive impact, while yet others have 
found no significant relationship. Each has sought to ask whether resources are on average a 
curse or a blessing. 
Several prominent papers in this literature can illustrate these disparate findings. 
Gylfason (2001) uses data from 85 countries between 1965-1998 to fit a regression line 
through a scatterplot, and finds that natural resource “abundance” (measured as the share of 
each nations’s natural capital over national wealth in 1994) is negatively associated with its 
per capita growth in GDP. In doing so, Gylfason also finds a similar negative result when he 
tries another resource intensity measure, the share of the primary sector in each nation’s total 
employment. Supporting this finding, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) find that natural 
resources strongly reduce growth indirectly through their effects on intermediate variables. 
These indirect effects work through increasing corruption, lowering incentives for 
 
2 Economic performance is commonly measured using real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, 
whether in levels or changes. 
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investment, reducing openness, worsening a nation’s terms of trade and weakening demand 
side incentives for schooling.   
In contrast, some later ‘resource curse’ researchers have found a positive association 
between countries’ resource production intensity and their economic outcomes, and have 
expressed skepticism about the original results of Sachs and Warner. Brunnschweiler (2008), 
for example, estimates a direct positive relationship between natural resource production 
(specifically mineral and fuel production per capita) and economic growth. Similarly, 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) find no significant link between resource dependence 
(defined as the average of mineral exports as a share of GDP over the period 1970-1989) and 
growth after using resource abundance measures as instruments, and instead a positive direct 
association between resource abundance (measured as subsoil wealth) and growth in GDP. A 
more recent study by Alexeev and Conrad (2011) also finds positive effects on per capita 
GDP of both resource dependence (measured as value of oil production over GDP) and of 
resource abundance (estimated oil reserves). Alexeev and Conrad (2009, 2011) similarly find 
positive effects of oil resources on per capita GDP for the transition economies of formerly 
socialist countries.  
The journey of empirical resource curse analysis begun by Sachs and Warner in 1995 
has tended to use macro-country level datasets, especially geared to include low or middle-
income countries. Thus, the main empirical approaches have predominantly used cross-
country comparisons. For example, Sachs and Warner (1995) used pooled cross-section 
international data on each country’s average annual growth rate between 1971-1990. The 
same approach was followed by Gylfason (2001), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) and 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004). Some researches have used country fixed effects rather than 
pooled cross sections in order to control for stable, unobserved country-level variables that 
affect growth (Torvik (2009); Lederman & Maloney (2003)). Some early studies have found 
an inverse association also holds in country fixed effects analysis (Collier and Goderis, 2009).  
Particularly in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, when evidence for the resource curse 
seemed strongest, scholars developed several major causal explanations by which it might 
operate. These causal channels provided plausible mechanisms through which natural 
resources could ultimately hamper economic achievement in resource-rich economies.3 The 
 
3 Other potential channels for the resource curse that have been identified by others will not be pursued 
here, such as volatility of commodity prices relative to non-commodity prices.  
6 
 
first channel identified was the “Dutch Disease”.4 Sachs and Warner (1995) write that the 
Dutch Disease can delay growth, because it makes countries rely predominantly on resource 
exports. It then crowds out the performance of non-resource sector exports, such as the 
manufacturing sector. Gylfason (2001) adds that natural resource exploitation crowds out 
human capital accumulation by reducing the incentive for young people to remain in school 
when high paying low skill jobs in the resource sector are on offer.  A third possible causal 
channel of the resource curse is that dependency on natural resources can decrease the quality 
of a country’s institutions, resulting in a weakening of economic outcomes. Some scholars 
such as Ross (2001) and Isham, et al. (2005) find that resource intensity can put downward 
pressure on institutional quality by providing governments with sources of revenue outside 
income taxes, and thus lessen their need for democratic accountability, and their vulnerability 
to demands for democratic reforms. Institutional effects are also supported empirically by 
Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) who link resource abundance (measured as a share of 
resource exports in total exports) with less rule of law and less government effectiveness as 
evidenced by a corruption measure.  
As mentioned, studies looking for a resource curse have now been conducted for over 
two decades, and have found various conclusions, and raised an extensive debate. As studies 
have accumulated, some economists have surveyed the literature, and mapped some 
important conclusions. For example, Cust and Poelhekke (2015), Badeeb, Lean and Clark 
(2017), and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016) have documented that an inverse association 
between resource dependence (rather than abundance) and economic performance has 
commonly been found in cross-country macro-level studies.  Some survey papers have 
blamed the literature’s contradictory findings on weak robustness checks, unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries that affects their economic outcomes, and the possible 
endogeneity of many commonly used resource dependence measures.  
For example, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016) criticize past cross-section and panel 
data analysis between countries. Firstly, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke claim that international 
datasets on which most studies depend are commonly too diverse with respect to the 
characteristic of each country. Employing cross-country analyses can lead to serious omitted 
 
4 Initially, this label came from the discovery of natural gas near the town of Groningen in 1956, which 
raised the real exchange rate of the Netherlands. 
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variable bias issues.5 Second, they argue that endogeneity problems likely occur when 
researchers use common proxies for resource dependence such as the share of primary exports 
in total GDP. As a result, the actual effects of unmeasured factors on growth are wrongly 
loaded onto resource dependence, or there can be spurious negative correlation with outcome 
measures.  
In their conclusion, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke recommend researchers pursue new 
strategies and datasets to produce more reliable evidence regarding the resource curse. 
Especially relevant here, they suggest that within-country analysis which emphasizes a 
specific area in one country, or the local impact of resource intensity, may provide a more 
reliable test of the resource curse hypothesis. This recommendation has also been proposed 
in other recent surveys by Papyrakis (2016), Fleming, et al. (2015), Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, 
and Land (2015), Cust and Poelhekke (2015). Papyrakis, for example, notes with approval 
that attention currently has shifted to analysis of data within countries at the district or county 
level to test the effects of natural resources. Papyrakis then argues that it is not enough to 
monitor macroeconomic outcomes, but that evidence of resource effects should be evident at 
the regional level. Further impetus for within country analysis is given by Aragón, Chuhan-
Pole, and Land (2015), who emphasize the need to monitor local effects as many resource-
rich countries have decentralised their fiscal systems. This decentralisation has in some cases 
led to significant revenue windfalls for producer regions.  
Many academics who have followed this advice have found a beneficial, rather than 
detrimental effect of resource intensity. Among within-country studies, for example, Caselli 
and Michaels (2013) assess the effect of resource windfalls at the local level in Brazil, and 
find a positive impact on incomes, local public goods, and public service delivery. A similar 
study of mining activities in 71 local government areas in Australia between 2006 and 2007 
by Hajkowicz, Heyenga and Moffat (2011) finds no negative effects on per capita GDP. 
Rather, Hajkowicz, Heyenga and Moffat find that mining operations are positively correlated 
with income, as well as with selected quality of life indicators. The same conclusion is 
reached by Fan, Fang and Park (2012) in the case of local level mining in China. Lastly, 
McMahon and Moreira (2014) also find no evidence of the resource curse when investigating 
the impact of the mining sector on social and economic development indicators in the five 
 
5 They suggests that doing “old cross-country” analysis should be no longer be chosen as a way to find 
evidence of the resource curse. See van der Ploeg & Poelhekke (2016).  
8 
 
resource-rich mining countries of Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, and South Africa. McMahon 
and Moreira focused on these five nations because they have a history of substantial mining 
discoveries.6 
Unfortunately, such within-country studies have not resolved the resource curse debate. 
Other within-country studies have found opposing results more in line with those of Sachs 
and Warner. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), for instance, examine United States counties as 
a pooled cross section and find a negative cross-county association between resource 
dependence (measured as the share of the primary sector in the real gross state product 
(GSP)), and long-term income growth. Papyrakis and Gerlagh also claim that a resource curse 
can be found even in more homogenous sub-samples of counties. Similarly, James & Aadland 
(2011) confirm this view and find a negative effect of natural resources earnings on growth 
in income per capita in counties of the United States. These results are consistent with those 
of Douglas and Walker (2016) who find negative effects of resource-sector dependence when 
trying to investigate the effect of coal mining among Appalachian counties in the United 
States. Douglas and Walker use a panel data set between 1970-2010 which is averaged over 
every 10 year period, or with four decade observations. Along with using fixed effects in their 
first analysis, these authors also use two-step GMM instrumental variables to address 
potential endogeneity in their resource measure.  
Surprisingly, while numerous empirical resource curse studies have been carried out in 
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, this phenomenon has not been examined to 
nearly the same degree in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is the richest country in Southeast Asia 
in terms of natural resource endowments of all types (oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, forest 
products, and agriculture).7 Yet resource abundance and dependence vary dramatically 
among regions of the country. Some prominent papers have included Indonesia as a sample 
country among other resource-rich countries (e.g. Gylfason (2001), Gylfason and Zoega 
(2006), Brunnschweiller and Bulte (2008), Arezki and van der Ploeg (2011)). However, there 
have been very few studies testing for a resource curse within Indonesia.  
 
6 In this study McMahon and Moreira concentrate on low and middle income mining countries and find 
that mining has a strong positive impact on economic growth and on the Human Development Index (HDI). 
Unfortunately, the paper does not employ econometric analysis and therefore can not offer proof about any 
causal effects of mining revenues.  
7 Indonesia is currently  7th in total mineral production, and the largest coal exporter in the world in terms 
of value added or in government revenues generated by mining. 
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In pioneering work, Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006) analyze the effect of 
resource rents (separated as forest, mining, oil and gas, and total resource rents) on the growth 
rate of district GDP, called real GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product) in 2001, the first 
year of Indonesia’s fiscal decentralisation. Edwards (2016) expands the investigation within 
Indonesia by focusing on the effect of mining dependence (the share of mining in total value-
added) on several social development indicators (that include health and education), using 
cross-section data from the year 2009. However both studies have relied on single year cross-
section data, making their conclusions vulnerable to omitted variable bias. More recently, 
Cust and Rusli (2016) have provided a valuable analysis of the effects of district government 
revenues associated with petroleum royalties on district economic performance, proxied 
again by GRDP. Cust and Rusli’s method seems to be promising as they have access to a 
longer period, 1999-2009, and consider effects of royalties on levels and changes in GRDP. 
Cust and Rusli also address the potential endogeneity of royalty revenues using total offshore 
oil and gas production as an instrumental variable in both level and change models. 
Dependence of local government revenues from petroleum royalties is, like most resource 
dependence or abundance measures, prone to endogeneity because of omitted variables that 
affect incomes or growth and because of spurious negative correlation where higher incomes 
simultaneously raise the dependent variable and the denominator of the resource measure. 
Cust and Rusli emphasize the importance of addressing the endogeneity issue that resource 
curse researchers face. Surprisingly, far from a resource curse, Cust and Rusli instead find 
that revenue windfalls boost local economic GRDP. Beyond these few papers, to the best of 
my knowledge, none has investigated the resource curse within Indonesia using sub-national 
data. 
 
2.1.2 The Significance of the Research 
The limited number of studies of the resource curse in Indonesia motivates me to test 
whether a curse phenomenon really exists when we can follow Indonesian districts over time. 
Therefore, this first part of my dissertation attempts to investigate empirically the overall 
effect of natural resources on economic performance within Indonesia at the sub-provincial 
level of districts. For reasons of data availability, I focus here on all non-renewable “point 
source” resources, namely oil, natural gas and coal. I focus on two kinds of resource 
dependence measures, either the share of resources in district GRDP, or the share of 
‘windfall’ revenues that district governments receive as a share of their total budgets. I 
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consider the years following the implementation of fiscal decentralisation, from 2005 to 2015. 
Finally, I construct and exploit various instrumental variables for resource dependence by 
introducing “historical resource abundance” measures available 30 years prior to 
decentralisation.  
As mentioned above, I focus on mining in Indonesia, employing the main resource 
intensity variables of “mining dependence” and “mining revenue dependence” on sub-
provincial level economic performance across all districts in Indonesia.8 I consider the post-
decentralisation period of the Indonesian economy, where much decision-making power and 
revenues devolved from the central government to provinces and districts. According to the 
Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2015, there were 512 districts within 34 provinces 
in Indonesia. Since decentralisation began in 2001, the Indonesia government has pursued a 
policy called “proliferation” or pemekaran. This policy has expanded the number of districts 
continuously. In 2001, there were just 336 districts, rising to 477 in 2010, and 512 in 2015. 
This proliferation of districts poses some challenges for any local level analysis that follows 
districts over time. 
The rest of this first part of my dissertation will proceed as follows: Section 2.2 reviews 
the resource curse literature, including both its theories and empirical tests. I pay particular 
attention to those studies concerned with within-country estimation of resource effects. 
Section 2.3 emphasizes the historical aspects and the role of natural resources in Indonesia, 
while Section 2.4 describes the country’s substantial policy changes during the period of 
decentralisation begun in 2001. Section 2.5 explains the data, and my empirical estimation 
strategies for estimating direct and indirect effects of mining dependence. Section 2.6 
discusses the results of my analysis. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Natural Resources and Economic Development 
 
Natural resources have been recognized as a key factor in the economic progress of 
many nations. Walter Rostow (1959) an American economist and political theorist at 
Columbia University argued that natural resources act as a preliminary foundation for many 
 
8 Mining here is defined according to International Standard Classification 0509, and comprises natural gas, 
coal, lignite, crude petroleum and other minerals. The definition follows that used in the recent study by 
Edwards (2016a). Under its decentralisation scheme, Indonesia has 34 provinces and (in 2015) consists of 
512 districts. Since each district publishes information on gross domestic output value [real and nominal 
price] by sector and in total, I can calculate resource dependence by dividing mining output by total output.  
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countries’ “take off” into industrialisation. Barbier (2005), a development economist, in his 
book Natural Resources and Economic Development argues that this transition phase, “in 
which countries achieve rapid development”, is often driven by access to abundant natural 
resources, and in particular the discovery of new sources of raw materials. Barbier argues that 
the term “resource-based development”, which has been applied to some well known 
countries that have been leaders in the world economy, is itself evidence of the influence of 
natural resource endowments in every stage of economic expansion. 
Looking at broad swathes of history, Barbier summarises several phases in which 
natural resources have contributed to stages of past human civilisation. The first stage, the 
agricultural transition, occured between 8,500 BC to 1 AD, and is characterised as a period 
when society, either tribes or individuals within society, compete with each other in hunting 
or planting something on the earth to gain benefit from natural resources, often simply for 
survival. Barbier calls the second stage, the era of Malthusian stagnation (from 1 AD to 1,000 
AD); natural resources determined food sufficiency and economic stability in human 
civilisation. The third stage he calls the emergence of the world economy, between 1,000 and 
1,500 AD, when international trade in renewable and non-renewable raw materials vastly 
expanded between nations.  
Barbier labels the next historical period the rise of Western Europe (between 1500-
1913). During this period, many West European countries created colonies in many parts of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. These efforts were largely driven by the desire to access 
quantities of natural resources from these countries and regions. Colonization also occured in 
North America where two countries, the United States and Canada,  became influential in the 
world economy. Barbier divides this period between Atlantic economic triangular trade 
(between 1500 and 1860), where trade agreements between countries were formalized, and 
the later golden age of resource-based development (from 1870 to 1913).     
Wright and Czelusta (2004), who also take a long historical view, argue that a number 
of successfully developed countries achieved that success with resource based development 
that was inevitably driven by the influence of natural resources. Wright and Czelusta 
emphasize the contribution of mineral production, which had strong linkages with advancing 
technology. Mineral production provided substantial benefits to countries such as the United 
States and Australia. Doraisami (2015) also argues that substantial knowledge spillovers 
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resulted from the linkages between nations’ extractive sectors and industrialisation, which in 
turn has driven successful development.   
The link between natural resources and economic output is commonly approached 
using a basic Cobb-Douglas technology function in which natural resources are involved as 
a substantial determinant of a nation’s aggregate output.9 In the growth literature that has 
developed since Rostow, natural resources are also commonly seen as a part of nation’s 
capital stock 𝐾. As one example, Lederman and Maloney (2008) model output assuming that 
(𝐾) consists of resource endowments, which are used either in static or dynamic growth 
models.10  
However, regardless of historians’ assertions of a positive effect of natural resources 
on development, the first empirical study found a famously contrarian result. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) were the first authors to find empirical evidence for a "resource curse”. 
Empirically, Sachs and Warner find that countries that depended largely on resource exports 
(measured as the ratio of primary product exports to GDP in 1970) experienced slower 
economic growth in subsequent periods (measured as the average of 1971-1989). Several 
causal channels have been proposed to explain why an abundance of natural resources can 
become a curse (or a blessing) for a society. I concentrate here on four channels that have 
received dominant attention in many papers:  (1) a Dutch disease; (2) effects on human 
capital, (3) effects on institutional quality, and, (4) effects on the quality of government 
investment/spending. These will be explored in depth in Chapter 3, but I will give here a short 
summary. 
The Dutch disease was first introduced in the Economist magazine inspired by the 
discovery of natural gas in Groningen, the Netherlands in the late 1950’s (Frankel, 2010). As 
documented by Davis (1995), the resulting explosion of mining in Gronigen led to an 
appreciation of the Dutch Guilder, which in turn decreased world demand for the Dutch 
export of non-resource tradable sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture. This 
 
9 Stiglitz (1974) includes the rate of natural resources utilisation in the form of Cobb-Douglas technology, 
𝑄 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑅, 𝑡) =  𝐾𝛼1 𝐿𝛼2𝑅𝛼3𝑒𝛾𝑡 ,      𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 = 1. Here 𝑄 is a nation’s aggregate output, 𝑅 is its rate of use 
of natural resources, 𝐿 represents its supply of labour, and 𝐾 and 𝛾 stand for its capital stock and rate of 
technological progress, respectively. 
10 For a brief explanation see Lederman and Maloney (2008). 
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phenomenon was one of the first causal explanations for resource endowments bringing a 
curse, rather than a blessing.11 
The next causal mechanism for a curse is through education. Gylfason (2001) and 
Gylfason and Zoega (2006) have pointed out that natural resource dependence may reduce 
demand side incentives for human capital accumulation. This may be observed as a decrease 
in school enrollment, public expenditures on education, or expected years of schooling in 
more resource intensive societies (Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega, 1999). Yet conversely, 
resource revenues could increase state funding for the supply of public education. 
Third, most empirical studies also predict that a resource curse is a phenomenon closely 
related to institutional quality. There are two variants of this argument: (a) Institutional 
quality is an endogenous factor, negatively affected by resource abundance/dependence, 
which in turn worsens economic performance. (b) Institutional quality is assumed to be 
exogenous to resource intensity, but that quality largely determines whether resources are a 
curse or blessing.12   
The fourth channel relates to the quality of public spending that results from resource 
vs non-resource sources of government revenues. A curse could result if windfall government 
revenues would be less likely to be spent on investment than non-resource revenues, such as 
income or consumption tax revenues. This argument often interacts with decentralisation of 
revenues and responsibility for public good investment and provision, such as that which has 
taken place in Indonesia. 
 Under decentralisation, resource extraction activities operate in local areas and the 
revenues are managed by the central government. However, the central government transfers 
resource rents back to the producing districts. Cust and Poelhekke (2015) and Aragón, 
Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) both emphasize this link between resource effects, 
government funding source, and quality of expenditures.  
2.2.2 The Resource Curse: A Survey of Empirical Studies 
Sachs and Warner’s influential study brought much attention from scholars because the 
authors concluded that resource-rich economies experience slower economic growth than 
 
11 Aragón, Chuhan-Pole and Land (2015) comment that the Dutch disease is analogous to 
deindustrialisation driven by resource windfalls. 
12 Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) distinguish two alternative types of institutions: “grabber friendly” 
and “producer friendly”. 
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resource-scarce economies, other things equal. In particular, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) 
find that “resource abundance”, which they defined as each country’s share of primary 
exports (SXP) in total GDP, has on average a negative association with average growth in 
single year or pooled cross-section regressions.  
This surprising result was found also by subsequent studies (e.g. Gylfason, 2001; Stijns 
(2000), Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004, Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 2006). However, other 
studies began pointing to weaknesses of Sachs and Warner’s methods. For example, 
Brunnschweiller and Bulte (2008) criticize Sachs and Warner’s resource “abundance” as 
actually defining its degree of dependence on resources.13 Brunnschweiller and Bulte 
distinguish resource abundance as a country’s stock of natural resource wealth, whereas 
resource dependence is the proportion of the flow of income that a country receives from 
natural resources. These authors find that resource abundance is positively correlated with 
economic growth and with institutional quality.14 More specifically, Brunschweiler and Bulte 
argue that resource abundance positively affects resource dependence, and that Sachs and 
Warner’s resource de facto dependence measure (the ratio of resource exports over GDP) 
suffers from endogeneity. To address this, Brunnschweiller and Bulte instrument this 
dependence using averaged  historical openness to trade between 1950-1969, but still find no 
evidence that higher dependence lowers economic growth.  
Other researchers have taken issue with the possible omitted variable bias of Sachs and 
Warner’s cross-section analysis. Lederman and Maloney (2003) update Sachs and Warner’s 
paper by performing both cross-section and panel fixed effects to compare the results. Their 
panel regression models find a positive effect of resource dependence on GDP per capita, 
whereas cross-section models find no significant association. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) 
also use country fixed effects, and find when using large oil endowments as an abundance 
measure that resource-rich countries experience higher growth in GDP per capita.  
 
13 Other authors also expressed doubts about Sachs and Warner’s measurement. For example Aleexev and 
Conrad (2016) tried several other measures of resource abudance such as resource deposits per capita or oil 
and mining production, and find no adverse effect. 
14 In general there is now a consensus that resource abundance represents the stock under the land of 
resources deposits or reserves while resource dependence is the flow of natural resources. Thus, natural 
resource abundance tends to be measured by using “stock” measures of estimated deposits in the ground. 
As an example, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) use each nation’s total amount of sub-soil wealth to 
measure natural resource abundance. 
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Yet other researchers argue that Sachs and Warner specifically neglected to control for 
institutional quality. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) argue that the curse effect is 
conditionally driven by the (exogenous) quality of countries’ institutions. These authors first 
show that inferior institutions lead to a curse. Instead of following the rent seeking hypothesis, 
which treats institutions as endogenously affected by resource dependence, they treat 
institutional factors exogeneously, but use Sachs and Warner’s data.15 They find that when 
institutional quality is controlled for within the Sachs and Warner model or interacted with 
the natural resource dependence measure, the negative effect of dependence on GDP growth 
vanishes in countries with “producer friendly” institutions, while remaining for countries with 
“grabber friendly” institutions. 
Other researchers, such as Arezki and van der Ploeg (2011), take issue specifically with 
a potential negative spurious correlation that may arise when researchers such as Sachs and 
Warner place GDP both as the dependent variable, and as the denominator of the right hand 
side dependence measure. For example, countries experiencing strong non-resource growth 
would appear to have a negative association between growth in “resource dependence” and 
in growth in GDP. Van der Ploeg (2011) also notes that cross-section analysis is highly prone 
to omitted variable bias. Some other recent papers have also tried to focus on dependence 
measures yet to address potential endogeneity, and again found contrarian positive results. 
Ouoba (2016) for example, finds positive and significant effects when he tries to use Sachs 
and Warner’s measure: resource dependence in GDP using a sample of resource-rich 
countries. Ouoba compares results from different techniques such as Driscoll-Kraay Fixed 
Effects, Instrumental Variables with 2SLS, and a GMM-System estimator following 
countries between 1980-2010. Similarly, Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012), using 
30 oil-rich countries between 1993-2005 find positive effects of oil revenues on real GDP per 
capita (in logs). 
More recently, Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) emphasize that it is difficult to 
generalize the effect of natural resources (positive or negative) at the broad national level. 
Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land argue that any potential resource curse effect will be a local 
phenomenon, more suitable to analyze at a local (sub-national) geographic level. In other 
words, they imply that a resource effect will be difficult to identify using cross-country 
variation.     
 
15 Mehlum and Torvik use Sachs and Warner’s data as in Sachs and Warner (1997) 
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Thus, while most early resource curse tests were cross-country, mixed findings and 
concerns over omitted variables that affect growth have resulted in a recent shift towards 
within-country studies. Cust & Poelhekke (2015), Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) 
and van der Ploeg & Poelhekke (2016) have all recommended that researchers look for 
resource effects using within country analysis.16 Cust and Poelhekke in particular highlight 
the urgency of narrowing down the investigation of the resource curse to regional 
development dynamics within specific countries. In a more recent survey article, Badeeb, 
Lean and Clark (2017) conclude that moving particular attention to within country studies 
and using more recent data after 2000 is crucial as many resource curse studies have been 
based on data from the 1990’s, with limited variation in resource price movements.  
However, even within the confines of within-country analysis, different results still 
occur, which makes it difficult to reach a general consensus regarding whether resource 
dependence is a curse or a blessing. For example, Douglas and Walker (2016) conduct an 
analysis on the effects of coal dependence at the county level in the Appalachian region of 
the United States.  Douglas and Walker use the period 1970 – 2010 for their analysis, and 
estimate that an increase of coal mining dependence lowers the annual growth rate of per 
capita income by roughly 0.5-1.0 percentage points in the long run, and by 0.2 percentage 
points in the short run. Douglas and Walker thus seem to confirm Sachs and Warner’s cross-
country findings. Guo, Zheng and Song (2016) similarly find negative, albeit weak linkages 
between resource dependence and output using panel data at the provincial level in China. In 
contrast, other within-country studies find positive effects of resource dependence, such as 
Hajkowich, Heyenga and Moffat (2011) and Fleming and Measham (2015) for Australia, 
Weber (2012, 2014) for Western U.S. states, Libman (2013) for Russia, Aragón and Rud 
(2013) for the case of Northern Peru, and most relevant for our purposes, Cust and Rusli 
(2016) for Indonesia (see Appendix 2.4 for a summary of some blessing effect results). 
Weber (2012, 2014), for example, focuses on the South-Central United States, and 
maps 362 non-metropolitan counties in Arkansas, Lousiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, and finds 
that natural gas development (defined as the change in natural gas production in billions of 
cubic feet) has a positive effect on total employment, using a first difference method. 
Specifically, Weber finds that each gas-related mining job is likely to create 1.4 non-mining 
 
16 Explicitly, these authors accept that within-country studies provide a better identification strategy, Also 
add that a positive impact on growth has been found by those within-country studies previously done. (Cust 
and Poelhekke (2015), Aragón, Chuhan-Pole and Land (2015)) 
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jobs for the local area. Boyce and Emery (2011) also find a positive effect when regressing 
the share of people employed in natural resource industries on income levels using US state 
level data. 
To summarise, the standard resource curse hypothesis has postulated that countries 
endowed with abundant natural resources grow slower than countries without such 
endowments. However, empirical findings have been mixed, and striking counter examples 
exist. 
 
2.2.3 The Resource Curse in Asia and Southeast Asia 
Very few empirical studies have tried to examine the effect of natural resources on per 
capita income in Southeast Asia.17 A greater number have examined the resource curse in 
East Asia, in China in particular (see Fan, Fang and Park (2012); Lei, Cui & Pan (2013); Wu 
& Lei (2016), Zhuang and Zhang (2016)). These do not tend to find strong evidence of a 
curse using sub-national data (e.g. Fan, Fang and Park (2012) using city level data).  
For Southeast Asia as a whole, Sovacool (2010) examines evidence for the resource 
curse by quantifying some key indicators without using econometrics analysis, and draws the 
opposite conclusion from a resource curse prediction. He chooses thirteen dimensions of 
outcome variables to represent all aspects of development, arguing that a single indicator such 
as economic growth (in GDP per capita) is inadequate to capture complex relationships 
between resource intensity and development. 
Specifically, Sovacool combines six economic factors (gross domestic product, 
exports, government revenues, per capita income, inflation and poverty levels), political 
factors (including measures of transparency and natural gas and oil production), and four 
social indicators (rates of literacy, infant mortality, undernourishment, and life expectancy). 
Sovacool concludes that Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Myanmar, are able 
to avoid the curse. Even the more resource dependent countries achieve good progress in most 
indicators. By comparing outcomes against those of major Middle Eastern oil and gas 
 
17 This comprises of ten countries that are currently playing an important role in the world economy. 




countries, who are members of OPEC, Sovacool finds that Southeast Asia has performed 
much better.  
In similarly descriptive work, Coxhead (2007) identifies Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand as resource abundant countries that managed their economies very well between 
1975-2001. The average rate of GDP growth in these three countries was above the overall 
mean of all countries in Southeast Asia. Coxhead argues that a massive flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) between 1985 and 1991 was the key factor which raised industrialisation 
rates for these three countries. As a consequence of this remarkable achievement, the World 
Bank has grouped these countries as a new “East Asian miracle” alongside Singapore and 
some other Northeast Asian economies. 
2.2.4 Empirical Evidence Related to the Resource Curse in Indonesia 
Moving to Indonesia in particular, there have been only a small number of empirical 
studies looking within that country, even though many cross-country studies have included 
Indonesia as a resource-intensive data point.  
A few studies have discussed Indonesia and the resource curse in a very descriptive 
way, such as Usui (1997), Rosser (2007), and Chandra (2012). Usui (1997) claims that 
Indonesia has successfully escaped relatively unscathed from both the Dutch disease in times 
of rising oil prices and from later declining oil prices, over the combined period from the 
1980’s to the 2000’s. Usui argues that good policy adjustments have contributed to this. 
Similarly, Gylfason (2001a) places Indonesia alongside Bostwana, Malaysia and Thailand 
among 65 countries that have successfully managed long term investment, making their 
economic growth exceed 4 per cent on average between 1970-1998. Gylfason argues 
generally that diversification and industrialisation have helped them reach that level of 
growth.  
Rosser (2007), similarly, describes Indonesia’s economy during a period of intermittent 
oil booms between 1967-2000. Qualitatively, Rosser argues that the oil booms did not carry 
Indonesia into “curse” conditions. Instead, the country experienced strong growth in the 
1970’s and 1980’s in a more sustained pattern than other Southeast Asian countries. Rosser 
credits this growth in part to political factors such as a successful transition of power (from 
the old order, under Soekarno’s rule (1945-1966), to Soeharto’s new order (1966-1998)), and 
to favourable external economic conditions. Again taking a descriptive approach, di John 
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(2011) identifies Mexico and Indonesia alone among the ten largest oil exporters as having 
succesfully managed their growth during oil price booms by introducing a “Dual track 
strategy”. These two countries translated oil windfalls between 1981-2002 into domestic 
investment to build and accelerate industrialisation.  
Finally among descriptive works, Chandra (2012) considers the effects of oil price 
booms on Indonesia’s overall economic growth over a longer period. Chandra finds that 
Indonesia, especially in the 1970’s-1980’s successfully managed the revenue windfall that 
came from massive mineral exports, especially oil and gas, to build their manufacturing 
sector. By the 1990’s, much of the overall growth nationally was driven by manufacturing 
performance, though in the 2000’s it was driven by growth in both the primary and 
manufacturing sectors. Chandra also notes that although Indonesia experienced oil price 
volatility in the early 1980’s, the country did not suffer a resource curse generally, nor a Dutch 
disease in particular. Instead, Indonesia was able to use revenue windfalls to develop their 
manufacturing sector. By the time of declining global commodity prices in the 2000’s, falling 
windfall revenues did not much affect the industrialisation process. However, although 
Chandra’s study is fairly comprehensive in the time period it considers, it is purely 
descriptive,  and only considers overall macroeconomic conditions.  
While previous studies have generally argued that Indonesia has avoided a resource 
curse, few have looked for evidence of resource intensity effects within the country, using 
district level data, in the period following decentralisation. Prior to decentralisation, during 
the Soeharto era, Indonesia experienced good progress in terms of key macro-economic 
indicators. However, the authoritarian governance under Soeharto, while sometimes good for 
political stability, hampered democracy and increased scope for rent-seeking behaviour 
among the elites with ties to the government. When the Asian Financial Crisis struck several 
Southeast Asian countries in 1997, Indonesia’s economy performed particularly badly, 
making Soeharto step down and paving the way for a change from a highly centralized 
administration to a decentralised and democratically accountable system of provincial and 
district level governance.18 
 
18 In the post Soeharto era, Indonesia adopted a decentralisation system, with legal changes beginning in 
2001, and political implementation beginning in 2005. 
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Under decentralisation, all provinces and districts receive a certain amount of revenue 
based on a legal scheme of “resource revenue-sharing”.19  In general, the higher the revenues 
generated from resource endowments within a district, the higher the revenues it receives 
back into its budget every year. The revenue-sharing schemes known as “intergovernmental 
transfers” in Law 33/2004, are calculated based on percentage allocations (see Table 2.1).  
Hill, Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2008) were the first researchers to rigorously 
evaluate Indonesia’s development progress at the provincial level over three decades from 
1980-2010. They cover the years before and after decentralisation of funds and decision 
making to provinces and districts. Although still at the somewhat broad provincial level, 
which can contain strong variation in district government performance, Hill et al. find some 
indication that income growth in Indonesia was relatively strong and stable over this thirty 
year period. They also find that those provinces situated on the islands of Kalimantan and 
Sumatra were consistently among the richest (proxied by per capita GRDP) and their relative 
standing remained unchanged between 1999 and 2011. 
The first econometric analysis of the resource curse in Indonesia was conducted by 
Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006). These authors use about 300 districts that existed in 
2001. Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana consider the effects of four measures of natural 
resource rents, measured using district-level resource revenues: (i) forestry revenue; (ii) 
mining revenue (land rents and royalties from coal and other minerals); (iii) oil and gas 
revenue; and (iv) total resource revenues (total rent). They find that while total revenue (from 
all natural resources) has no significant impact on regional economic growth, mining sector 
revenues are negatively associated with economic growth on average. However, 
Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana’s study is based on a single year cross section analysis, in 
the earliest period of decentralisation when many districts had not long been receiving 
resource funds.   
Edwards (2016a) offers more recent evidence regarding Indonesia’s natural resources, 
albeit not exactly as a resource curse investigation (i.e. not using per capita GDP levels or 
growth as a dependent variable). Instead, Edwards performs cross-section analysis of more 
 
19 Aragón, Chuhan-Pole and Land (2015) explain that fiscal decentralisation arrangements provide policies 
to answer three questions: (1) who should collect revenues (local, regional, or national governments)?; (2) 




than 430 local districts in Indonesia in 2009, looking at the effect of mining dependence, 
(proxied using all types of non-renewable resource output over total output at the district 
level), on various important development indicators. Interestingly when using mining share 
in GRDP (in log form), Edwards concludes that mining dependence may significantly reduce 
household human capital investment (measured using education and health expenditures). 
Mining dependence may also reduce education and health outcomes, which are proxied using 
senior secondary school enrollment, senior test scores, and births attended by a skilled health 
worker, respectively.  However, Edwards does not use instrumental variables to address 
potential endogeneity in his resource dependence measure. 
Edwards’ findings may provide initial evidence of a resource curse within Indonesia. 
However, similar to Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana, Edwards’ analysis covers a single year 
(2009), and focuses only on social development indicators (health and education). 
Conversely, Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana’s study has the advantage of considering 
economic performance as a dependent variable, but their study does not follow districts over 
the period when decentralisation of revenues to districts and political decentralisation to local 
citizens were fully implemented. To sum up, there is as yet no clear evidence regarding 
whether heavy reliance upon resources consitutes a blessing or curse for Indonesia. 
The study closest to my own investigation is by Cust and Rusli (2016). Cust and Rusli 
examine the effects of oil and gas dependence on levels or growth in Indonesian district 
GRDP per capita between 1999 and 2009. Cust and Rusli also address the potential 
endogeneity of their oil and gas dependence variable by using the instrument of physical 
offshore oil production (within 0 – 4 miles of the coastline). Taking this more comprehensive 
approach, Cust and Rusli find a surprising positive, statistically significant effect of oil and 
gas dependence upon district GRDP using either levels or changes between 1999 and 2009.  
While Cust and Rusli’s study provides the highest quality investigation of the resource 
curse within Indonesia to date, my current investigation contributes on several fronts. First, I 
start my analysis several years later, when district level data reporting capacity had improved 
post-decentralisation, and I extend analysis to more recent years – 2015. Second, I examine 
the effects of coal dependence as well as oil and gas. Third, while repeating Cust and Rusli’s 
use of physical output instruments, I also source other instruments related to historical 
resource abundance – a necessary precondition for resource dependence. 
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2.3 A Glimpse of Indonesia’s Natural Resources  
2.3.1 Historical Natural Resources Exploration and Production 
Indonesia has a very long history of natural resource exploration. Many ventures were 
initiated by Dutch geologists, when the Netherlands colonized Indonesia on behalf of the 
Netherlands East Indies company. The petroleum history of Indonesia began in 1871 when 
Jan Reerink, a Dutch geologist surveyed and drilled at several locations in Tjibodas (now 
Cirebon district) in West Java Province in search of crude oil. Though Reerink eventually 
found oil, Tjibodas failed to provide sufficient quantities of production to be commercialized. 
While Reerink and others made further attempts in some nominated areas, these also were 
unsuccessful in extracting substantial amounts of oil. Nonetheless, these efforts left some 
legacies as a clue to the location of oil deposits in West Java and others islands in Indonesia.20 
In 1911, the well known Dutch company Royal Dutch (also known as Bataafsche 
Petroleum Maatschappij or B.P.M.) found strong evidence of large deposits of crude oil on 
several islands. As a result, Royal Dutch secured roughly 44 concessions of oil fields, spread 
over Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java Islands, which succeeded in producing around 13 million 
barrels. The Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatscappij (N.K.P.M) then began 
exploration in 1912 as a competitor to Royal Dutch, but its concession was limited to 
operating in the Talang Akar area of South Sumatra so that its production was limited. By 
1930, the main fields of oil on Kalimantan Island contributed about 68 per cent of Indonesia 
total oil production. More specifically, East Kalimantan and North-East Kalimantan 
Provinces were the largest contributors by the late 1920’s. 
Caltex, a merger between Nederlandsche Pacific Petroleum Maatschappij (a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil of California) and the Texas Corporation operated in Indonesia 
starting in 1936. Caltex made many succesful explorations and commercialisation of oil 
production. Its exploration was concentrated in the Minas Field of Central Sumatra, and by 
1940 wells there were contributing about 61.5 million barrels annually (Bee, 1982). 
Unfortunately, oil production fluctuated and fell dramatically because of the Second World 
War. Indonesia was targeted by Japan for occupation in large part because of the country’s 
vast deposits of natural resources. Many Dutch concessions were overtaken by the Japanese. 
At the war’s end when Japan surrendered to the United States in August 1945, the young 
Indonesian leader Soekarno took the opportunity to proclaim Indonesia’s independence, 
 
20 The historical perspective here heavily cites from Bee (1982). 
23 
 
though the Dutch government did not acknowledge Indonesia’s proclamation. It failed, 
however, to regain the country using aggression or political negotiation.  
Figure 2.1. Historical Crude Oil Production in Indonesia, 1911-1979 
 
Source: Bee (1982) 
During Soekarno’s rule of Indonesia, the country adapted a policy of nationalisation of 
the oil and gas sector. The Indonesia Oil Company took what had been left by Royal Dutch 
(BPM), Shell, and other companies. Under the Indonesia Oil Company, the rate of production 
rose from 63 million barrels in 1951 to about 177 million barrels by 1965. However, a coup 
attempt by the Communist Party in 1965 destabilized the goverment. Soekarno was accused 
of protecting communist ideology, lost his power, and his old order of government collapsed. 
Major General Soeharto, who had been supported by the Indonesian military, became the new 
leader in 1966, and ruled Indonesia until 1998. While authoritarian, the political situation 
stabilized, and foreign investment was encouraged as a result of a liberalisation policy 
pursued by Soeharto’s cabinet.  
The renamed National Oil Company (PERTAMINA) attracted many foreign oil 
companies to join under “production sharing contracts” to explore and produce crude oil. This 
strategy was chosen both to share the cost of exploration, and to gain from foreign companies 
their capital and experience with advanced technology.  As a result, many oil discoveries took 
place beginning in 1968, and resulted in several offshore oil fields, such as Cinta (North-West 
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Java) and Attakka (East Kalimantan), along with the onshore Minas field in Central Sumatra. 
Crude oil production thus increased sharply in Indonesia between 1960-1980 (see Figure 2.1). 
While less prominent than oil, natural gas extraction also climbed rapidly in Indonesia, 
starting in 1976. The Arun and Badak fields in the Aceh Utara and Kutai districts, contributed 
to commercializing Indonesia’s natural gas production for export across the world (Bee, 
1982). 
While crude oil has been the dominant non-renewable resource exploited in Indonesia, 
coal mining also has a long history. Initially, in the 1850’s, geologists of the Dutch colonial 
government struggled to find coal abundant areas, with little attention paid thereafter. But 
after Soeharto ruled, coal exploration expanded quickly in the late 1970’s, driven by the 
falling price of oil. Following this momentum, an important coal deposit was found in South 
Sumatra Basin (in the Tanjung Enim and West Banko districts) between 1973-1980, under 
the supervision of the state owned mining company PN Tambang Batu Bara.21 Following 
this discovery, a golden period of coal extraction began between 1981-1988. This accelerated 
after the Indonesian government again invited several foreign companies who had 
successfully found the deposit, to sign a mining contract known as the first generation of Coal 
Contracts of Work (CCoW). Much of the country’s subsequent coal production was sourced 
from these locations. In particular, those contracts signed between 1981 and 1990 contributed 
more than 50 per cent of total coal output in 2015. All contracts were located on Kalimantan 
Island (in East and South Kalimantan Provinces) and in West Sumatra Provinces ((Leeuwen 
(1994) and Friederich and Leeuwen (2017)).22 
Moving to the more recent development of Indonesia’s natural resources, Figure 2.2 
shows the production of all types of natural resources in Indonesia over the 1973-2012 period. 
As shown, oil and coal have comprised more than 60 per cent of total natural resource 
production in Indonesia. Crude oil, as already indicated, has been a major contributor to 
Indonesia’s resource economy from the 1970’s to the 2000’s but it subsequently experienced 
a slight decline relative to coal following the rising world price of coal. As a result, oil remains 
the largest contributor to mining production in Indonesia, but coal production has risen 
dramatically to become the second largest resource contributor. Curiously, even though 
 
21  These historical locations of oil, gas and coal in Indonesia have become the main areas of mineral 
extraction up to the present time. Kalimantan and Sumatra are the main locations. 
22 There were eleven foreign companies under contract with the Indonesia government under PN Tambang: 
Arutmin, Utah Indonesia, Agip, Kaltim Prima Cola, Adaro, Kideco, Berau, Chung Hua, Allied Indo Coal, 
Multi Harapan Utama, Tanito Harum, and Indominco Mandiri (Friederich and Leeuwen, 2017). 
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natural gas has been extracted since 1976, its production has remained below 100 Mtoe over 
the 1976-2012 period. Growth in natural gas extraction has thus been very slow. 
Figure 2.2. Energy production by source, 1973-2012 
 
Source: IEA, Indonesia Energy Policies (2015, p.21.) 
(https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Indonesia_IDR.pdf)  
 
Most recently, however, the production of natural gas has increased rapidly after the 
Indonesia government in 2009 launched a conversion program from kerosene to LPG 
(Liquified Petroleum Gas). Finally, the remaining types of resources aside from oil, gas and 
coal have not contributed very much.  
While the production of crude oil has been large on average (as shown in Figure 2.3), 
annual production and exports rose from 1973-1976, cycled and then declined in a second 
phase from the mid 1990’s to 2012. Production peaked about 80 Mtoe (one million tonnes of 
oil equivalent) in 1994, before declining subsequently. This decline has been attributed to an 
excess global supply of crude oil, and a weakening demand for crude oil within European and 
Asian countries. Another factor has been the rise in LPG use, and to a lesser extent, attempts 
to develop non-carbon energy sources such as biofuels, geothermal, and hydro. 
Export trends followed those in production, with a more pronounced decline since 
1976, accompanied by an increase in the level of oil imports. Indeed imports reached the level 
of exports from 2003 to 2012.  
In contrast to oil, a rapid expansion of coal production occured in 1989 and continued 
until 2013 before appearing to go down slightly in 2014 and 2015 (see Figure 2.4). This rapid  
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Figure 2.3. Production of crude oil in Indonesia, with export and import trend information, 
1973-2012 
 
Notes: Mtoe = million tonnes of oil-equivalent, Source: IEA, Indonesia Energy Policies 
(2015, p.56.) 
 
Figure 2.4. Production of coal  in Indonesia, 1981-2016 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
 
expansion has been driven by the high global demand for coal in China, India, and in some 
parts of Europe. As explained in Section 2.3, coal deposits were concentrated mostly in 
Kalimantan and Sumatra Islands where now East Kalimantan and South Sumatra Provinces 
have become the largest extraction areas. The major coal companies have operated in these 
areas for more than 25 years.  
While natural gas was developed in the same period in which oil extraction expanded 
and commercialized, its production remained stable over time. As shown in Figure 2.5, the 
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of about 3.1 TSCF, before decreasing slightly between 2011 and 2018. According to the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, with only those natural gas reserves already 
identified (142.72 TSCF), current natural gas extraction levels will still be feasible 49 years 
from now.  
Figure 2.5. Production of natural gas  in Indonesia, 2007 - 2018 
 
Notes: unit is MMSCF (Million Standard Cubit Feet) 
Source: Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics of Indonesia, 2007 - 2018 
 
2.3.2 World Energy Prices 
One could reasonably argue that the effect of a district’s resource dependence on its 
economic growth might depend on exogenous movements in world prices for oil, coal and 
gas during the period being studied.  I thus present world energy prices in United States 
dollars for the years surrounding and including my study period: 1990 – 2017. I convert 
nominal world prices to real prices using the United States’ Consumer Price Index. Of 
particular interest is whether the years of my study (2005 to 2015), which already coincide 
with the years of fully implemented decentralisation, are also years of atypically rising or 
falling prices. 
Figure 2.6 presents the real prices movements of these three categories. Beginning with 
oil, it is clear from the Figure that there has not been a steady upward or downward trend in 
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ending US$5.85/barrel lower in 2015 than in 2005.  Nevertheless, relative to the 1990-2004 
period, there has been an upward trend in the average price for crude oil.    
Moving to coal, the pattern of price movements has been similar to that of crude oil, 
though more pronounced.  In particular, coal’s repeated price rise and fall between 2005 and 
2015 has been more pronounced that that for oil, while its longer term rise relative to the 
1990-2004 period has also been greater than that for oil. Coal prices on world markets have 
been heavily influenced by China’s demand. As China has gradually committed to reducing 
carbon coal consumption, this has affected global coal prices.  Finally, in contrast to crude 
oil and coal prices, world natural gas prices have remained relatively low and stable over the 
wider period considered, though still slightly higher in 2005 – 2015 relative to 1990 – 2004. 
Figure 2.6. Real World Energy Prices, 1990-2017 
 
Notes: World oil prices are based on spot crude prices (i.e. Brent and West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI)), while prices for coal are averaged from the Nortwest Europe marker price and China 
Qinhuangdao spot price. All prices are deflated by the US Consumer Price Index. Source of data: 






From the price movements of Figure 2.6 we may conclude first that our period of study 
contains both substantial price rises and falls, but second that it contains prices that were 
higher on average than those in the preceding 15 year period.  This suggests the importance 
of including a control for time trends in subsequent analysis. 
2.4 Overview of the Natural Resource Policy Before and After the 
Decentralisation Period 
Indonesia is the third most populous country in the world after China and India. In 
Southeast Asia, according to data from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)23, Indonesia is the largest in terms of total land area (1,913,579 square kilometres), 
total population (255,461,700) and gross domestic product (more than 800 US$ million).  
Decentralisation began in Indonesia in 1999, when the autonomy law (Law 21/1999) 
was implemented. Most districts applied by 2001 to be both responsible for public service 
delivery for their local citizens, and to receive enabling financing from the central 
government.24 Outside some more developed districts on Java Island, many districts 
previously had limited local taxation capacity. Thus, natural resource income became a 
fundamental source of finance for their spending (Aden (2001)).  
Long before decentralisation was implemented, Indonesia’s main constitution (Law 
1945) adopted a nationalistic and anti-liberalisation ideology. With regards to natural 
resources management, Article 33 states that: “The earth and water and the natural resources 
contained within them are to be controlled by the state and used for the greatest possible 
prosperity of the people.” However, the new order, under the Soeharto government was far 
more permissive in welcoming foreign investment, particularly in the extractive sector, and 
based upon “production sharing contracts”. The Indonesian government assumed that these 
“partnerships” would be mutually beneficial.  
Realizing that Indonesia was a large, diverse archipelago country, new government 
orders under Soeharto (Law 5/1974) sought to minimize the frictions within or between 
districts and to advance the country’s development. Thus under Law 5/1974 the central 
 
23 Key Selected Indicators data base as announced in August 2016 
24 In 1999, the Indonesian central government initially announced Law 25/1999 regarding revenue sharing 
with districts from natural resources (oil, natural gas, coal and other minerals, forestry, fisheries resources 
management). Revenues were first to be collected by the central government and then re-distributed to the 
local level governments. But the initial regulation was incomplete, and a revised Law 33/2004 was 
substituted for the previous law. 
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government fully retained all administrative, political, and fiscal duties, reinforcing 
Soeharto’s authoritarian style of leadership. As explained in the previous section, this 
relationship changed rapidly in 1999 due to widespread demands for reformation. These 
changes produced laws that specified how revenue was to be shared, including natural 
resource revenues.  
In essence, under the revised Law 33/2004, revenues from oil and gas wells are 
allocated to the district in which the wellhead has produced oil and gas (defined as ‘lifting’). 
If the wellhead is situated on the district’s land it is labelled as an onshore location; if it is 
offshore, the nearest distance to the coastline determines the district to which the revenue is 
allocated. If the distance ranges up to 4 miles, the nearest district has the right to the revenue. 
If the distance ranges between 4 – 12 miles, the provincial government receives the revenue, 
while if the distance exceeds 12 miles, the central government retains the revenue. The 
formula to calculate resource revenues is determined by the realisation of production (lifting) 
of oil and gas.  
Thus, oil and natural gas lifting determines how much revenue districts obtain every 
year from these resources. In contrast, for coal and other minerals, revenues are calculated 
based upon the total district area in which coal companies have a license to operate, as well 
as by production volumes and the sales price. These variables are used to formulate Land 
rents and royalties as a reference to calculate coal and mineral resource revenue. Whereas 
land rents are fixed, royalties are paid by the company per unit of production. They can be 
written as follows: 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 
𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 ×  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  
In summary, the allocation of resource revenues to districts follows strict percentage 
proportions managed by the Ministry of Finance based upon Law 33/2004. Under these rules, 
more resource productive districts receive a larger portion of revenues. Table 2.1 summarises 
the rules for the allocation of revenues from natural resources.  Meanwhile, resource-poor or 
resource-absent districts still receive a windfall, but a much smaller portion. Note that, 
because of transfer rules between the central and provincial governments, those districts 
situated within the same province as resource-rich districts may receive higher transfers than 
similar districts in other provinces without such neighbours. At the extreme, if no resource-
rich district exists within a province, a district within it will receive no resource windfall. 
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Table 2.1. Percentage of Point Source Natural Resources Revenue Sharing Allocation 
No Type of Natural 
Resources 










1 Oil 85 15*      or          15* 
2 Natural gas 70  30*      or          30* 
3 Coal and other minerals 
(Land rents)  
20 16 64 
4 Coal and other minerals 
(Royalties) 
20 16 32 
 
Source: DJPK Depkeu, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia (Type of natural resources is 
restricted only for “point-source” resources type).  
*For oil wells 4-12 miles offshore where the 15% is allocated to the province, 5% ultimately goes to 
the province, and 10% to all districts within that province. For oil wells less than 4 miles offshore, 
where the 15% is allocated to districts, 3% ultimately goes to their corresponding province, while 12% 
goes to the district nearest the extraction. For natural gas wells 4-12 miles offshore where the 30% is 
allocated to the province, 10% ultimately goes to the province and 20% to all districts within the 
province. For gas wells less than 4 miles offshore, where the 30% is allocated to the district, 6% 
ultimately goes to their corresponding province, while 24% goes to the district nearest the extraction. 
 
It is important to note that the Indonesian central government makes other grants to 
districts that may have the effect of partially offsetting district resource windfalls.25  In 
particular, the central government also transfers annual development grants for all provinces 
and districts, quite apart from whether they are resource-rich or not. This transfer, called “the 
general allocation fund” or DAU, accounts for at least 25% of the national budget each year. 
Given the limited capability of local governments to generate own-source revenues, the DAU 
has been a significant source of income to run local government programmes, particularly for 
under-developed, geographically isolated, or resource poor districts.26 
Although DAU funding may lessen the disparity of total revenues available to resource 
rich and poor districts, it likely remains the case that resource-extracting districts retain on 
average a revenue advantage over their non-extracting counterparts. To shed light on this, I 
plot each district’s total local government budget per capita in logs (REV_PERCAP), vs. its 
 
25 In all, district revenue types under decentralisation consist of (1) own-source revenue (2) shared taxes; 
(3) shared natural resource revenue; (4) DAU; (5) DAK/Special Purpose Grants. 
26 Based on the Ministry of Finance’s formulation, DAU funding is substantially influenced by the number 
of people in poverty, suggesting that poorer districts are likely to receive higher DAU transfers.   
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share of mining revenues from oil, gas, coal and minerals (MINREV) in district government 
total budget, both in 2006 and in 2015.  Figures 2.7 appears to show a weak positive 
relationship between the variables involved.  
Figure 2.7. Total Revenue Per Capita and Mining Revenues, 2006 and 2015 
 
 
































2.5 Data and Empirical Estimation Strategy 
2.5.1 Scope of Analysis 
Indonesia has been repeatedly included among samples of resource-rich economies in 
cross-country regression analysis. However, little comprehensive analysis has been 
conducted within the country. This is particularly true in the era following Indonesia’s 
“decentralisation” of powers to provincial and district levels. This study therefore limits its 
scope to within Indonesia analysis, following rural districts and urban municipalities over 
time in the period following decentralisation. Using districts rather than provinces is relevant 
as Indonesian provinces do not have much administrative authority beyond their role in 
distributing resources upwards to the central government, or downwards to district. 
Indonesia commenced its decentralisation in 2001, and as of 2015 comprised more than 
480 districts and municipalities. As explained in Section 2.4, each district obtains and 
manages revenues generated from resource extraction from the central government based on 
the proportions stated in Law No. 33/2004. As mentioned, these regulations generally tie 
distribution to the proportion of resources extracted from each district, so that revenues 
partially return to the districts where extraction took place. Since 2005, local citizens in each 
district have also started to elect their regional leaders, both for executive and legislative 
positions. As a result, districts are quite homogenous in terms of administrative and political 
processes, and in terms of regulatory background.  
2.5.2 Data 
Before describing the data and empirical estimation strategy applied in this study, it is 
necessary to distinguish two types of natural resource concepts used in this study: “resource 
dependence” and "resource abundance". I mainly focus on the effects of dependence for two 
reasons. First, abundance measures, such as estimations of oil and coal deposits, are not 
generally available at the district level, and certainly not over time as required for panel 
regression. Abundance measures are available at the provincial level, for some years, but this 
seems too coarse for within-country analysis for the number of years for which data is 
available. By contrast, measures of resource dependence based on economic output can be 
readily constructed at district level. Second, I focus on resource dependence because previous 
cross-country empirical studies have tended to use such measures, in particular the ratio of 
resource exports to total GNP or GDP. However, export data at the district level is not 
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available, because records of export values are generally held on behalf of the port from which 
goods are sent overseas, and not the district of product origin.  
Instead, I use a measure of mining dependence (which includes coal, oil, gas, and all 
minerals, including quarrying) similar to what has been employed by within-country papers 
such as Douglas and Walker (2016) or the closely relevant Indonesian study by Edwards 
(2016). Edwards employs mining and quarrying’s share of total GRDP for each district in 
Indonesia using cross-sectional data, in 2009. I also use this measure for mining resource 
dependence in Indonesia, for the years 2005 to 2015.27 
Some within-country studies have instead tried to capture resource dependence using 
resource revenues that flow to local governments as royalties, particularly in cases where 
central governments transfer large portions of revenues sourced from extraction activities 
back to producing regions. Since this is also the case for Indonesia, I employ additional 
measures of resource dependence, namely mining revenues (MINREV) defined as total 
revenues from oil (including natural gas) and coal mining that each district government 
receives, as a proportion of its revenues from all sources. I also decompose this alternative 
measure to separate the combined effect of oil and gas from coal revenue dependence, 
respectively. These data are obtained from several reliable publications by the the Ministry 
of Finance and the Audit Investigation Board (BPK) of the Republic of Indonesia from 2005 
to 2015.28 
Aside from resource revenue dependence measures, most of the data required for this 
study come from the “Indonesia Data for Policy and Economic Research” or INDODAPOER 
data base published by the World Bank.29 INDODAPOER is a multipurpose dataset providing 
more than 300 indicators and currently covers the period from 1976 to 2013 at the district 
 
27 More specifically, ‘mining’ is defined as an economic activity to extract and prepare for further 
processing minerals in solid, liquid or gas form. Products include crude oil and natural gas, coal, iron sand, 
tin concentrate, nickel ore, bauxite, copper concentrate, gold, silver, and manganese. Quarrying, in contrast, 
is an economic activity that covers extraction of all quarried commodities. These include chemical 
elements, and mineral and rock sediment below the ground (excluding metal, coal, petroleum, natural gas 
and radioactive elements). Quarrying commodities include stone, limestone, marble, sand, quartz sand, 
kaolin, and clay. For a more detailed explanation, see: 
https://www.bps.go.id/Subjek/view/id/10#subjekViewTab1  
28 The BPK publications can be downloaded using this link: http://www.bpk.go.id/lkpp , while the data 
from the Ministry of Finance can be accessed by opening the link: 
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/?page_id=307  
29 The datasets can be downloaded using: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/indonesia-database-for-
policy-and-economic-research.   
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level.30 INDODAPOER itself gathers information from official government sources, such as 
Susenas (the National Economic Survey, Republic of Indonesia), from the Indonesia 
Statistical National Agency (BPS), and from the Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately, most 
district level observations are missing for most variables prior to decentralisation (1976-
2003). Fewer district level observations are missing from 2003 to 2005, and virtually none 
thereafter. To populate missing observations from 2003 onward, I use the statistical yearbook 
published by the BPS.31 The list of variables and their definitions is presented in Appendix 
2.1. 
Ultimately, I elected to restrict the years of analysis to between 2005 and 2015. I 
excluded 2003 and 2004 because prior to 2005 there is evidence of some unevenness in the 
quality of the district level data, due to the political transition to downward democratisation 
under the decentralisation framework established between 1999 and 2003.32 There were also 
some revisions to the fiscal mechanism for revenue sharing for Law 22/1999 concerning 
regional governments and Law 25/1999 concerning revenue sharing made in 2004 under Law 
33/2004. The modifications of this law were announced in 2004, and effectively implemented 
in 2005. Thus, only by 2005 were both elections and revenue sharing effectively implemented 
by all districts.33 
When I try to follow Indonesia’s districts over time, an obstacle arises due to a rapid 
increase in the number of districts after 2005 caused by a “proliferation” policy. As discussed 
in Section 2.4, Indonesia’s central government decentralised their authority to provinces and 
districts. This was predicated on the view that it is good to make local government closer to 
the people in order to spur improvements in public service delivery. This policy resulted in 
the number of districts rising from around 370 in 2003 to more than 500 by 2015. To facilitate 
longitudinal analysis,  I merge “children” districts back into their “parent districts” using the 
annual population of each child to create weighted averages. Since most districts existing in 
 
30 I define districts to include rural districts (kabupaten) and urban districts (kota/municipalities). 
31 This can be freely downloaded from https://bps.go.id/index.php/Publikasi . 
32 Initially, the “big bang” reform of 1999, and approval of Indonesia regional autonomy began in 2001, 
followed by presidential approval of elections. However, there were challenges to implementation over the 
first five years as debate escalated over revenue sharing turns, and delays in the implementation of local 
political elections at the district level. 




2015 were identifiable from parent districts in 2003, I have chosen this year as a benchmark 
when aggregating districts back to their earlier forms. 
More specifically, I begin with the number of districts in 2015 (including the older and 
the newer districts). From this complete list, I merge the new districts back to their parent 
districts  down to the districts existing in the year 2003.34 This results in 390 consolidated 
districts in 2015, down from 512. While this procedure loses observations for later years, it 
ensures that no district values are missing during the period 2005-2015, creating a balanced 
panel. 
2.5.3 Estimation Strategy 
I use three regression forms to estimate the effects of resource dependence on output: 
a panel fixed-effects regression following districts in Indonesia, a first-difference regression, 
and a first-difference regression with instruments to mitigate the potential endogeneity of my 
resource dependence measures.  
2.5.3.1 Model 1: Fixed Effects Estimator 
By effectively including a dummy variable for each district, fixed effects models 
consider the influence of stable but unobserved district characteristics that could be 
influencing output (Wooldridge, 2016). With 390 districts followed over 11 years, my data 
are relatively large in the cross section dimension, 𝑁, but small in the time-series dimension, 
𝑇, or a “shallow” panel.  
The Fixed Effects (henceforth FE) approach controls for variations across districts (i.e. 
the average of variables between districts) (Wooldridge, 2016). More formally, if the panel 
regression model is written as: 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑡, the time-average of each variable can 
then be written as:  𝑌?̅? = 𝛼𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖𝛽. If we substract the latter equation in means from the former 
equation, we get: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑌?̅? = (𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋?̅?)𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑡. As this difference illustrates, fixed effects 
eliminates the district specific effects 𝛼𝑖 caused by unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
between districts.   
For FE estimation, I use the following model: 
 
34 The 2003 list of districts comes from the Ministry of Home Affairs. I excluded the regions of Jakarta 
(Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, East Jakarta, South Jakarta, Kepulauan Seribu) and Tanjung Pinang district. 
Jakarta is excluded because it is not defined as a district under decentralisation law. The final district is 
omitted because of lack of data availability over time. 
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 𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  𝛽 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ......................... (1) 
 
Here GRDP is per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product (real prices in 2000) of 
district 𝑖 at time 𝑡, where 𝑖 = (1, ..., 390), and time 𝑡 = (2005,….,2015). The natural log of 
GRDP is used following standard growth models, and is useful for mitigating problems such 
as potential skewness or non-stationarity that often occurs in annual income panel data that 
increases over time (Wooldridge, 2016). For example, the log of real GRDP is used in 
resource curse studies by Al Mamun, et al. (2017), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012), Sarmidi, et al. 
(2014), and Cust and Rusli (2014, 2016). A final benefit of using logs is that the resulting 
coefficients on control variables can be easily interpreted as elasticities (if in double-log 
form). Note that my dependent variable is in levels, which differs from Sachs and Warner, 
who used average or change in GDP. Note that FE may solve the problem of unobserved 
district characteristics that affect output, but that it alone does not address potential 
endogeneity of resource dependence measures. I address this issue subsequently. 35 
To address unobserved heterogeneity, I include 𝑁 − 1 district fixed effects represented 
in (1) by 𝜇𝑖. I also apply year dummies, 𝛿𝑡, to control for any shock events common to all 
districts at a point in time, such as the changes in world commodity prices mentioned 
previously, business cycle fluctuations, or economic crises. The error term, 𝑖𝑡 is assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). With year dummies also included, the 
coefficient on my resource dependence measure will capture the effect of the variation around 
a district’s own average level, but not any effect of differences in average resource 
dependence across districts. 
My key independent variable in (1) is 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡, the measure of natural resource 
dependence. As discussed in Section 2.5.2., I try several alternative proxies for this 
dependence. First, I use the share of overall real mining output in total district real GRDP  
(MINDEP). A similar measure has been used by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) in the case of 
the United States, and by Edwards (2016a,b) in the case of Indonesia. Second, I use the share 
of the district government’s revenues that come from overall mining, or oil and gas alone, or 
coal alone. This approach follows recent sub-national investigations of the effects of resource 
windfalls associated with resource extraction. For example, resource revenues are transferred 
 
35 Lederman and Maloney (2008) update Sachs and Warner’s seminal work by applying panel data fixed 
effects. This approach is also followed by Manzano and Rigobon (2001). 
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on the basis of “producer origin” under decentralisation in Brazil. I thus follow an approach 
inspired by Casselli and Michaels (2013), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012), and Cust and Rusli (2014, 
2016).36 These measures are respectively labelled as the share of combined oil, gas and coal 
mining revenues over total district budget revenues (including from offshore and onshore 
operations) (MINREV), the share of oil and gas revenues over total revenues (OILGASREV), 
and the share of coal revenues over all revenues (COALREV).  
Finally in (1), 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a matrix comprising other determinants of GRDP per capita, such 
as the total number of annual earthquake events at the district level, the labour force 
participation rate, and the proportion of households with access to electricity. The latter two 
variables range from 0-1. Some standard growth variables from cross-country studies, such 
as openness to trade (export activities) are unfortunately not available within country. 
Similarly, a variable proxying for private investment is not available at the district level. 
Positively, government capital expenditures at the district level are available, but will be used 
in subsequent analysis exploring the the causal channels of resource effects. 
Edwards (2016a) argues that mining value-added (i.e. the share of GRDP approach) 
can be the best practical measure of resource dependence because it captures direct impact. 
However government revenues from natural resources are also relevant since many rich 
resource economies re-distribute resource revenues across their counties. It is widely thought 
that the extent to which countries avoid the resource curse is related to how well they manage 
revenues generated from resource extraction, and invest it for the benefit of the wider 
population. 
2.5.3.2 Model 2: First-Difference Equation 
My second model follows growth research because it allows explanatory variables to 
have long term effects on either GDP or change in GDP as explained in Barro (1991). To test 
the impact of the change in resource dependence on the change in income per capita, similar 
to FE for 2 periods, I use first-difference or FD models to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in districts that affects growth (Wooldridge, 2016).37 Here I take a year 
 
36 Komarulzaman & Alisjahbana (2006) and Loayza & Rigolini (2016) also use a similar measure of 
resource dependence. Cust & Poelhekke (2015) discuss the importance of observing the effects of revenue 
based on natural resources under fiscally decentralised systems. 
37 FD models in resource impact analysis have been used by Weber (2014), Fleming, Measham and Paredes 
(2015), Lee (2015), Weinstein, and Partridge and Tsvetkova (2018). Fleming et al. (2015) for example 
regress ΔLn(Income) = f(ΔlnMiningEmployment, X’s) using 2001 and 2011 as the year interval. FD can 
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difference, 𝑡2015 − 𝑡2006. I retain my earliest available year of 2005 as a baseline year to 
control for differing initial conditions between districts that can affect their subsequent 
growth. Controlling for initial GRDP is suggested and commonly implemented in previous 
resource curse studies (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Douglas and Walker, 2016; Edwards, 
2016a). 
To see the equivalence between two period fixed effects and first difference models, I 
follow Wooldridge (2016) and take the difference of panel data across two years, 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. 
Specifically, the first-difference regression can be derived as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑡       (2) 
𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛾(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑡−1   .  (3) 
Subtracting (3) from (2), we get the first difference form:  
𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛽(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝛾(𝑡 − (𝑡 − 1)) + ( 𝑡 − 𝑡−1)  (4) . 
We can also write this as: 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽𝛥𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾 + 𝛥 𝑡     ,  (5) 
where 𝛾 is the time trend and 𝛽 is the coefficient that has the same meaning as in the 
original levels model. 
Wooldridge cautions that first-difference models can result in large standard errors 
when estimated using OLS. It is important therefore to use a large cross section, or sufficiently 
long differences in time (Wooldridge, 2016). Here, I use the longest possible change of 9 
years for my first-difference model. However, the downside of this strategy is that it reduces 
the sample size to effectively that of a single year cross-section model. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, the first difference model has the advantage of being widely used in the resource 
curse literature, and of being a good “bridging” model for attempts to deal with potential 
endogeneity of resource dependence measures using cross sectional instruments. 
 Applied here my first difference model is:  
 ∆𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖) = 𝛾 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜎 +  ∆ 𝑖𝑡 ......................... (6) 
 
capture the cummulative effects of resource dependence throughout the interval concerned while still 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.  
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Here ∆𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,2015) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,2006) measures longer term changes 
in the log of GRDP per capita. The change in GRDP measure follows the growth measure 
used by Douglas & Walker (2016), Walker (2013), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004, 2007), 
James and James (2011), and James and Aadland (2011) in within-country studies for the 
United States.38 The explanatory variable, ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 , is the change in the level of resource 
dependence in district i, while 𝛾 is the time trend.39 The ∆𝑋′𝑖 stands for a set of control 
variables including changes in labour force participation rate, initial level of population in 
2005 (in logs) and the total number of earthquake events over the last 10 years. Initial 
population is included as a control to test for potential pro-growth effects of economies of 
scale. Some additional level dummies are included to capture whether districts are urban (a 
municipality) (DURBAN), and located on Java Island (DJAVA). By including these controls, 
which would have washed out of annual FE, I can control for the differences between regions 
of Indonesia. Historically, Indonesian investment and infrastructure development has not 
been broad based, but more concentrated in Java.   
As commonly used in growth models and resource curse studies, I also control for the 
log of initial GRDP per capita in 2005. In a first difference setting, this variable tests for 
convergence in GRDP between districts as suggested in traditional growth theory (Barro 
(1991) and Temple (1999)). A negative coefficient on baseline GRDP would be interpreted 
as evidence that poorer districts have subsequently had higher growth rates between 2006-
2015, catching up to richer districts.  
2.5.3.3 Model 3: First-Difference with Instrumental Variables (IV) 
Several key resource curse papers criticize the commonly used measures of resource 
dependence as being very likely to suffer from endogeneity. As it is commonly measured as 
a ratio, where the denominator captures all economic activities (GDP or GNP) similar to the 
dependent variable, this measure may not be sufficiently independent, and thus can not be 
assumed exogenous.  One way to address potential endogeneity is to find valid instruments 
 
38
 Douglas and Walker (2016) and Walker (2013) measure the difference in log per capita income over 10 
year periods as: 𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = (
1
10
) (𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡,2015 − 𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡,2005). Other authors mentioned above use 








39 As an alternative, I try regressing the change in per capita income on the level of resource dependence in 
2006 and the other determinants as above. The findings are reported in Appendix 2.2. As this model does 
not control for unobserved factors that are a major concern in the resource curse literature, the FD model 
in equation (6) will be my main specification. 
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for resource dependence. In my first difference model, I treat the ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  variable as potentially 
endogenous, and seek a suitable instrument for it. I do not use an instrument in my annual 
panel model because my main instrument is time invariant.40   
Theoretically, a valid instrument must be correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor in the first-stage regression, and must not be correlated with the error term. In 
sourcing potential instruments, I follow the strategies of Edwards (2016a) in an international 
cross-country context, Caselli and Michaels (2013) in the case of Brazil, and Cust and Rusli 
(2016) in Indonesia. These authors all use an instrument of past resource abundance, and this 
strategy fits well with the nature of the resource dependence measure that I use in this 
analysis.  
In particular, Edwards has instrumented the ratio of mining to total GDP in 2005 with 
international estimated fuel reserves in 1971 when using his international dataset.41 Similarly, 
Caselli and Michaels instrument for government oil revenues (at municipality level) using oil 
output in Brazil, while Cust and Rusli use past offshore oil and gas production in Indonesia. 
All of these approaches seem likely to generate instruments that are correlated with 
subsequent resource dependence, because abundance is a logical pre-condition needed for 
production and dependence on resources. Cust and Rusli specifically use a change form for 
their instruments (the change in physical offshore oil and gas production between 1999 and 
2009) for Indonesia. However, their concern is with the effects of oil and gas, not coal mining. 
It is important to capture coal mining because this resource in particular experienced a boom 
in Indonesia in the early 2000’s. 
Following Edwards, Caselli and Michael, and Cust and Rusli, in my third model, I 
instrument for ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  using each district’s historical level of resource abundance, 𝑅𝐴1970𝑠 . I 
try both continous and binary versions of abundance levels based on merging historical maps 
of natural resources in Indonesia with district level maps as of 2003. For the binary instrument 
versions, I classify districts as “oil/gas abundant” if they had at least one proven major field 
as of the 1970’s, and as “coal abundant” if at least 20 per cent of the district was covered by 
“first contract” agreements with coal companies as of the 1980’s. For the continous 
 
40 I do not pursue using the lag of the dependent variable in annual panel models (known as a dynamic 
panel model using System GMM). I do not use this method because it may introduce a bias, which could 
lead to wrong inference under the null hypothesis significance test (Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky, 2015). 
41 Edwards also regresses mining contribution on various development indicators at district level in 
Indonesia in 2009. However Edwards does not apply instrumental variables. 
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instrument versions, for oil and gas I use the number of major or minor oil and gas fields in 
the 1970’s.42 For coal I divide coal deposit areas by total district areas according to first 
generation coal agreement contracts in the 1980’s as shown in an original map by Leeuwen 
(1994) and Frederich and Leeuwen (2017). See Table 2.2 for a summary of these instruments. 
My historical abundance level instruments are produced using original historical maps 
released by Bee (1982), Leeuwen (1994) and Friederich & Leeuwen (2017). ArcGIS software 
was used to match geographic coordinates of oil/gas fields or coal exploration agreement 
areas according to the Bee, Leeuwen, and Frederich and Leeuwen maps with specific district 
boundaries as of 2003. This matching procedure resulted in new maps as illustrated in 
Appendices 2 and 3 of Hilmawan & Clark (2019). These new maps enable me to exploit 
historical information regarding oil, natural gas, and coal mining abundance as of the 1970’s 
(for oil and gas) or the 1980’s (for coal). By this time, knowledge of resource locations had 
accumulated based in part on exploration efforts by the Dutch when Indonesia was a colony. 
Yet this period also immediately preceeded a “golden era” of natural resource 
commercialisation in Indonesia.43  
While abundance is a logical pre-condition for dependence, the ex ante grounds for 
expecting correlation between change in dependence and levels of abundance seems weaker. 
Consequently, I also try to construct a change form of an instrument. This is difficult to do 
since it requires a reliable measure of resource endowment, deposit or reserve at district level 
over the two years of 2015 and 2006. Since such data is not publicly available from the 
Indonesian government, I follow the approach of Caselli and Michaels (2013) and of Cust 
and Rusli (2016) in using an instrument based on changes in levels of physical oil and gas 
output. Note that physical resource output functions less as a logical pre-requisite for resource 
dependence, than a simultaneous correlate of resource dependence.44 Data on oil and gas 
 
42 For coastal oil fields in particular, I only consider onshore and offshore oil and gas wells, within 4 miles 
from the coastline of the related districts as laid out under Law 33/2004 of the Republic of Indonesia. 
43 One might argue that measurable resource abundance is not actually exogenous to income, since poorer 
regions might invest less in oil, coal or gas exploration. However, as I have described, historical exploration 
in Indonesia was funded centrally either by Dutch geologists, or the Indonesian central government in 
conjunction with multinational corporations.  
44 For comparison, I also try using only historical resource abundance measures as instruments for ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 . 
With fewer instruments, tests for overidentification cannot be run for two of four resource dependence 
measures (OILGASREV or COALREV), and Kleibergen F tests indicate greater weakness.  I find that the 
estimated effects of resource dependence on growth remain very similar to those reported below. In 
particular, the estimated effects of MINDEP, OILGASREV and MINREV remain significant and positive, 
using continuous or binary form-based instrument (see Table 2.2 below for details about instruments). 
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lifting are released by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR).45 These data 
are used as a basis for district revenue redistribution calculations.  With regard to coal 
dependence, I use instead Rupiah measures of land rents summed with royalties as an 
instrument.46 With these change instruments, ∆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖  and ∆𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖  constructed over 9 year 
differences (2015 minus 2006), the first stage regression can be constructed. 
Returning to my third model, the first difference specification can initially be expressed 
as follows: 
 ∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖  𝛽2 + ∆ 𝑖𝑡 
 
(7) 
With instruments constructed, the first and second stage regressions are modelled as 
follows:  
 ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿1𝑅𝐴1970𝑠 + 𝛿2∆𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖 +  𝛿3∆𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝛿4∆𝐶𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖  𝛿5 + ∆ 𝑖𝑡 (8) 
 ∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝜋1∆𝑅?̂?𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜋2 + ∆ 𝑖𝑡                                .                             (9) 
 
Thus I treat the change in resource dependence, ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖, as potentially endogenous and 
use level measures of resource abundance, 𝑅𝐴1970𝑠, and changes in physical resource output, 
as instruments.47 When total resource dependence is considered, using either MINDEP or 
MINREV, I use all instruments together, both in level and in change forms. When resource 
dependence is measured as oil and natural gas separately from coal, however, I use only a 
single abundance instrument associated with the particular type of  dependence. Why might 
such positive correlation occur? In the case of oil and gas, the considerable capital and risk 
bearing needed to ramp up extraction following succesful exploration could lead to a positive 
correlation. In the case of coal, first contracts only reveal the potential for viable coal deposits 
to be found, which would require time to confirm with geological sampling.48 
 
45 In practice, oil and gas lifting data is used under the decentralisation scheme (Law 33/2004), to calculate 
resource revenue sharing across districts. The same rule also applies for coal, using land rent and royalties 
as a basis for coal revenue allocation. 
46 The land rents and royalties rely heavily on coal production. Indonesia formulates land rents as a fixed 
tariff that must be paid by coal producers based on their licenses, whereas they pay royalties per unit of 
output.  
47 To see how the individual instruments perform in both, I also provide first-stage regressions based on 
reduced form models as follows: ∆RD = f(instruments, X variables) and ∆lnGRDP = f(instruments, X 
variables). Results are shown in Appendix 2.3. Reassuringly, instruments have consistent signs and 
significance across the two models. The exceptions are my coal abundance and change in coal output 
instruments. 
48 By looking at the current main locations map of natural resources extraction activities provided by the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, no dramatic shift occured over the 2006-2015 period. Thus, 
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Table 2.2. Instrument Summary 
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Table 2.2 summarises my various instruments, and how they relate to my various 
measures of resource dependence. For all instrumental variables estimation, I use two step 
feasible efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM2S) with robust standard errors 
rather than two stage least squares (2SLS) to address the potential presence of 
heteroskedasticity and produce more efficient estimates.49 I then perform diagnostic tests of 
whether my instruments are sufficiently correlated with resource dependence and sufficiently 
 
there is no way for district governments to experience resource windfalls in 2015 without having 
successfully proven deposits, 30-40 years before. 
49 I use the ivreg2 command in the STATA module developed by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007). 
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uncorrelated with the error term (instrument “exogeneity”). Correlation or relevance can be 
checked using the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics for the first stage regressions, or the Cragg-
Donald Wald (if error terms are assumed to be identically and independently distributed) 
(Schaffer, Baum and Stillman, 2003; Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). I use an F statistic 
> 10 as a rule of thumb following Wooldridge (2016, p.478) to verify instrument strength.50 
Instrument exogeneity will be examined using overidentification tests such as Hansen’s J-
statistic.51 Overidentifications tests require the number of instruments to exceed the number 
of suspected endogenous regressors. 
2.6 Empirical Results 
Summary statistics for annual panel and first-differenced data are shown in Tables 2.3 
and 1.4, respectively.  My dataset uses 4,290 observations for 390 districts for annual panel 
specifications and 390 district changes in first-difference models. In annual FE, the average 
real GRDP per capita (in logs) is 4.13 and the standard deviation is 0.690. The mean share of 
mining GRDP in total GRDP is about 9.0 per cent, while the share of mining revenue over 
all district government revenues is about 5.3 per cent. 
Figure 2.8 presents a scatterplot of the correlation between real GRDP per capita and 
mining dependence (MINDEP) as measured by the share of mining over total GRDP. Both 
variables are an average value for the 11 observations between 2006 and 2015 for each 
district. As shown, overall, as MINDEP increases, economic performance rises, which 
implies a positive relationship between income per person and district economic reliance on 
mining. I also add a linear trendline generated from Excel which shows a positive 





50 Although an F statistic of 10 has traditionally been viewed as a’safe’ lower bound, a recent study by 
Young (2019) indicates that it may be inadequate in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Kleibergen F 
statistics, however, can be used as a robust statistic when heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or clustering 
occurs (see Baum, Schaffer & Stillman, 2007, p.490). 
51 Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen J statistic suggests that instruments satisfy the 
exogeneity condition. However caution should be raised as this test is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for instrument exogeneity. As sufficiency cannot be demonstrated with a statistical test, 




Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics for all districts/years pooled 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GRDP per capita 
(in logs) 4290 4.139 0.690 1.951 7.684 
Mining Dependence 
GRDP 4290 0.091 0.179 0 0.955 
Mining Revenue 
Dependence 4290 0.053 0.124 0 0.872 
Oil&gas revenue 
Dependence 4290 0.038 0.107 0 0.872 
Coal Revenue 
Dependence 4290 0.015 0.044 0 0.550 
Earthquake 4290 0.060 0.253 0 3 
Labour force 
participation rate 4290 0.645 0.096 0.195 0.988 
Households with 
electricity 4290 0.874 0.190 0.003 1 
 
Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics for First Difference Model 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ Real GRDP per capita 
(in logs) 
390 0.414 0.345 -0.852 2.685 
∆Mining Dependence 390 
0.012 0.142 -0.614 0.795 
∆Oilgas Revenue 390 
-0.029 0.091 -0.528 0.224 
∆Coal Revenue 390 
0.015 0.048 -0.119 0.359 
∆Mining Revenue 390 -0.013 
0.084 -0.523 0.256 
Earthquake 390 0.464 





0.112 -0.191 0.443 




0.704 1.951 7.684 




1.029 9.450 15.227 
DURBAN 390 0.208 0.406 0 1 
DJAVA 390 0.303 0.460 0 1 
Instruments      
Oilgas_continuous 390 0.154 0.660 0 7 
Coal deposit_continuous 390 3.660 14.327 0 94.214 
Oilgas_binary 390 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Coal deposit_binary 390 0.067 0.250 0 1 
∆oil production 
(thousand barrels) 
390 -103.164 3805.166 -22751.3 64381.61 
∆gas production 
(MMBTU) 
390 267.544 31094.970 -402891 378035.7 




Next, Figure 2.9 shows a similar pattern for my second type of resource dependence 
measure—district government revenues from oil and gas over all sources of revenue. Once 
again, each observation represents an eleven year average for each district. Here again, a 
simple  regression line through the scatterplot has a positive slope, contrary to a resource 
curse prediction.  In both figures, I also notice the presence of outliers which could have a 
disproportionate influence on results, and suggest a possible issue with heteroskedasticity. 
While excluding the outliers may solve the issue of disproportionate influence, it could also 
eliminate the historical resource-rich districts used as instruments in the first-difference 
regression.52 I thus keep the original observation in all specifications, with the caution that 
the results may be sensitive to their inclusion.  
Before moving to regression analysis, I first compare the overall average performance 
of per capita GRDP growth between Indonesia’s resource-rich and resource-poor districts.53 
Using the data I will subsequently use in regressions, I find that resource-rich districts achieve 
on average higher growth in per capita income than resource-poor districts, with a 8.2 per 
cent difference in overall growth achieved from 2006 to 2015. A simple t test finds this to be 
a statistically significant difference at the 1 per cent level.54 
 
52 As my last chapter will also focus on spatial analysis, dropping a district that is potentially an outlier 
would also change the configuration of my spatial weigth matrices. 
53 I rank each district for resource dependence based on the value of mining’s share in its total GRDP 
averaged between 2006 and 2015, from the largest share to the lowest. I then split these 390 districts into 
two different groups (each with 195 observations). While each 195 districts group had a positive average 
growth: richer and poorer districts grew 45.5 % and 37.3% over the nine years, respectively. 
54 I test these two groups, richer and poorer districts, by first obtaining a pooled value from the sample 






, where 𝑛 is total observation of the first (𝑥1) and second group (𝑥2), and 𝑆
2  is the variance 
















2.6.1 Annual Panel Data Results 
As a baseline, I describe results in Table 2.5 from annual FE regressions at the district 
level, using the period 2005-2015.55 Real GRDP per capita (in logs) is used here as the 
dependent variable. The impact of all four resource dependence measures is presented in 
models (1) to (4). Similar to the scatterplots, the first model shows a surprising sign according 
to the standard resource curse hypothesis. I find that mining dependence (shown in model 
(1)) is positively associated with real GRDP per capita at the local level in fixed effects 
 
55 Because in subsequent first difference analysis I compare 2006 to 2015 results, I have also run the annual 
fixed effects analysis using 2006 to 2015 data only. The results are virtually identical. Results are available 
from the author upon request. 
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analysis. That is, districts that increase in dependence (measured through mining’s share of 
district GRDP) have larger per capita GRDP, on average. The coefficient on MINDEP in 
model (1) seems especially strong. Here, a one standard deviation increase in MINDEP 
(0.179) is associated with an increase in real district income per capita of (0.179*0.406 = 
0.0727) 7.27 per cent, on average, all else equal. 
Coal resource revenue dependence  looks to have a negative effect on GRDP per capita. 
In contrast, oil and gas dependence has a positive sign but insignificant effect. Thus, 
combined oil, gas and coal dependence has a coefficient near zero and not statistically 
significant. At first glance, these results may indicate that resource dependence in overall 
output is good for GRDP, while dependence in government budgets has either no effect, or 
possibly a negative effect on GRDP for coal in particular. That is, the resource that comes 
closest to resource curse predictions is district government coal revenue dependence. 
Looking at other control variables in Table 2.5, the frequency of earthquake events 
appears to be negatively associated with GRDP over time, though only at the 10 per cent 
level. As the earthquake variable is defined as the annual number that each district 
experienced between 2005-2015, model (2) finds that one additional earthquake decreases 
real per capita GRDP by 1.68 per cent (=100(0.0168)). This seems reasonable as the damage 
from earthquake occurrence reduces economic performance and raises risks of investment in 
new goods and services, which can lower growth. Other controls, such as the labour force 
participation rate has a positive coefficient but is insignificant. Surprisingly, the proportion 
of households with access to electricity is not significantly associated with local GRDP per 
capita.  
Overall, my FE results do not seem to support the standard resource curse hypothesis, 
with a possible exception for local government dependence on coal mining revenues. They 
do not support the view that non-renewable resources lead to reduced local GDP. These 
results are similar to those found by Cust and Rusli (2016) at the district level in Indonesia 
and in line with some blessing effects found by other researchers as summarised in Appendix 
2.4. However, in spite of controlling district fixed effects and year effects, the potential 
endogeneity of my four resource dependence measures has not been addressed, and I do not 
have suitable annual instruments to do so.  
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Table 2.5. Panel Fixed Effect Model of the Effect of Resource Dependence on real GRDP per 
capita 
Dependent Variable: GRDP per capita (in logs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4 
Mining Dependence 0.406***    
 (0.113)    
Oil&Gas Revenue  0.167   
  (0.170)   
Coal revenue   -0.421*  
   (0.241)  
Mining Revenue    0.0353 
    (0.132) 
Earthquake -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* -0.017* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Labour force  0.105 0.117 0.104 0.117 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) 
Household elect. -0.073 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.089) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) 
Constant 3.891*** 3.867*** 3.879*** 3.869*** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,290 4,290 4,290 4,290 
R-squared 0.492 0.478 0.479 0.478 
Number of DISTRICT1 390 390 390 390 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Thus, my first assessment using FE models is inconclusive. Therefore I move next to a 
first-difference model, using 2015 and 2006 as the final and initial years, respectively. 
2.6.2 First-Difference Estimates 
In the first-difference model (FD hereafter), I include some level dummy variables to 
capture the urban/rural nature of districts (DURBAN) and potential spatial benefits of being 
a district in the centrally located island of Java (DJAVA). Note that such unchanging 
characteristics could not be retained in fixed effects analysis. With a direct measure of 
urban/rural status, I no longer use household access to electricity, but I still use the sum of 
earthquakes at district level. As mentioned previously, I now also include initial real GRDP 
per capita in 2005 (in logs) to control for initial economic conditions, and to test for a 
convergence in per capita GRDP between initially richer and poorer districts. Additionally, I 
also control the size of initial district population in 2005 to test for gains to growth from 
economies of scale. 
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Table 2.6. Effects of resource dependence on change in real GRDP per capita (in logs) in 
First Difference form (without instruments) 
Dependent Variable: ∆GRDP per capita in logs         
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Mining Dependence 0.738***    
 (0.190)    
∆Oilgas Revenue  -0.160   
  (0.473)   
∆Coal Revenue   0.469  
   (0.522)  
∆ Mining Revenue    -0.076 
    (0.389) 
Earthquake -0.033** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.037 0.025 0.073 0.020 
 (0.186) (0.192) (0.189) (0.206) 
GRDP per capita, 2005 
(in logs) 
-0.113*** -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.141*** 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.034) (0.029) 
Population, 2005 (in logs) 0.008 0.0003 0.004 0.0002 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
DURBAN 0.046 0.040 0.047 0.036 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) 
DJAVA 0.085* 0.038 0.036 0.034 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) 
Constant 0.730** 0.983*** 0.938*** 0.961*** 
 (0.290) (0.357) (0.328) (0.350) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.164 0.082 0.084 0.081 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.6 reports the effect of changes in mining dependence on changes in longer term 
real GRDP per capita again using four different measures of resource dependence. As with 
FE, I find a positive association between rising output dependence and growth. In model (1), 
a standard deviation increase in the change in mining’s share in local GRDP is associated 
with a (=0.142 * 0.738 = 0.105) 10.5 per cent higher GRDP per capita. As with FE, the effects 
of government dependence on resource revenues is less conclusive. In model (2), the 
coefficient on oil and gas revenue dependence is negative, but not statistically significant, 
while coal effects in model (3) are insignificant but the sign is positive. Therefore, when I 
aggregate both oil and gas and coal, it too is statistically insignificant (see model (4)). With 
potential endogeneity of my resource dependence measures not yet addressed, I find evidence 
that overall resource output dependence is positively associated with growth in real GRDP, 
and no clear association between government revenue dependence and growth in GRDP. 
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The impact of earthquake frequency on district economic performance is also similar 
to that found in FE in all models. Note that for FD models the earthquake variable is defined 
as a cumulative total of each district’s earthquakes over the 10 years (2006-2015). What is 
new in Table 2.6 is the strong effect on subsequent growth of initial real GRDP per capita (in 
2005). The coefficient on baseline GRDP per capita is negative in all four models at the 1 per 
cent level. My finding here is consistent with convergence of incomes between poorer and 
richer districts during the decentralisation period.  
Among other control variables, the sign of the dummy variable, DURBAN, is positive, 
though not statistically significant in any specifications. Similar results occur for DJAVA, 
though with slightly stronger evidence that districts in the historically more developed island 
of Java look to have grown more rapidly since decentralisation than other districts. In model 
(1), in particular, Java’s districts (excluding the capital Jakarta) grew 8.81 per cent higher 
between 2006 to 2015 than non-Java districts though the effect is significant only at the 10 % 
level. 56 
The FD results seem broadly similar to those from FE models with resource 
dependence in GRDP a blessing, and dependence in government budgets neutral. 
Nonetheless, the resource dependence findings in these models are not addressing the 
possible endogeneity of my resource dependence measures. I thus move to results using FD 
estimation with instrumental variables. 
2.6.3 First-Difference Estimates With Instrumental Variables 
For my final results, I add two types of instrumental variable (IV) analysis to a FD 
model, where the relatedness of these instruments was explained in Table 2.2. Table 2.7 
provides results using the continuous form of abundance-based instruments along with the 
physical output instruments. Recall that the instruments are defined as the total number of 
major and minor petroleum (oil and natural gas) fields, in the 1970’s, and the relative share 
of coal deposit areas to total district areas, in the 1980’s. For comparison purposes, I place 
the earlier OLS results side by side with IV-GMM results.   
I start with whether the instruments satisfy the relevance and overidentification tests. 
In general, the instruments are fairly strong, particularly for oil/gas and coal resource 
 
56 To interpret dummy explanatory variables when the Y variable is in logs form, I follow the formula 
100.[exp(𝛽𝑖)̂ − 1] (see Wooldridge, 2016, p.212). 
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dependence for models (3′)-(4′). As shown, the Kleibergen Paap F statistic ranges from 
16.834 in model (1’), to 25.347 in model (3), greater than the recommended rule of thumb for 
instrument strength. Alternatively, as shown in Table 2.7, according to Cragg-Donald F 
statistic values, we see relevance increasing from models (1′) and (4′) to (2′) and (3′). 
However, I emphasise Kleibergen F statistics that are robust in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Likewise, regarding overidentification, the Hansen J statistic fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments in any models from (1′) to (4′), though with the 
lowest p-value in model (2’) of 0.1486. This implies that my instruments pass the necessary 
conditions of the two tests, which are consistent with validity. 
With the performance of my combined instruments appearing fairly strong for all 
models, I next test whether the change in resource dependence, ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 , is endogenous. In 
model (1’), the p value from a Hausman type endogeneity test cannot reject the null that 
mining dependence (model  (1′)) is exogenous (p value 0.248). However, endogeneity tests 
reject exogeneity in IV-GMM models (2′) to (3′) at the 5% level, with p values of 0.015 and 
0.018, respectively. In model (4′’) the p value is close to borderline, at just above the 10 per 
cent level (0.108). Therefore, with exogeneity rejected or borderline rejected for 3 of 4 
models, I move next to describe second stage IV results. 
Just as in the FD case without instruments, I find no evidence that higher non-renewable 
resource dependence creates an adverse effect on growth.  As is clear from models (4’), (1’) 
and (2’), my resource dependence coefficients increase in their magnitudes with use of 
instruments, and are significant at the 1 per cent or 5 per cent levels. Under the IV-GMM 
estimator, a change in district government dependence on oil and gas revenues in model (3’) 
has the largest estimated coefficient. Here, an increase of a standard deviation in the change 
in oil and gas revenue dependence, on average, increases real income per capita by 
(0.091*1.765 = 0.1606) 16 per cent. This finding once again does not confirm Sachs and 
Warner’s negative findings in a within-country case. Instead, these results support the views 
of many earlier descriptive papers for Indonesia considering the effect of the oil boom of the 
1970’s and 1980’s (see Gylfason, 2001; Rosser, 2007; Sovacool, 2010).  
For its part an increase in coal revenue dependence continues to have no significant 
effect on long run growth if instruments are included, though the sign of the coefficient turns 
negative. The insignificant effect of coal may have been caused by the weak performance in 
individual instruments as shown by the first-stage regression results in both reduced form 
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models. For example, as reported in Appendix 2.3, coal abundance and change in coal 
production have inconsistent signs in models (5) and (6), when they are respectively regressed 





Table 2.7. First difference model of effect of resource dependence on GRDP per capita (CONTINUOUS abundance levels plus change in production 
IV’s)  
Dependent Variable: ∆GRDP per capita (in logs) 
 (1) (1’) (2) (𝟐’) (3) (𝟑’) (4) (𝟒’) 
VARIABLES OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.738*** 1.356***       
 (0.190) (0.444)       
∆Oilgas Revenue   -0.160 1.765**     
   (0.473) (0.810)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.469 -0.696   
     (0.522) (0.645)   
∆Mining Revenue       -0.076 1.164** 
       (0.389) (0.581) 
Earthquake -0.033** -0.031* -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.037 0.059 0.025 0.051 0.073 -0.045 0.020 0.215 
 (0.186) (0.189) (0.192) (0.234) (0.189) (0.201) (0.206) (0.179) 
Ln GRDP per capita, 2005 -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.148*** -0.035 -0.150*** -0.119*** -0.141*** -0.097** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.066) (0.034) (0.039) (0.029) (0.039) 
Population, 2005 (in logs) 0.008 0.023 0.000 0.021 0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.032 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021) 
DURBAN 0.046 0.075* 0.040 0.012 0.047 0.018 0.036 0.048 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) 
DJAVA 0.085* 0.114* 0.038 -0.048 0.036 0.029 0.034 -0.022 
 (0.048) (0.060) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) 
Constant 0.730** 0.487* 0.983*** 0.351 0.938*** 0.973*** 0.961*** 0.397 
 (0.290) (0.282) (0.357) (0.323) (0.328) (0.320) (0.350) (0.256) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat  8.900  29.017  111.683  27.509 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F   16.834  27.754  25.347  14.807 
Hansen J statistic, P-value  0.223  0.355  0.635  0.149 
Endogeneity test, P value  0.248  0.015  0.018  0.108 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.164 0.103 0.082 -0.107 0.084 0.065 0.081 -0.001 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reported negative R-squared in column (2’) and (4’) can be obtained when using IV 
estimation as the sum of squared (SSR) of residuals exceeds the total sum of squared (TSS) of dependent variable (see Wooldridge (2016), page 471; or 




Regarding the other control variables, effects are generally similar to the FD model 
without instruments. For example, the cumulative number of earthquakes over 10 years 
negatively affects the change in per capita income at district level in Indonesia in all four 
models of resource dependence. Initial GRDP per capita again has a strong negative 
association with district income per capita, indicating convergence as before.  
Given no evidence of a resource curse with continous abundance level instruments 
(combined with change in physical production instruments), I next estimate the same models 
but now using binary abundance level measures, combined with change in physical 
production measures. As previously described, a binary variable for oil/gas abundance takes 
on a value of 1 if a district has a major oil field and 0 otherwise; that for coal abundance takes 
a value of 1 if the district has a proportion of 20 per cent or more with coal deposits, and 0 
otherwise. Results are provided in Table 2.8. Kleibergen F statistics indicate that the binary 
abundance instruments generally are strong for models (4’), (2’) and (3’), with F values of 
13.896, 30.976 and 27.580, respectively. More importantly, overidentification test p values 
are now everywhere far above rejection thresholds in all models. Thus the binary abundance 
instruments combined with physical production change instruments past tests consistent with 
validity, albeit still with some weakness in model (1’). 
Moving to findings, Table 2.8 shows that results are similar when the binary abundance 
instruments are used in place of continous ones. The coefficients on resource dependence are 
positive, and significant for oil/gas and for oil/gas and coal combined. Taking oil and gas 
revenue dependence as an example in model (2’), a one standard deviation increase in the 
change of the share of oil and gas revenue over total government revenues is associated with 
an increase in long run per capita GRDP of about (0.091*1.359 = 0.1236) 12.36 per cent. 
Once again, with binary instruments as without instruments, there is no significant association 
between rising coal revenue dependence and per capita income. 
In the analagous endogeneity tests using binary abundance instruments, I again find 
that exogeneity cannot be rejected in model (1’), and can be rejected in model (3’). In contrast, 
evidence of endogeneity is now stronger in model (2’) rather than borderline (p value 0.063), 





Table 2.8. First difference model of effect of resource dependence on GRDP per capita (binary abundance levels plus change in production IV’s)  
Dependent Variable: ∆GRDP per capita in logs 
 (1) (𝟏’) (2) (𝟐’) (3) (𝟑’) (4) (𝟒’) 
VARIABLES OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.738*** 1.143**       
 (0.190) (0.579)       
∆Oilgas Revenue   -0.160 1.359*     
   (0.473) (0.710)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.469 -0.456   
     (0.522) (0.708)   
∆Mining Revenue       -0.076 1.059* 
       (0.389) (0.637) 
Earthquake -0.033** -0.031* -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.027** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.037 0.135 0.025 0.068 0.073 -0.003 0.020 0.237 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.192) (0.218) (0.189) (0.202) (0.206) (0.173) 
Ln GRDP per capita, 2005  -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.148*** -0.056 -0.150*** -0.128*** -0.141*** -0.087** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.056) (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) (0.039) 
Population, 2005 (in logs) 0.008 0.029 0.000 0.020 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.031 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021) 
DURBAN 0.046 0.069 0.040 0.019 0.047 0.030 0.036 0.039 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.053) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) 
DJAVA 0.085* 0.093 0.038 -0.032 0.036 0.025 0.034 -0.019 
 (0.048) (0.066) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) 
Constant 0.730** 0.415 0.983*** 0.430 0.938*** 0.919*** 0.961*** 0.368 
 (0.290) (0.281) (0.357) (0.293) (0.328) (0.322) (0.350) (0.257) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat  8.108  41.389  115.597  31.065 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F   7.759  30.976  27.580  13.896 
Hansen J statistic, P-value  0.269  0.456  0.631  0.470 
Endogeneity test, P value  0.697  0.018  0.167  0.063 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.158 0.136 0.075 -0.036 0.077 0.072 0.074 0.012 




Regarding other control variables with binary abundance instruments, earthquake 
frequency still has negative and statistically significant effects, as I found in the previous 
results. The coefficient on initial district population level is not significant across models, 
suggesting no benefits of economies of scale on growth. The initial GRDP per capita in 2005 
is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level across all specifications, again implying that 
convergence is occuring in real income levels between districts during the 2006-2015 period.  
Interestingly, although the regression results have generally found that resource 
dependence is promoting income, the results in Appendix 2.2 which use initial resource 
dependence in 2006  have reported consistent negative signs and statistically significant at 1 
per cent level according to IV-GMM specifications. For example, in column (2’), where the 
instruments’ strength and exogeneity have passed necessary requirements to be valid, a one 
standard deviation increase in the share of oil and gas revenue in total local government 
budget in 2006 lowers per capita income by (0.126*(-1.084)=) 0.136 or 13.6 per cent. These 
findings support resource curse argument as found in many early studies particularly those 
which relied on data at country level. Across time, however, concerns have raised due to the 
problem of unobserved time-invariant factors at national level which cannot be solved by 
putting resource dependence as a level variable in cross-section regressions as tried here. 
While acknowledging these contrary findings, I therefore put more weight on my first 
difference specifications with instruments better approach has been used increasingly studies 
conducted at the local level, though to date mostly in developed country studies. 
 
2.7 Discussion 
My estimation results seem generally contrary to the predictions and some findings of 
the resource curse literature. I find a positive or no significant association between various 
measures of resource dependence and per capita income, using fixed effects models and first 
difference models, with and without instruments. With some exception regarding the effects 
of coal revenue dependence, this lack of negative association persists when I control for 
relevant growth variables, and control for district and year fixed effects as well as initial 
income levels (real GRDP per capita) and control for population, labour force participation, 
and urban/rural status. There is instead some evidence that resource dependence seems to 
confer a blessing effect, particularly when measured using overall mining’s share in GRDP, 
or in overall or oil/gas revenue dependence. For its part, coal revenue dependence seems to 
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confer a neutral effect, neither a significant blessing nor a curse, lacking statistical 
significance in almost all specifications in FD models.  
Why might resource dependence in output, or in oil and gas revenue dependence, 
confer benefits for GRDP within Indonesia, when it does not seem to have elsewhere?  
Table 2.9. Summary of Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FE + ◦ ◦ − 
FD + ◦ ◦ ◦ 
FD with 
instrument 1 
+ + + ◦ 
FD with 
instrument 2 
+ + + ◦ 
Notes: FE = Fixed Effect; FD = First Difference; Instrument 1 is continuous+changes of physical 
production; Instrument 2 is binary+changes of physical production;  
 
There are several factors which could contribute: (i) commodity price booms during 
my sample period, (ii) the effects of Indonesia’s decentralisation policy, (i.e. improvements 
in institutional quality triggered by decentralisation); (iii) the effects of quality of public 
spending on investments, such as education or infrastructure. 
First, the oil boom during the 1970’s and 1980’s, and the coal boom during the 2000’s, 
have tremendously contributed to Indonesia’s non-tax revenues, which even before 
decentralisation of resource revenues has made growth in per capita income more progressive 
in the outlying regions of Indonesia. The world crude oil prices have also been on average 
higher during the period of 2005 – 2016 relative to the preceeding 15 year period, though 
with substantial fluctuation, suggesting that this may have contributed to resource 
dependence’s pro-growth effects.  This also suggests that resource-rich regions, mostly 
situated in Kalimantan and Sumatra, have enjoyed high incomes because of their historical 
abundance of natural resources. Far from this income being a “curse”, regional dynamic 
studies of Indonesia have identified most resource-rich regions in Eastern and Southearn 
Kalimantan and Sumatra Island as consistently being the most prosperous regions according 
to GRDP per capita between 1999 and 2011 (Hill, Resosudarmo, Vidyattama, 2008; Hill and 
Vidyattama, 2016). My results support this evidence, and similarly confirm Cust and Rusli’s 
(2016) study that finds that government revenues driven by oil and gas royalties have 
significantly increased district GRDP.  
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In particular, as indicated earlier by national level studies of Indonesia such as Usui 
(1997), Rosser (2007), di John (2011) and Chandra (2012), my results are in line with earlier 
work showing that Indonesia has avoided a resource curse. These studies argue that Indonesia 
successfully escaped a Dutch disease or resource curse more broadly during 1973-1985 as a 
result of managing its oil windfalls to strengthen both its agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors. Although such “activist” industrial policy interventions have not persisted, they may 
have benefited resource intensive regions in the years prior to decentralisation. 
Second, Indonesia is an archipelago country consisting of five large islands and more 
than 450 districts. With the implementation of decentralisation, there is scope for considerable 
variation in regional government policies. Spillover effects from more successful districts, or 
competition between local leaders, has been implicitly encouraged by the central government 
through a system of rewards and punishments.57 To the extent better governance can forestall 
a resource curse, Indonesia’s decentralisation may have contributed by creating incentives 
for better local governance. 
To provide an example, take the fiscal rules implemented since 2005. The mechanism 
designed to redistribute windfalls across districts may have contributed to expanding the 
ability of poorer local governments to finance themselves. This could raise local living 
standards as predicted by Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015), if the revenue streams 
derived from oil are used to fund local public provision of infrastructure and education. 
Therefore, if it is true that a key factor to escaping the resource curse is how well a country 
manages its resource revenues, the incentives of decentralisation for good governance at the 
local level may explain Indonesia’s positive resource outcomes.58  
In support of this “good governance” explanation, Bostwana is often cited as an 
example of a country that established an effective system for prudential fiscal policy to 
manage mining revenues. It is then taken as an example among developing resource-rich 
countries of a society that has avoided a resource curse (Iimi, 2007). In Indonesia’s case, 
where state corruption has historically been a problem, the central government undertakes 
 
57 Theoretically, fiscal decentralisation is believed to affect economic growth positively. Fiscal 
decentralisation may aid growth under the assumption that this system leads to higher economic efficiency 
because district governments are better placed to provide local public services than central/national 
government. Furthermore, competition among district governments and the rapid mobility of local citizens 
may better match the preferences between governments and their local people (Davoodi and Zou, 1998). 
58 For an example of this argument, see Natural Resource Charter (Second Edition), 
(www.resourcegovernance.org and www.naturalresourcecharter.org.) 
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some efforts to monitor what local governments do. Financial audit investigations, for 
example, have been conducted annually by the Indonesia Audit Board (BPK) since 2005. The 
BPK investigates the performance of the central government, including State Owned 
Enterprises (BUMN), but it also investigates local district local governments on some aspects 
of quality of their financial reporting. It thus creates accountability incentives even at the local 
government level. The BPK announces their findings every six months, which has likely 
contributed to good governance. Similarly, since 2010, the Indonesian Ministry of Home 
Affairs has annually evaluated all district governments and ranked them based upon their 
overall performance index.59  
The period of my analysis, 2005-2015, captures a time when substantive political 
participation was distributed to districts. It seems likely that this created improvements in 
public service delivery and accountability through the use of direct local elections. Of course, 
decentralisation that increases the authority of local goverments could conceivably multiply 
the incidence of lower-level money politics, corruption, and inefficient allocation of public 
service delivery. However, local elections and heightened political participation can be a tool 
to make local citizens more aware of what their government does, which could in turn make 
resource revenue use more transparent. For example, district governments would find the 
resource revenues helpful for reaching the goals set for them in the Medium Term Regional 
Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah(RPJMD)). All levels 
of government are obliged to show how they fulfill this plan. The contents of these plans are 
themselves based on campaign promises of the winning parties during election campaigns.  
Other researchers also, such as Cust and Poelhekke (2015) and Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, 
and Land (2015) in their survey paper, emphasize that government spending effects may be 
responsible for regional growth dynamics. Growth may well be related to how well local 
governments spend resource revenues. Connecting this assumption to Indonesia’s context, if 
a district government uses resource revenues to expand their public investment or public 
spending, this could raise income. 
 
59 The Ministry of Home Affairs investigates district government performance for most districts. Its ranking 
of districts is then used to give rewards and punishments. For the researcher, this index can provide a 
measure of institutional quality. In 2012, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform also 
announced The Report of Accountability Performance to stimulate good governance implementation at 
district level. “Local leader commitment” and “innovation” are two important indicators for determining 
the highest score. For example, Banyuwangi district has been given an A index and recognized as the best 
governed district in Indonesia in 2016. 
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A final explanation why resource dependence may be positively associated with GRDP 
in Indonesia has to do with education provision. While traditional resource curse explanations 
have looked at negative effects on demand for education, these have ignored potential positive 
effects of windfall revenues on the supply side. Some resource-rich economies have avoided 
curse effects, possibly by using resource windfalls to invest more in education and human 
capital. In Indonesia’s case, better education provision is one of the ultimate goals of public 
service delivery stated in most RPJMD’s. It is possible that districts with resource revenues 
have used these to boost education and health provision beyond what they would otherwise 
be, creating gains in subsequent labour productivity.  
Overall, the above explanations are still speculative, built from conceptual and 
empirical findings by studies in other locations. I have not confirmed which causal 
transmission channels may be responsible for the overall resource blessings found in my first 
chapter. Thus, to test whether some of these speculations are supported by evidence, I will 
investigate them more formally in my subsequent chapters.  
2.8 Conclusions 
So far in my analysis, I have empirically examined the direct effect of resource 
dependence, proxied by mining’s share of GRDP or share in government revenues, on real 
GRDP per capita. I have examined resource dependence’s effects by applying annual Fixed 
Effects (FE) regressions and a longer term First-Difference (FD) models. Both approaches 
deal with unobserved heterogeneity across districts that may affect their GRDP. In the FD 
case, I have also introduced various instruments for my resource dependence measures in 
case they are endogenous. These instruments have been both in levels (using continuous and 
binary historical resource abundance measures) and in changes in physical output (oil, natural 
gas, and coal mining) used.  
The original resource curse hypothesis was that having a high dependency on natural 
resources can lead to poor growth performance. Following Indonesia’s districts between 
2005-2015, I find little support for this hypothesis. Instead, I find that in most specifications, 
non-coal natural resource dependence is positively associated with local district income, 







Appendix 2.1. Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Real GRDP per capita 
Natural logarithm of the GRDP 
(Real Gross Regional Domestic 
Product) divided by total population 
at district level  
INDO DAPOER World Bank, The 
Indonesian National Statistical 
Agency (BPS) 
Earthquake  
The number of earthquake events at 
the district level 
Indonesian National Board for 
Disaster Management (BNPB). 




Natural logarithm of the 
participation of labour force in the 
number of people at working age 
(15-65) 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, 
BPS 
LGRDP per capita ‘05 
Natural logarithm of initial GRDP 
percapita in 2005 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, 
BPS 
LPOP_05 
Natural logarithm of initial 
population in 2005 
BPS 
DURBAN 
Dummy urban status 
(municipalities) = 1 if urban 
districts, = 0 if non-urban/rural 
district 
  
Identity of urban 
district/municipality is taken from 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Republic of Indonesia 
DJAVA 
Dummy of Java Island = 1 if the 
districts are located on Java Island, 
= 0 otherwise 
- 
Household electricity 
Per centage of households with an 
access to electricity. 
INDO DAPOER World Bank 
 
MINDEP 
The ratio of mining GRDP to total 
GRDP (real) 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
MINREV 
The share of mining revenues, 
summing oil, natural gas, and coal 
revenues, in total government 
budget at district level 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
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Variable Definition Source 
OILGASREV 
The share of oil and natural gas 
revenues in total government 
budget, at district level 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
COALREV 
The share of coal and other minerals 
revenues in total government 
budget, at district level 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
OILGAS BINARY 
Dummy variable, = 1 if at least one 
major oil or gas field operated there 
during 1970’s, = 0 otherwise.  
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
COAL BINARY 
Dummy variable, =1 if at least 20% 
of district is covered by a “first 
generation” coal agreement contract 
during the 1970’s, = 0 otherwise. 




The number of major and minor oil 
and gas fields in 1970’s production 
period in all island in Indonesia. 
Major oil and natural gas fields is 
weigted by 1, and all minor fields 
are weighted by 0.25. So, if in 
district A has a 10 minor oil/gas 
fields location, therefore: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐴 = 10 × 0.25 = 2.5 
 
 
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
COAL CONTINOUS 
The share of coal deposit areas 
(showed by first generation coal 
agreement contract introduced by 
Leeuwen (1994, 2017)) of total area 
of respective district. 
 
Leeuwen (1994), Friederich & 
Leeuwen (2017) 
∆GRDP PER CAPITA 
The natural logarithm of difference 
of real GRDP per capita, formulated 
as: 









The difference of mining 
dependence between 2015 and 
2006, formulated as: 
(𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃2015) − (𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃2006)  
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
65 
 
Variable Definition Source 
∆MINING REVENUE 
The difference in mining revenue 
shares, between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆OILGAS REVENUE 
The difference in oil and gas 
revenue shares, between 2015 and 
2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆COAL REVENUE 
The difference in coal revenue 
shares, between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆LABOUR FORCE 
PARTIC.RATE 
The change in labour force 
participation rate between 2015 and 
2006 




The change in the population (in 
logs) between 2015 and 2006 




The change in coal land rents and 
royalties between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, Republic of Indonesia 
∆OIL PRODUCTION 
The change in oil production (in 
barrels) between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, Republic of Indonesia 
∆GAS PRODUCTION   
The change in natural gas 
production (in MMBTU) between 
2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 






Appendix 2.2. Results based on the regressions of the change in log income per capita on initial resource dependence 
 OLS IV-GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev 
Mining dependence06 -0.210    -0.354**    
 (0.134)    (0.159)    
Oilgas revenue06  0.213    -1.084***   
  (0.321)    (0.270)   
Coalrevenue06   0.173    -1.100  
   (0.813)    (0.858)  
Mining revenue06    0.232    -1.067*** 
    (0.322)    (0.236) 
Earthquake -0.0370*** -0.0326*** -0.0335*** -0.0321*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
labforce05 -0.199 -0.187 -0.228 -0.189 -0.194 -0.338* -0.202 -0.285* 
 (0.196) (0.195) (0.194) (0.192) (0.191) (0.181) (0.189) (0.173) 
lgdp_percap05 -0.109*** -0.159*** -0.141*** -0.163*** -0.084* -0.042 -0.126*** -0.041 
 (0.0359) (0.0350) (0.0338) (0.0377) (0.045) (0.052) (0.037) (0.050) 
lpop_05 0.00144 -0.00287 -0.00175 -0.00278 0.014 0.006 -0.005 0.012 
 (0.0233) (0.0240) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
DURBAN -0.00742 0.0343 0.0254 0.0373 -0.022 -0.019 0.012 -0.013 
 (0.0455) (0.0412) (0.0452) (0.0415) (0.051) (0.053) (0.046) (0.050) 
DJAVA 0.0386 0.0508 0.0436 0.0534 0.024 -0.006 0.035 -0.021 
 (0.0406) (0.0438) (0.0415) (0.0447) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Constant 0.973*** 1.172*** 1.124*** 1.185*** 0.727*** 0.777*** 1.102*** 0.674** 
 (0.284) (0.303) (0.278) (0.308) (0.280) (0.272) (0.264) (0.267) 
Kleibergen F Stat     28.13 21.50 16.29 9.995 
Hansen’s J, p-val     0.0405 0.164 0.823 0.448 
Endog p-val     0.182 0.0844 0.0387 0.0309 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.093 0.089 0.085 0.090 0.088 -0.067 0.080 -0.076 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Instruments for IV-GMM model use historical resource abundance (in continuous form) and physical resource production in 2006. 
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Appendix 2.3. First-stage regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ∆mindep ∆Income ∆oilgasrev ∆Income ∆coalrev ∆Income ∆minrevrev ∆Income 
Earthquake -0.001 -0.036*** 0.001 -0.036*** -0.002** -0.036*** -0.001 -0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) 
Δlabforce 0.029 0.064 -0.006 0.059 -0.059*** 0.001 -0.066* 0.064 
 (0.056) (0.181) (0.041) (0.182) (0.016) (0.193) (0.040) (0.181) 
lgdp_percap05 -0.018 -0.104*** -0.046*** -0.096*** 0.010** -0.128*** -0.033*** -0.104*** 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.009) (0.034) (0.004) (0.036) (0.007) (0.035) 
lpop_05 -0.004 0.021 0.001 0.019 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.007 0.021 
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.002) (0.026) (0.004) (0.021) 
DURBAN -0.018 0.027 0.015 0.020 -0.009*** 0.028 0.004 0.027 
 (0.015) (0.043) (0.011) (0.043) (0.003) (0.046) (0.010) (0.043) 
DJAVA -0.081*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.005 -0.003 0.025 0.025*** 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.043) (0.007) (0.042) (0.003) (0.045) (0.007) (0.043) 
Instruments:         
Oilgas abundance -0.043*** -0.075** -0.032*** -0.078**   -0.037*** -0.075** 
 (0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.031)   (0.011) (0.032) 
Coal abundance 0.001 -0.000   0.001*** -0.001 0.001* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
ΔOilproduction 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000   0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔGasproduction 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*   0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔCoalproduction 0.000 0.000   0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.166* 0.575** 0.141** 0.563** 0.061** 0.900*** 0.199*** 0.575** 
 (0.097) (0.270) (0.061) (0.265) (0.024) (0.331) (0.059) (0.270) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.193 0.182 0.412 0.181 0.541 0.083 0.366 0.182 
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Appendix 2.4. Papers Finding Evidence of a Blessing Effect of the Natural Resources 
No Findings (+) Authors Period Sample Techniques Definition of resources 
1 Resource abundance (Natural 
resource capital) is positively 
correlated with average annual 
growth in real GDP per capita 
Gerelmaa & Kotani 
(2013) 
 
1990-2010 Cross-country OLS Regression The log of the per capita natural 
resource capital data to estimate 
the effect of natural resource 
abundance on economic growth 
over the period between 1990 and 
2010 
2 Resource dependence is 
positively correlated with 
theaverage annual growth rate 
of the real GDP per capita 
Ouoba (2016) 1980-2010 Panel data, 
country 
Panel data Resource dependence is the share 
of total natural resource rents in 
GDP 
4 Resource abundance [total 
natural capital and subsoil 




1994-2000 Cross-country OLS and 2SLS, Log growth of income per cpaita, 
average 1970-2000 (as dependent 
variable), resource abundance is 
defined as the log total natural 
capital (in US$) per capita, 
averaged over 1994-2000, and as 
the log of subsoil wealth (in US$) 
per capita, averaged 1994-2000 
 
Resource rent is measured as a 
proxy for natural resource wealth. 
7 Oil rent and mineral resources 
have a positive impact on real 
income for (Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation) OIC 
countries but not for non-OIC 
countries.  









GMM panel data  
First-differenced 
GMM works  
Dependent variable uses GDP per 
capita, oil, mineral natural gas, 
forestry and coal as the natural 
resource wealth. All data are 
obtained from world Bank.  
8 Resource abundance has a 
positive effect on growth 





Linear regression Resource abundance is measured 
using the average fraction of 
mining industry (coal, oil, natural 
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No Findings (+) Authors Period Sample Techniques Definition of resources 
comprising 206 
cities 
gas, metal and non-metal ores and 
other resources) workers 
compared to the total population. 
Growth rate is calculated as 
average rate of GDP per capita of 





10 Oil and natural gas have a 
positive effect on economic 
growth in non-democratic 
regimes, rather than in 
democratic regimes 
Libman (2013) 2000-2006 Russia, 72 
Russian regions 
Panel, OLS, Fixed 
Effect and Two-
Way FE 
Oil and gas extraction relative to 
gross regional product (GRP): the 
extraction value is calclated by 
multiplying the quantity of oil and 
gas extracted (in tons and cubic 
meters, respectively) by the 
average annual export prices for 
crude oil and natural gas. 
12 Mining has a positive impact on 
non-mining employment and 
family income 
Fleming, Measham 
& Paredes (2015) 






OLS  Independent variable is mining 
employment whics is the (log) 
change in mining employment in 
region I between 2001 and 2011. 
Dependent variable is using two 
proxies which are non-mining 
employment growth and income 
growth model, where median 
family income is used 
13 Coal based employment is 
negatively correlated with the 
per cent change in per capita 
during 1990-2000, when coal 
prices were low, and positively 
correlated during 2000-2010, 
when coal prices were higher. 










Initial mining industry 
employment shares consists of 
coal, oil, and natural gas, and 
other mining sectors.  
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No Findings (+) Authors Period Sample Techniques Definition of resources 
A similar effect was found for 
oil and gas employment. 
Commission 
(ARC) 
15 Boom countries in gas 
production have higher has 
positive impact on growth in 
total employment, wage and 
salary income and median 
household income 






209 counties in 
Colorado, Texas 
and Wyoming 
 A Boom county is defined as a 
county in the top 20% for its 
upward change in gas production 
16 Mining operations and fiscal 
revenues positively affect social 
and economic development (as 
measured by annual growth rate 
in GDP, direct employment in 




2001-2010 Chile, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Peru 
and South 
Africa (had long 
mining 
histories) 
Case studies South Africa and Chile (had a 





Appendix 2.5. Panel data regression (year by year) results using Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 
Mining Dependence 1.385***    
 (0.0616)    
Mining Revenue  2.529***   
  (0.0873)   
Oil&gas revenue   2.610***  
   (0.0994)  
Coal Revenue    4.604*** 
    (0.280) 
Population (in logs) -0.159*** -0.123*** -0.143*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00994) (0.0102) (0.0105) 
Labour force participation 
rate 
-0.209** 0.0945 0.215** -0.386*** 
 (0.0871) (0.0871) (0.0909) (0.0991) 
Household elect. 1.387*** 1.332*** 1.384*** 1.365*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0442) (0.0441) (0.0477) 
Constant 3.875*** 3.506*** 3.538*** 3.890*** 
 (0.0858) (0.0862) (0.0896) (0.0937) 
     
Observations 4,290 4,290 4,290 4,290 






3 CHAPTER THREE 
Resource Dependence and the Causes  
of Local Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There has been a continuing debate about whether resource endowments can help or 
hinder a country’s economy. Traditionally, economic theory assumed that an abundance of 
natural resources would benefit a country’s economy, either as a source to transform 
economic structures from traditional to industrial, or as a key input of a society’s long-term 
output (Rostow, 1959; North, 1982). Yet after Sachs and Warner’s (2001) early investigation 
found an inverse correlation between resource “abundance” (measured as each country’s 
share of primary exports to total GNP in 1970) and average growth in GDP per capita, other 
studies began to try to investigate the “resource curse”, and the transmission channels through 
which resources could be hindering growth.  
In contrast, in my previous chapter, I found that, other than coal, resource dependence 
seems on average to have boosted Indonesian district per capita income, implying that 
resources have been a blessing there rather than a curse. Thus this chapter tries to investigate 
the mechanisms that resource dependence may be acting through to raise income. Previous 
papers trying to explain a resource curse have proposed causal mechanisms which could 
account for adverse resource effects on growth in aggregate income. Some channels proposed 
have been crowding out of a country’s manufacturing (called the “Dutch disease”), demand-
side depression of human capital investment or education, downward pressure on institutional 
quality, and more recently through pervese incentives regarding public spending or public 
investment (Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014); Collier and Goderis (2009); Karimu et al. 
(2017)). I will therefore concentrate here on these four prominent candidates.  
The theory of the first channel says that a commodity boom in minerals hinders the 
expansion of a country’s tradable sectors as commodity exports cause the local currency to 
appreciate, making it harder to export manufactured and agricultural products. Consequently, 
if the manufacturing sector is believed to be a key driver of long-run growth, this mechanism 
lowers long run growth performance, most notably in subsequent resource bust periods 




associated with poor institutions. In general, countries with higher dependence on resources 
have typically suffered from a high level of corruption within government, low levels of 
democratisation, and poor implementation of the rule of law, which in turn affect growth 
(Ross, 2001; Isham et al., 2005). Thirdly, it has been argued in the resource curse literature 
that human capital accumulation is also commonly hindered by extractive sectors, e.g. coal 
mining, where there are incentives for young people to discontinue their schooling to get 
well-paying but low skilled entry level jobs (Gylfason, 2001a; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; 
Black, McKinnish, and Sanders, 2005). Finally, some resource curse papers discuss the 
negative impact of resource windfalls or rents on the composition of government spending, 
distinct from institutional quality. If resource windfalls are spent unwisely, i.e. for 
unproductive expenditures such as administrative or personnel spending, this too may slow 
long-run growth (Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land, 2015).  
However, research about whether resource intensity actually works through these 
transmission channels to negatively or positively affect growth has been far from conclusive. 
On the one hand, several empirical papers have indeed found a negative effect of resource 
dependence on school enrolment rates, or on public expenditures on education as a proxy for 
human capital investment (Gylfason, 2001; Edwards, 2016a). Resource dependence has also 
been found to delay manufacturing sector expansion ((Sachs and Warner (1995), Stijns 
(2005)) and to worsen institutional quality by increasing incentives for rent-seeking 
behaviour, or unaccountable management of revenue windfalls (Ross, 2001; Isham, et al. 
(2005)).  
Yet at the same time, other researchers have found positive effects of resources on 
growth via these same channels.  In the case of the Dutch disease, van der Ploeg (2011) has 
shown that the phenomenon is less likely to happen in a country that initially has a relatively 
low share of manufacturing in GDP. Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) in an earlier study, 
also have found cases where resource-rich countries experienced expansions in 
manufacturing during oil booms. Similarly, with respect to education, Stijns (2005) and 
Alexeev and Conrad (2011) find higher resource intensity leads to higher education enrolment 
levels. Again, with respect to institutional quality, Brunnschweiler (2008) and 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) find that resource intensity has no effect on measures of 
rule of law or government effectiveness, and thus no effect on growth through this channel, 




These conflicting findings regarding causal mechanisms are perhaps not surprising 
since, as pointed out in the first chapter, there is as yet no consensus among previous studies 
regarding the overall association between resource intensity and economic growth. Overall 
resource effect findings may differ because researchers use different resource measures 
(dependence or abundance)60, data (within-or cross country, cross-section or panel), or 
quantitative methods (see for example, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016)). However, a 
majority argue that negative associations are more likely to occur in developing rather than 
developed countries (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2011; Frankel, 2010).  
Finally, both resource curse and blessing papers have proposed a variation of the 
institutional quality causal mechanism. This variation is that it is the exogenous degree of 
institutional quality (e.g. degree of corruption, accountability, and rule of law) that nations 
possess that determine whether resource dependence aids or hinders growth. Here, resources 
are said to aid growth for countries with strong institutions, but hinder it for those with weak 
institutions (Arezki & van der Ploeg (2010), Papyrakis (2016), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
(2006)). This argument is distinct from one that says rising resource intensity itself lowers 
institutional quality, thereby slowing growth. 
As most empirical studies on the resource curse have used international country 
datasets, most tests of causal channels have also used such datasets, or tried to investigate 
causal channels within countries using insights from the cross country literature. In the case 
of Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find oil-related revenue increases the supply of 
teachers and classroom facilities at the municipal level, though the evidence is not robust to 
alternative specifications. On the contrary, Douglas and Walker (2016) find evidence that the 
initial dependence of a region on coal mining is positively correlated with the high school 
dropout level in the Appalachian region of the United States. 
Given the prominence of these proposed transmission channels in the resource 
curse/blessing literature, I will here investigate the extent to which they can explain the 
apparently positive effect of resource dependence on economic growth within Indonesia. 
Given the positive overall effect I find for resource dependence, I investigate the following 
four channels: positive spillovers to manufacturing sector performance, positive effects on 
 
60 Resource dependence is commonly defined as flows generated from resource extraction activity while 
resource abundance refers to the known stock of oil or minerals reserves/ deposits in the ground (see 




education supply, positive effects on institutional quality, and positive effects on the quality 
of local government spending. The first three candidates have been identified in previous 
between-country empirical papers, while the fourth has been identified by more recent 
empirical papers at the sub-national level in some developing countries (e.g. Brazil, Peru, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Colombia, and Indonesia).61 Note that for resource curse cases, previous 
studies have asked whether resource dependence lowers these growth-relevant factors, while 
for my resource blessing case I am asking if resource dependence raises them. I believe that 
using this approach is beneficial for two reasons. First, this is the first within-country 
investigation of the mechanisms by which resource dependence affects growth in Indonesia. 
Second, this investigation can either verify or challenge what recent empirical studies have 
found regarding causal mechanisms elsewhere. 
More generally, this study aims to provide further insight regarding the positive direct 
effect of resource dependence on district economic growth in Indonesia in its post-
decentralisation era. It will ask whether the causal channels chosen here are affected by 
resource dependence, and in turn whether they affect the rate of economic growth. It will also 
address the auxiliary question of whether resource dependence is a blessing for districts who 
have good initial quality institutions, and a curse for those who do not.62  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a literature review of 
transmission channels between resource dependence and economic growth. Data sources and 
empirical estimation strategies are explained in Section 3.3, while Section 3.4 provides 
empirical results and discussion. Section 3.5 concludes.   
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Causal Mechanisms of the Resource Curse Hypothesis 
Having identified four potential causal channels by which resource dependence can 
affect growth, I will provide more detail here on each, based on the resource curse/blessing 
literature.  
 
61 See for example Caselli and Michaels (2013), Loayza and Rigolino (2016), and Cust and Rusli (2016).  
62 I will use two different measures of district level institutional quality: one of longer duration that captures 





3.2.1.1 The manufacturing sector and Dutch disease 
An early explanation for the resource curse was that a high dependency on natural 
resources delays or crowds out development of the manufacturing sector, whose development 
would otherwise generate greater positive effect than the resource sector in raising GDP over 
time. This hypothesis is called the “Dutch disease” because it was first introduced in the 
Economist magazine after the discovery of natural gas in the province of Groningen in the 
Netherlands in the late 1950’s (Frankel, 2010). As documented by Davis (1995), the resulting 
rapid expansion of mining and exports from Gronigen led to an appreciation of the Dutch 
Gelder, which in turn decreased the output of the non-resource sectors such as manufacturing 
and agriculture. This spillover effect was one of the first, and primary causal explanations for 
the resource curse.63  I will explain it in greater depth below. 
As explained in Figure 3.1, a country’s trade (say of resource exports) generates a 
stream of capital inflows and of resource investment. In a time of resource price booms or 
resource discovery, a rise in these resource exports can cause a country’s currency to 
appreciate vis a vis the rest of the world. This appreciation leads to uncompetitiveness of the 
country’s manufacturing sector as the price of its goods internationally will be higher than 
that of its competitors in monetary jurisdictions without resource booms. In short, the 
resource boom causes a stream of capital inflow appreciating the real exchange rate, and 
reducing exports of the non-resource sector (commonly manufacturing). This short term 
change in the composition of a country’s production and exports can harm its growth over 
time if the spillover benefits of some sectors (manufacturing) are greater than those of others 
(resource extraction). 
Sachs and Warner’s studies (1997, 2001) appeared to provide some support for the 
Dutch disease hypothesis. Evidence for crowding out has often been taken from the effects 
of resource development on the performance of exports of manufactured goods. Stijns (2005) 
for example, using cross-country analysis finds that higher oil and gas reserves are associated 
with a smaller proportion of manufacturing exports in total exports. Despite this fact, Stijns 
also finds that having larger coal abundance, comprised of recoverable anthracite, 
bituminous, lignite and subbituminous reserves, seems to have a positive effect on real growth 
in the non-resource sector, and a larger share of manufacturing exports in total exports. 
 





Papyrakis and Raveh (2014) in the case of Canada find that mineral production (oil, gas, 
minerals) is negatively associated with growth in non-mineral exports internationally, while 
for growth in domestic exports (to other Canadian provinces and territories), the effect of 
mineral production is not significant. 
A more descriptive study from Usui (1997) explores a comparison between Indonesia 
and Mexico in avoiding the Dutch disease. Using some informative economic indicators, Usui 
finds that an increased share of petroleum exports in total exports in Indonesia over the period 
of an oil bonanza in  1970-1975 actually raised the percentage share of the manufacturing 
sector in GDP, while in the case of Mexico the manufacturing sector’s share in total GDP 
held constant. After the oil boom ended between 1975-1982, as the share of petroleum in 
exports declined gradually, Indonesia successfully maintained the performance of its 
manufacturing sector with a substantial rise in its percentage of GDP. According to Usui, 
Indonesia avoided a Dutch disease effect because it invested its accumulating surplus from 
oil revenues during the boom period on investments to accelerate growth in non-primary 
tradable sectors, particularly manufacturing. In a similar way, but looking more recently in 
the 2000’s, Feryawan (2011) conducts a descriptive study that seems to find the opposite of 
a Dutch disease for Indonesia. Feryawan argues that the mining sector, especially oil and gas 
extraction, has had positive spillover effects that expanded the manufacturing sector for the 
country as a whole, though he does not use regression analysis. Empirically, a more recent 
study by Ito (2017) finds some evidence that a Dutch disease has not occured in the case of 
Russia, using quarterly time series data from 2003 to 2013 and Vector Error Correction 
Modelling (VECM). With greater oil abundance than any other country in the world, even in 
Russia oil-price shocks that caused appreciation of its real exchange rate did not prevent a 




Figure 3.1 The Route of the Dutch Disease Mechanism on Growth 
 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) in their re-investigation of Sachs and Warner’s 
data again do not find a clear significant positive or negative association between countries’ 
degrees of resource dependence and the size of their manufacturing sectors as a share of GDP. 
Using within-country data, a more recent study by Estrades et al. (2016) find in the case of 
Uruguay that resource-driven currency appreciation does not significantly affect the output 
of any sector there, nor does it affect growth of any sector in the long run.  
Finally, Aragón, et al. (2015) point out that resource wealth may significantly affect a 
country’s level of industrialisation, but question whether currency appreciation and 
deindustrialisation will lower growth in GDP over time, rather than merely change its 
composition. In any event, Aragón et al. conclude that resource booms might not create as 
much deindustrialisation as some studies predict. Instead, they argue that resource booms 
may help the development of related types of manufacturing. 
 
3.2.1.2 Human Capital Investment 
Researchers in growth and development generally agree that a country’s investment in 




Education is often measured using years of schooling, school enrolment rates, or proportions 
with certain levels of attainment.64 An increase in high school enrolments, for example, can 
have a positive effect on productivity and growth in income per capita, and vice versa. The 
positive effect of education on growth has been found in many studies (Barro, 2001; 
Hanushek and Wöbmann, 2007; Sebastian-Perez and Raveh, 2015).  
However, a theory for the resource curse explains that resource abundance may 
decrease growth performance by reducing the amount of education demanded by local 
citizens as reflected by low public school enrolment or underfunding. Thus resource 
dependence can lead to reduced human capital accumulation and slower long term growth. 
Gylfason (2001) and Gylfason and Zoega (2006) argue, for example, that natural resource 
dependence may crowd out human capital accumulation on the demand side, lowering the 
relative return to individuals from acquiring it.  This could occur if the resource extraction 
sector of a resource-rich country provides widespread employment for low skilled workers, 
thereby reducing the incentive for young people to continue with additional schooling 
required for employment in non-resource extraction sectors. In short, an expansion of 
resource-based sectors may create jobs which require less education. This could increase the 
wage of uneducated workers, narrowing the wage gap with educated workers, and creating 
incentives for young people to delay or forego additional education as its opportunity cost 
rises. A decrease in the number of educated people may in the long run reduce growth in 
output (Walker, 2013; Douglas and Walker, 2016; Gylfason, 2001).  
Gylfason (2001) tests this argument using country level data between 1980-1997, and 
finds a negative correlation between share of natural capital in total capital, and public 
expenditure on education. Gylfason also shows that having resource wealth can lead to a 
decline in average years of schooling for girls, and in the level of boys’ and girls’ enrolment 
in secondary school. Thus resource endowments might be crowding out human capital 
accumulation, slowing development over time. Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005) 
similarly argue that booms in the oil sector raise the opportunity cost of people going to school 
as local wages rise, creating incentives for them to leave school. This is thought to be why 
 
64 In resource curse studies, school enrolment rates are most commonly used as a measure of human capital 
accumulation (see Davoodi and Zou (1998); Gylfason and Zoega (2006), Carmignani and Chowdury, n.d.) 




the high school drop-out rate in the Appalachian region in the United States increased 
substantially during the coal boom in the 1970’s (Black et al., 2005).  
Douglas & Walker (2016) also find support for the education demand channel in more 
recent empirical analysis of the effects of coal abundance on education in the Appalachian 
counties of the United States. Douglas and Walker assume that because mining employment 
does not need high levels of education, or even a high school degree, it potentially reduces 
human capital accumulation as a source of long run growth. They find that indeed coal mining 
dependence negatively affects education attainment with the effect on high school completion 
stronger than that on college completion. Of course, some resource extraction activities 
require higher levels of skill or education than others, or are less labour intensive. 
Nonetheless, these studies have confirmed a negative effect of increased resource abundance 
or dependence on education attainment, with presumed knock on effects on longer term 
economic performance.  
In contrast, a few papers have found contrary evidence regarding resource dependence 
and human capital investment. For example, Blanco and Grier (2012) find no significant 
effect of overall resource dependence on either physical or human capital in 17 Latin 
American economies. In even greater contrast, when decomposing natural resources into 
specific types, Alexeev and Conrad (2011) find that per capita oil output has a positive and 
significant effect on primary and secondary school enrolment rates. They also find a positive 
association between the share of resources in Gross National Income (GNI) and primary 
school enrolment rates. Similarly, using United States state level panel data, James (2017) 
finds the enrolment rates in public schools tend to be relatively high in resource-rich states, 
as do teacher salaries and teacher-student ratios. James also finds a positive association 
between resource-rich endowments and public spending in education. In the case of 
provincial level analysis for China, Wul & Lei (2016) similarly find a positive association 
between human capital accumulation and resource abundance with both positively correlated 
with sustained growth. These contrary findings could arise because resource dependence does 
not always depress education demand, or because resource windfalls may offsettingly 
increase education supply. 
3.2.1.3 Institutional Quality 
The third causal mechanism commonly proposed between resource dependence and 




wealth makes governments less dependent on taxing their populations, which in turn makes 
them less accountable to the citizens they govern (Deacon & Rode, 2015; Deacon, 2011). 
This results in poor quality economic institutions, (or rules by which the economy operates 
as in North (1991)), thus reducing growth. This argument is often linked with theories of rent-
seeking, which claim that resource-abundant countries have experienced a higher incidence 
of corruption compared with non-resource abundant countries.  
Most scholars in the broader growth literature recognize the importance of good 
institutions for growth (e.g. Acemoglu, et al. 2005) and so it is perhaps not surprising that 
resource curse scholars have investigated what effects if any resource abundance or 
dependence has an institutional quality. Resource dependence may provide public officials 
with greater scope for rent-seeking behaviour, unaccountable bureaucracies, and corruption. 
Yet resource revenue windfalls could also lead to stronger institutional quality if governments 
use them to implement better governance practices. Finally, resource dependence may not 
affect institutional quality per se, but might pose a blessing or a curse for growth conditional 
on the exogenous quality of the institutions a society has. 
Thus the link between resources, institutions, and growth can be split into three 
hypotheses: (a) Natural-resource intensity may affect institutional quality which in turn 
affects economic outcomes (Isham et al., 2005; Bulte, Damania and Deacon, 2005); (b) 
Institutional quality is exogenous to resource intensity but determines whether resources spur 
or hinder growth (Mehlum, et al. 2006); and (c) There is no association between resources 
and institutional quality (Brunnschweiler, 2008; Alexeev and Conrad, 2011). I will elabourate 
on the first two options listed above. 
The most common form of the first proposition is in the negative form, and says that 
resource abundance or dependence will have an adverse effect on the quality of institutions. 
Ross (2001) provides empirical evidence that resource-dependent governments are less 
dependent on tax revenues from the general population, making them less accountable to their 
populations. This impact can be more pronounced for point-source resources in particular 
(see Isham et al. (2005)). For example, Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) using cross-
country data in 97 countries find that countries that have a high share of fuel and mineral 
exports have lower rule-of-law indicators and lower measures of government effectiveness. 
This association is absent for countries with high shares of exports of more broadly based 




following 129 countries over the years of 1984-2007, and distinguish their sample between 
86 developing and 43 developed countries. They find that an increase in the share of natural 
resource exports in GDP is negatively associated with institutional quality measures such as 
the control of corruption. Busse and Groning also indicate that developing countries as a sub-
group have a positive association between dependence on resources and degree of corruption.  
Ross (2001) and Isham et al. (2005) refer to this detrimental effect of resource intensity 
on development as “rentier” effects. These effects are most likely to occur in resource 
abundant countries when revenues can be easily generated by extracting point resources, such 
as oil, coal, and minerals. Another consequence of rents is that they can enable states to fund 
repressive regimes which in turn may suppress dissent in ways that increase conflict and 
lessen incentives for private innovation.65 
While some studies seem to support this negative flow from resources to institutional 
quality to lack of growth, other studies fail to find support for this hypothesis. Some studies 
find no significant effect of mineral resource abundance on institutions, or even suggestive 
positive effects. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and Brunnschweiler (2008) in cross 
country analysis find positive and significant effects of total natural capital and sub-soil 
wealth assets per capita (averaged 1970-2000) on two governance quality indicators (rule of 
law and government effectiveness). This positive effect,  however, was not robust to the 
addition of controls for initial income levels. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) similarly fail to find 
that resource dependence worsens institutions. Using the ratio of mining in GDP, as well as 
mining output per capita, Alexeev and Conrad find no statistically significant effect from 
these mining measures on the rule of law index (for the year 2000).  Recently, Karimu et al. 
(2017) find resource rents (as a share of GDP) significantly improve public investment, 
though the strength of effect depends on institutional quality. Karimu et al. find that if 
resource windfalls are managed well, they have a positive effect on growth. Similarly, di John 
(2011) also finds little evidence that resource wealth raises corruption practices, countering 
the rent-seeking argument. In di John’s detailed survey, corruption levels in mineral abundant 
countries were lower and rose less than in non-mineral countries during the periods of 1965-
 
65 Both Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason and Zoega (2006) argue that natural resources may 
encourage poor insitutional rules by encouraging “rent-seeking” behaviour and a corruption culture. 
Resources foster close and hidden connections between extraction companies and government, as the latter 
has the power to issue exploitation licenses. This weakening of accountability for royalties revenues may 





1990 and 1990-2000. Di John also critiques the rent-seeking or rentier-state theory for failing 
to explain counter examples of long-run growth in developing countries such as Bostwana, 
Malaysia and Venezuela. 
As foreshadowed, an alternative hypothesis is that a country’s institutional quality is 
not affected by its resources but that its exogenous institutional quality determines whether 
resources help or hinder growth. Mehlum et al. (2006) have convicingly claimed that 
resources slow the growth of a country’s economy if it already has poor quality institutions, 
as reflected by a weak rule of law, a high degree on corruption, or ineffective bureaucracy. 
Informally, Mehlum et al. classify two types of institutions: “producer-friendly” and 
“grabber-friendly”. Producer-friendly institutions encourage income growth because they 
build secure business environments and attract entrepreneurs and investment. By contrast, 
grabber-friendly institutions reward unproductive activities of seeking wealth-transfers, 
reducing incentives for production.  
Mehlum et al. (2006) empirically test this hypothesis by regressing country-level 
average growth in real GDP per capita from 1965 to 1980 on resource dependence, measured 
as a share of primary exports in GNP in 1970, along with institutional quality and an 
interaction term between the two. They find the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, 
implying that as institutional quality improves, the negative effect of dependence on growth  
diminishes. This method has subsequently been widely used, for example by Arezki and van 
der Ploeg (2011), Libman (2013), and by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010). Oyinlola, 
Adeniyi and Raheem (2015) use this approach in the case of Africa using 47 countries and 
panel data analysis. They too find a positive and significant interaction effect, though their 
main effect of resource dependence on growth does not confirm Sachs and Warner’s original 
negative finding. 
A rare contrary finding regarding Mehlum et al’s. hypothesis comes from a cross-
country study by Brunnschweiler (2008) using the interaction term approach in an OLS 
framework. Brunnschweiler tries three alternative measures of resource abundance: total 
natural capital, mineral resource assets and Sachs and Warner’s resource export dependence 
measure. In contrast to Mehlum et al. when Brunnschweiler uses the first two resource 
measures, she finds the coefficient on the interaction term is negative, and that the main effect 
of resource abundance is positive. This implies that resource abundance spurred growth in 




the growth caused by resource abundance. However, when Brunnschweiler used the last 
measure of resource dependence, the results were consistent with those of Mehlum, et al. 
(2006). Based on her main findings, Brunnschweiler concludes that: “.... the more 
institutionally and economically developed countries have on average experienced lower 
positive growth effects of resource wealth.” (page 407).66  
Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012) use panel data for 30 oil-rich countries 
between 1993 and 2005. Bjorvatn et al. stress the effect of resource rents (the share of oil 
revenues in total government budget) on GDP per capita, but also use the effect of a political 
fractionalisation index and interact this measure with resource rents. This fractionalisation 
index is increasing in the number of political parties, which they interpret as a proxy for weak 
government (similar to Mehlum et al. and Brunnschweiler’s exception). Bjorvatn et al. find 
that oil revenues boost growth, while the interaction term with fractionalisation is negative 
and significant, implying that weak government diminishes the positive effect of oil rents on 
growth. 
 
3.2.1.4 Composition of Public Spending from Revenue Windfalls 
The last causal theory is associated with a proposition following the classical theory of 
fiscal federalism (Tiebout, 1956). This theory assumes that local governments are better 
informed about local preferences than national governments, and can thus provide better 
quality public spending as needed by local populations. Under such optimistic conditions, if 
resource revenues exist and are transferred to local governments, as some countries have done 
under fiscal decentralisation, this may improve accountability and public service delivery. 
Better public spending could in turn spur economic growth.67  
 
66 Alternatively, Arezki and van der Ploeg (2010) using cross country analysis covering the period 1965 to 
1990 do not find any statistically significant evidence of institutions or interaction between institutions and 
resource dependence on growth, either employing OLS or IV estimation. 
67 With regard to whether public investments have positive significant impacts on growth, some empirical 
studies still find mixed results. A study from Davoodi and Zou (1998) using cross-country regression, on 
the other hand, finds a weak negative relationship, between public spending and economic growth. 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) argue that positive and negative findings could arise depending on the extent 
to which investments (as a share of government investment in GDP) are allocated to productive uses. In 
their study, Atkinson and Hamilton regress government expenditure allocation on economic growth using 
cross-country regression in countries from Central America, the Middle East and North Africa, the OECD, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1980-1995. They find negative signs on both government investment 




Among resource curse scholars, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) are the first scholars 
who identify whether resource dependence could affect growth through its effects on the 
composition of public expenditures. They argue that resource wealth may hinder growth 
when governments poorly invest windfall resource revenues. Cust and Poelhekke (2015) 
express similar views specifically when under fiscal decentralisation policy resource royalties 
flow to local governments. In contrast to Tiebout’s optimism, Cust and Poelheke argue that 
such royalties may lessen growth if local level governments lack the capacity to administer 
resource windfalls. Others argue that a resource curse arises only where a country’s 
government (of whatever level) is unable to manage its resource revenues (Atkinson and 
Hamilton, 2003). Similarly, Collier & Goderis (2009) argue that government use of revenues 
generated from resource extraction may be inefficient, as governments face less pressure to 
account for its use than revenues raised via more broadly based taxation. Resource wealth 
can thus bring positive or negative effects on economic welfare, depending on the 
composition of government spending between genuine investments vs. wasteful consumption 
(Aragón, Chuhan-Pole and Land, 2015; Aragón and Rud, 2013).  
In theory, Aragón, et al. (2015) identify both positive and negative potential effects of 
revenue windfalls on government spending in resource-rich emerging economies. As Aragón 
et al. illustrate in Figure 3.2, revenue windfalls can expand public spending as a consequence 
of higher budget constraints. With strong institutions and effective governance, these resource 
revenue streams will be invested for local public provision such as public infrastructure, 
health care and education quantity or quality. These capital expenditures create spillover 
effects on the overall economy, raising incomes and living standards. On the other hand, 
revenue windfalls may hamper growth if they incite conflict within society generated from 
unfair distribution. Such conflicts may be more likely when institutions are weak, or 
government is ineffective in redistributing resource windfalls. 
Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) using data from the OECD and developing countries 
between 1970 and 2007 find that resource rents lower the level of public capital stock. They 
stress that for resources to boost growth, investments in resource-abundant countries should 
focus on public capital such as education, health and infrastructure.68 Likewise, using 
provincial data from China, Zhan, Duan and Zeng (2015) also find that resource dependence 
 
68 In their empirical paper, Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) find increased resource rents have been 




lowers government spending particularly on human capital-enhancing public goods such as 
education and health care. On the other hand, some papers show positive effects of resource 
revenues on the size or composition of public spending. Karimu et al. (2017), for example, 
focusing on resource-rents in 39 Sub-saharan Africa countries between the period 1990-2013, 
find that total natural resource rents are positively associated with government investment. 
Total rents here are defined as the sum of rents from petroleum activities, natural gas 
production, coal, minerals, and forest resources, while government investments include the 
level of public capital spending both at the central and regional level. Karimu et al. find that 
the increase in spending increases economic growth. Likewise, in a within-country study of 
Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find that municipal oil revenues increase spending in 




Figure 3.2. Revenue Windfall Effect and Transmission Channels 
 
Source: Aragón, et al. (2015, p.49) 




3.3 Data and Estimation Strategy 
3.3.1 Data  
To investigate whether the resource blessing for Indonesia has worked through my four 
candidate channels I use the same data as in my first chapter, including the time period from 
2006-2015. However, as the main purpose of this chapter is to test some potential causal 
channels of resources on growth in per capita income, several new data series are used.  
All additional data come from various Indonesian government ministries, which I then 
combine with the Indonesian Statistical Agency (BPS) dataset. For education, I use the 
district level high school enrolment rate from the Ministry of Education and Culture. Data on 
capital vs. non-capital spending comes from the Ministry of Finance. According to the BPS 
definition, capital spending comprises all expenses paid to produce tangible fixed assets 
whose benefit or value continues more than a year. It ranges from, for example, public 
servants’ office equipment, such as computers or photocopy machines, to road constructions, 
bridges, public buildings, etc.  
Measuring the quality of institutions at district level in Indonesia presents some 
challenges, as the Indonesian central government does not have a single standard measure 
covering all years of my analysis. Administratively, the central government did not have an 
instrument to evaluate district institution quality when decentralisation began in 1999 or when 
its implementation was completed in 2004. Fortunately, the Indonesia Audit Board (or BPK) 
did begin to issue audit reports which scored each district beginning in 2006. This audit score 
only captures each district’s ability to manage and produce financial statements to an 
approriate government accounting standard. Each district receives an assessment result based 
on auditor opinion after inspection, and is scored on a scale from 1 to 4, with the score 
increasing in assessed compliance.69 In spirit, this audit score captures the level of local 
administrative capacity, rather than the level of local corruption, though it may serve as an 
indirect proxy for the latter. 
A second, more comprehensive measure of institutional quality at district level 
becomes available in 2010. In 2008, the Indonesian government recognized the need in 
 
69 The opinion ranges from the worst to the best: cannot give any opinion, here scored as 1, to some degree 
acceptable = 2; performed well/qualified, but corrections needed = 3; qualified without any exception = 4. 





Government Rule No. 6/2008 to evaluate district governance more comprehensively. This 
culminated in a governance composite score that ranges from 0 to 4, with the number 
increasing in quality of governance. This index contains sub-indicators as follows: (a) 
compliance with the rules and procedures laid out for local districts in national law; (b) 
intensity and effectiveness of public consultation processes with local residents; (c) 
transparency in budget planning, and in reporting sources of income and its allocation; (d) 
local government innovation to improve the local region.70 Since 2010, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs has announced evaluation of each district government’s performance index score each 
year.71  
Note that even my first institutional quality measure does not enable me to exactly 
replicate the full years of analysis used in Chapter I. The measure requires the loss of 2006 
(now used as a base year). 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Estimation Strategy 
3.3.2.1 Causal Channel Investigation 
To investigate whether the resource blessing found for Indonesia has operated through 
any of my four candidate causal channels, I will use a three step procedure. The first step 
simply repeats the first difference equations estimated in Chapter 2, which provides an 
estimate of the overall (reduced form) effect of rises in resource dependence on growth in 
GRDP, now between 2007 and 2015.72 
My approach for the second step is fairly straight forward. Again using first differences 
I estimate the extent to which each potential causal channel is affected by resource 
dependence, as follows: 
∆𝐶𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛽∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜎∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 (1) 
 
70 The guidance on how to explicitly measure this index is explained in the Minister of Home Affairs Rule 
No. 73/2009.  
71 A decision list of these evaluation scores is published yearly in PDF format on the Ministry of Home 
Affairs website (http://otda.kemendagri.go.id/). 
72 I use the following regression function: Change in GRDP per capita = f(Change in resource dependence, 
other control variables), to see the direct effect of resources on district GRDP per capita growth. Both OLS 





The subscript 𝑖 represents each district, and first differencing is a way to control for the 
unobserved individual effects of districts. ∆𝐶𝑖 stands for the change in each potential channel. 
It consists respectively of a change in GRDP from manufacturing (∆𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑖), not in logs, to 
capture the original size of this sector, a change in high school enrolment rates (∆𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖), 
in institutional quality (∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖), and in public spending (∆𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖). Each is regressed 
separately, or : 
 ∆𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛽∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜎∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 ......................... (2) 
 ∆𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛽∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜎∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 ......................... (3) 
 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛽∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜎∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 ......................... (4) 
 ∆𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛽∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜎∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 ......................... (5) 
 
In each case, ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  measures the change in resource dependence in district i between 
2007-2015. As in Chapter 1, I try four alternative measures of dependence, namely mining’s 
share of district GRDP, or the share of district government total revenues that come from 
mining in general, or from oil and gas in particular, or from coal in particular. I expect that 
the coefficient on ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 in equations (2)-(5) will be positive, assuming each channel positively 
contributes to growth, and given that resource dependence was found to have a positive 
overall effect on growth. The ∆𝑋′𝑖 includes a set of control variables that is commonly used 
in the growth literature, such as changes in the labour force participation rate, the initial level 
of district population in 2006 (in logs) and the log of GRDP per capita in 2006.73 Initial 
population is included to control for potential pro-growth effects of economies of scale. I also 
control for the total number of earthquake events over the 9 year period. Dummy variables 
are also included to distinguish urban from non-urban districts (DURBAN) and districts 
located on Java Island or not (DJAVA), to allow for variation in growth within Indonesia.74  
The ordinal nature of my institutional quality measures requires some care when put in 
first differenced form. I begin by treating the auditor scores as cardinal, and take simple 
difference in each district’s score over time. I then reanalyse equation (4) recognizing that the 
 
73 Some control variables common in the cross-country growth literature are absent. For example, it is 
impossible to get data on openness to trade at district level. 
74 I do not use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model to estimate (2) – (5) simultaneously 
because the same control variables, ∆𝑋′𝑖 , are included in every equation. These variables are specified in 




auditor scores are ordinal, and collapsing changes over time to the three possible categories 
“improved”, “stayed same” or “worsened”. I then use an ordered probit of (4) (with or without 
instrumental variables) using the IV-Probit under Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) module 
in Stata provided by Roodman (2009).  
As in my first chapter, I address the possible endogeneity of each district’s level of 
resource dependence over the two years considered by using two types of instrumental 
variables. I again use as one instrument district resource abundance (RA) measures in the 
1970’s for oil and gas and coal at district level, which were constructed using historical 
resource maps mapped to modern district boundaries using ArcGIS Software. Areas 
containing oil and natural gas deposits had been largely identified by this time. While 
Indonesia’s national government had limited fiscal and technological capacity for exploration 
prior to the 1980’s, it had entered into potential production-sharing agreements with 
multinational companies who had done so. I also use the second instrument of the difference 
in physical oil, natural gas, and coal mining production from 2006-2015, following Caselli 
and Michaels (2013) for Brazil, and Cust and Rusli (2016) for Indonesia.  
After testing whether resource dependence affects each potential causal channel of 
growth, I run the third and final step by regressing the change in real GRDP per capita on 
∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  as in step one, but now along with all potential causal channels simultaneously, as well 
as the other control variables from step one. The step three model is thus : 
∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛿1∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿2∆𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿3∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛿4∆𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛿5∆𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖  𝛽2 +  𝑖    (6) 
 
As before, ∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖 is 𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,2015) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,2007), capturing growth in per 
capita income over an eight year period.  
Together, these three steps should enable us to test the extent to which the resource 
blessing experienced by Indonesia is operating via any of the four potential causal channels. 
The coefficient on ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  in step one indicates the total reduced form effect of resource 
dependence on growth. The coefficients on ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  in equations (2) to (5) of step 2 indicate the 
extent to which resource dependence is affecting these potential causal channels. Finally, the 
coefficient on ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 in step three should indicate the residual effect of resource dependence 
on growth that is not explained by the four channels. In addition, the coefficients on each of 




whether movements in those channels are caused by resource dependence, or by other 
influences. 
This three step strategy will use ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental 
variables with the feasible efficient two-step GMM estimator (or IV-GMM hereafter) 
developed by Schaffer, Baum and Stillman (2003).  
3.3.2.2 Testing the Effect of Institutions on Whether Resources Help or Hinder 
Growth 
 
For institutional quality in particular, the three step procedure described above will be 
used to test the hypothesis that resource dependence itself changes institutional quality, which 
in turn affects growth. However, many papers have tested the alternative hypothesis that 
institutional quality is not itself affected by resource dependence, but rather, is critical in 
determining whether resource dependence will help or hinder growth. 
Here I use two methods to test this alternative hypothesis. First, I use an initial baseline 
level of district institutional quality as a benchmark to rank and separate the districts between 
the 50% with highest and lowest measured quality. I use the initial financial audit score of 
each district in 2006, to divide them into two groups of 390/2 = 195 each, and then test if 
resource dependence subsequently raised growth for the stronger district sample, and lowered 
growth for the weaker district sample. 
I repeat this exercise for my better but shorter duration quality measure using the 
baseline year 2010. Either way, I then run the same model as in the first step for the stronger 
and weaker samples separately.  
The stronger institutions group specification is expressed as follows: 
 ∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 = 𝛾 + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2∆𝑋′𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟  +  𝑖 
 
(7) 
The second group equation is: 
 ∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 = 𝛾 + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2∆𝑋′𝑖,𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟  +  𝑖 
 
(8) 
I also try this with instruments for resource dependence as before, so that the first and 




 ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛾𝑅𝐴1970𝑠 +  𝛾∆𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖 +  𝛾∆𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖 +  𝛾∆𝐶𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 (9) 
 
 ∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1∆𝑅?̂?𝑖 + 𝜋2∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖 (10) 
The second method for testing this alternative hypothesis follows Mehlum et al. (2006) 
in using an interaction term with the whole sample of districts. Here I check whether the 
beneficial effect of resources on growth is increasing in institutional quality. To implement 
this, I run a first step regression of the whole sample as before that now includes a measure 
of institutional quality, and an interaction term between dependence and institutional quality. 
This takes the form: 
∆𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛿1∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛿3(∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝛿4∆𝑋′𝑖  +  𝑖    (11) 
 
Here 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 is institutional quality at a base year of 2006. As before, I also try an 
instrumental variable approach to account for the possible endogeneity of ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖  including its 
interaction with 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟.  Note that, owing to a lack of 𝐼𝑛𝑠 measures in 2005, (7)-(11) 
are run for the difference in values between 2007 and 2015, rather than 2006 and 2015. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Summary statistics for my potential causal channels and other variables are reported in 
Table 3.1 in difference form, just as they will be used in regressions. My first-difference 
models here use 390 observations following the number of districts in Indonesia between 
2007-2015.  
The average change in real GRDP per capita (in logs) is 0.372 and the standard 
deviation is 0.340. Note that district changes in resource dependence over this time were 
small on average, but with large individual cases of both positive and negative change. For 
example, the largest rise in mining dependence is 0.793 over these eight years. Similarly, the 
share of local government revenues from resources all rose by as much as 0.239, 0.256, and 
0.3660 for oil/gas, mining, and coal, respectively, for individual districts. On average, 
Indonesian districts became slightly more resource dependent over this time as measured by 
share of GRDP or local government coal revenues, but local district governments become 





Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs) 390 0.373 0.340 -0.876 2.603 
∆Mining Dependence 390 0.012 0.139 -0.613 0.793 
∆Mining Revenue 390 -0.012 0.085 -0.507 0.257 
∆OilGas Revenue 390 -0.027 0.088 -0.619 0.240 
∆Coal Revenue 390 0.015 0.046 -0.060 0.366 
Earthquake 390 0.464 0.936 0.000 7.000 
∆Labour force participation rate 390 0.067 0.114 -0.133 0.415 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) 390 3.958 0.697 1.961 7.609 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 390 5.834 1.016 2.534 8.324 
DURBAN 390 0.208 0.406 0.000 1.000 
DJAVA 390 0.303 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Oil and gas deposit_continuous 390 0.154 0.660 0.000 7.000 
Coal deposit_continous 390 3.660 14.327 0.000 94.214 
OilGas_binary 390 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000 
Coal deposit_binary 390 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000 
∆oil production (thousand 
barrels) 
390 -165.588 3304.062 -22034.380 51931.340 
∆gas production (MMBTU) 390 2767.066 33453.220 -336333.700 382843.900 
∆ coal production (IDR) 390 61.194 483.250 -3692.962 5614.593 
∆Share spending on capital 390 0.001 0.099 -0.307 0.452 
∆Institutional Quality (capacity) 390 1.167 1.054 -2.000 3.000 
∆Net enrolment ratio 390 0.163 0.119 -0.172 0.617 
∆Manufact  (in 10,000 IDR) 390 0.046 0.159 -0.654 1.926 
InsQual06 (performance) 390 2.510 0.845 1.000 4.000 
InsQual10 (performance) 383 2.468 0.423 0.686 3.240 
Note: Detailed definition and variable source are given in Appendix 3.1 
Focusing on the four candidate transmission channels, the high school student 
enrolment rate grew substantially by 16.29 percentage points on average over this eight year 
period. The share of local government spending on capital fell slightly on average over this 
time, but with considerable variation across districts. The Institutional Quality (capacity) 
measure provided by auditors rose sharply on average, though again with considerable 
variation. Note that with score levels from 1 to 4, differences ranged in practice from +3 to -
2. The formal results of testing the association between resource dependence and these four 
causal channels and how these channels affect district economic performance will be 





3.4.1 Channels Investigation 
As mentioned in section 3.3.2., this investigation follows a three step procedure. I first 
report the first difference (FD hereafter) results as I did in Chapter 2, showing the overall 
impact of changes in resource dependence on district growth. Since the data used in this 
causal channels investigation uses the difference between 2007 and 2015 rather than 2006 
and 2015, the results differ slightly from those in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 in the previous chapter.75 
Table 3.2 presents the overall effect of changes in four different resource dependence 
measures (∆Mining Dependence, ∆Mining Revenue, ∆OilGas Revenue, ∆Coal Revenue). For 
comparison, I place the results for both OLS regressions and instrumental variable (IV-
GMM) estimators side by side. In general, my instruments under IV-GMM seem to have less 
weakness than with the slightly longer time interval of Chapter 1, ranging from 9.046 for 
column (2’) to 12.266 and 16.081 for columns (1’) and (3’).76 Since I have two instruments 
(historical resource abundance (in continuous form) and change in physical output of natural 
resources) but only one suspected endogenous variable, I can also report an overidentification 
test. The Hansen J statistics, which are valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity, show that 
in all models (1’)-(4’), the p-values fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. 
Hausman-type tests regarding whether the resource dependence measure is exogenous reject 
this null in models (2’)-(4’) at the 5% level, and are near borderline in model (1’), suggesting 
as in Chapter 1 that my resource dependence measures are endogenous.77  
Moving to the results, as I found in the first chapter, in general resource dependence 
positively contributes to income per capita in local regions. Concentrating on column (3’) of 
two-step GMM, I find that income per capita growth is significantly raised by an increase in 
local government dependence on oil and gas revenues. A standard deviation increase in the 
change in oil and gas dependence is associated with a (=0.0883 * 1.119 = 0.098) 9.8 per cent 
increase in income per capita between 2007 and 2015. As in Chapter 1, the baseline year 
 
75 In Chapter 2 I use a  9 year difference, 2015-2006, and retain 2005 as my baseline year. Reassuringly, 
the results are similar in terms of coeffcient signs and significance. Table 2.7 in the previous chapter used 
historical resource abundance in continuous form, which is the form I use in this chapter.  
76 An F statistic equal or greater than 10 is commonly acceptable as a benchmark to evaluate instrument 
strength (Wooldridge, 2016).  
77 For brevity, I report only the coefficients on the key resource dependence variable, though all control 
variables used in step 1 are also included. Full results are reported in Appendices B through K. Table 3.2 
only reports results using the historical resource abundance instrument in continuous form. The results 




GRDP per capita also influences subsequent growth in all models, supporting the 
convergence hypothesis as postulated in the growth literature. 
I turn next to the second step procedure to test whether each potential causal channel is 
affected by resource dependence. Table 3.3 summarises results using FD under both OLS and 
IV-GMM, along with test results of instrument weakness, exogeneity, and endogeneity of the 
main resource dependence variable. Results for each candidate are given in regressions (1)-
(4), where each case provides results for my four alternative resource dependence measures. 
Each candidate is presented in turn, beginning with changes in manufacturing output.78  
Before interpreting the results, I begin with validity checks for my two instruments for 
resource dependence. Beginning with regressions for manufacturing and net enrolment ratio, 
the Kleibergen F statistic shows in general correlations between instruments and resource 
dependence for manufacturing, with values above 10, or nearly 10, as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2016, p.478). The same strength also applies for net enrolment ratio, with 3 of 
4 values of its Kleibergen F statistic greater than 10. In tests of overidentification, the p values 
of Hansen J tests fail to reject that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term for both 
manufacturing and net enrolment ratios. Finally, for both causal candidates tests for 
endogeneity of resource dependence fail to reject exogeneity in IV-GMM models (2’)-(4’), 
but reject it at the 10% level for model (1’) (p-value of 0.0397 for manufacturing and 0.0529 
for net enrolment variable). Instrument validity test results are similar for regressions 
regarding public capital spending, with most of the weakness F test values high and the 
overidentification tests failing to reject the null of instrument exogeneity. Similarly, for public 
spending exogeneity of resource dependence is rejected only for the first measure of resource 
dependence, mining’s share in GRDP.  
Instrument validity results differ, however, for institutional quality regressions. 
Although the instruments remain strongly correlated with resource dependence measures, 
Hansen J p values are smaller, between the .06 and .10 levels in all models (1’)-(4’). This 
suggests the instruments may be correlated with the structural error terms in institutional 
quality regressions, and thus not exogenous. However, if we use the stricter significance level 
of 5%, all models fail to reject instrument exogeneity. Regarding the test of whether resource 
 
78 Note that for brevity, I only show the coefficients related with the effect of my four resource dependence 
proxies on each four causal channels transmission. The full results including all control variables are 




dependence is exogeneous using these instruments, only column (2’) has a p-value less than 
10%, implying that for resource dependence models (1), (3) and (4) OLS results may be valid. 
Moving to the findings, in general, rising natural resource dependence increased most 
of the channels investigated, with the exception of public spending on capital, both in OLS 
and IV-GMM regression. Beginning with the effects of the four resource dependence 
measures on manufacturing activity, I find that rises in three of four of them are positively 
correlated with the size of increases in manufacturing output (measured as real district GRDP 
in Indonesia currency (10,000 IDR)), with the notable exception of coal revenue dependence. 
For example, referring to the coefficient in column (2), a standard deviation increase (0.085) 
in the change in the share of mining revenues in total local government revenues is associated 
with an increase of (0.085*0.183 = 0.0155) 1.55 percentage points in manufacturing output.  
Regarding high school enrolment, in all four OLS estimations, the sign of the effect of 
rising resource dependence on change in net enrolment ratio is positive, and in 3 of 4 cases 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. These positive associations occur whether 
dependence is measured through mining’s share of district GRDP, or its total share in 
government revenues, or share of oil/gas revenues, leaving only coal revenue share with no 
significant association. Focusing on the IV result given in column (1’) as indicated by 
endogeneity tests, a standard deviation increase in the change in the share of mining 
dependence raises the enrolment rate of students in high school by (0.139 * 0.381 = 0.0525) 
5.25 percentage points. 
With regards to public spending composition effects, I find less evidence that rising 
resource dependence leads to greater proportional spending on capital. Only the OLS 
estimation for coal revenue dependence has a significant positive impact on local capital 
spending. For the other three measures of resource dependence and for all IV-GMM models, 
there is no significant association with proportion of local spending on capital. Taking the 
only significant result in column (4), a one standard deviation increase in the change in coal’s 
share of total government budget, on average, increases the share of local government 
spending on capital by (=0.046 * 0.453 = 0.0208) 2.08 percentage points, holding all other 
factors constant.  
Less valid instruments notwithstanding, I also find that all resource dependence 
measures are positively correlated with institutional quality, contrary to the rent-seeking 




and unproductive, inhibiting improvements in institutions. Focusing on OLS models, rising 
resource dependence has a positive significant effect on raising quality of institutions, with 
the exception being local government dependence on oil and gas revenues, where the positive 
coefficient is not significant. Interestingly, rising dependence on coal mining revenues seems 
to have a strong impact on raising district financial administrative capacity, with or without 
instruments. Taking the example of column (2), a one unit (i.e. 0.01) increase in mining’s 
share of district total budget is associated with an increase in auditor score of 0.0158 index 
units, while under IV-GMM estimation it is associated with an increase of 0.0321 index units. 
To summarise, I have so far found evidence that resource dependence is positively associated 
with three of my four candidate measures: size of manufacturing sector, high school 
enrolment rates, and institutional quality.  
Before proceeding to my third step, however, I relax my assumption treating 
institutional quality as a cardinal variable. I use instead ordered probit estimation (for audited 
quality that has risen, stayed the same, or fallen), while the independent variables remain as 
before. Table 3.4 presents estimated coefficients under ordered probit with and without 
instruments. I find again that for all resource dependence measures rising resource 
dependence appears positively associated with changes in institutional quality. However, I 
now find that in only 2 rather than 3 out of 4 cases, columns (2) and (4), is the association 
significant at the 5 per cent level. The marginal effects for illustrating the magnitude of effect 
for each resource dependence measure are reported in Table 3.5. As presented, an increase in 
the share of local government revenues from mining in its total budget from 0% to 100% 
increases the probability of institutional quality improving over time by 59.5 per cent and 
decreases the probability of it worsening by 9.3 per cent. Similarly, an increase in coal 
revenue dependence tends to increase the probability that institutions improve (the marginal 
effect of a rise from 0% to 100% is to raise the likelihood of improving by 181 per cent, and 
to reduce the likelihood of worsening by 28.1 per cent). 
As mentioned in section 3.3.2.2, I also show the results of ordered probit using 
instrumental variables (hereafter IV Oprobit) to deal with possible endogeneity of the main 
regressor in Table 3.4. The key first stage results of all instruments are shown in each column 
where IV estimation is labelled. They show that my instruments are indeed significantly 
correlated with each resource dependence measure at the 1 per cent level, which means that 
the excluded instruments are not weak. However, the CMP Stata module that I used to 




assume that my instruments do not directly affect changes in institutional quality except 
through their effects on resource dependence. The endogeneity tests of resource dependence 
are shown by the atanhrho p-values. The null hypothesis for this is that each measure of 
resource dependence is exogenous. Since the results show that all models fail to reject the 
null, it would suggest that the regular ordered probit estimates may be valid.   
For completeness, however, the IV Oprobit models again find a positive association 
between resource dependence and institutional quality, but again significantly so only in one 
of four cases: coal revenue dependence. For coal in particular, my OLS or IV Oprobit results 
may indicate that the coal boom experienced during 2000-2012 has contributed to increasing 
district government administrative capacity. This could occur if increased coal revenues have 
been used to raise the quality and training of regional civil servants that might in turn improve 
administrative processes.  
Thus my step two results so far provide evidence that district resource dependence, 
with the absence of coal dependence measure, has had a positive influence on three factors 
generally thought to contribute to the change in per capita income: size of manufacturing, 
high school enrolment rates, and possibly institutional quality. However, I have not yet 
established whether these three factors, or composition of public spending on capital, actually 
contribute to income growth within Indonesia, nor the extent to which they can account for 




Table 3.2. OLS and IV regressions 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
Independent Variables OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.678*** 1.539***       
 (0.191) (0.483)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.211 1.032***     
   (0.272) (0.381)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.0385 1.119**   
     (0.384) (0.494)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.672 -0.642 
       (0.583) (0.699) 
Earthquake -0.028** -0.025 -0.029** -0.0219** -0.030** -0.0276** -0.027** -0.032*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.226 0.237 0.261 0.379** 0.232 0.322* 0.262 0.196 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.171) (0.155) (0.166) (0.176) (0.187) (0.182) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.116*** -0.099*** -0.131*** -0.104*** -0.136*** -0.076 -0.156*** -0.121*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.047) (0.033) (0.037) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.011 0.022 0.008 0.025 0.005 0.026 0.008 0.002 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
DURBAN 0.049 0.073* 0.041 0.045 0.040 0.026 0.058 0.026 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046) 
DJAVA 0.083* 0.140** 0.028 -0.009 0.032 -0.025 0.042 0.027 
 (0.047) (0.064) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) 
Constant 0.723*** 0.551*** 0.826*** 0.628*** 0.860*** 0.542*** 0.904*** 0.837*** 
 (0.138) (0.175) (0.151) (0.140) (0.166) (0.168) (0.160) (0.162) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  12.266  9.046  16.081  14.164 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.4228  0.1824  0.2910  0.9786 
Endog test, p-value  0.1195  0.0597  0.0491  0.0079 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.156 0.045 0.091 0.054 0.088 0.031 0.094 0.070 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are district’s historical resource abundance in 
the 1970’s and the 1980’s (continuous form) and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, 




Table 3.3. Summary of OLS and IV regressions: resource dependence and four potential causal channels of growth in per capita income 
 (1) (𝟏’) (2) (𝟐’) (3) (𝟑’) (4) (𝟒’) 
VARIABLES OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Regression (1): Dep. Variable:  ∆Manufacturing output 
∆Mining Dependence 0.081 0.319*       
 (0.053) (0.184)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.183** 0.255**     
   (0.073) (0.122)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.378*** 0.385**   
     (0.119) (0.167)   
∆Coal Revenue       -0.594*** -0.710* 
       (0.209) (0.367) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  12.266  9.046  16.081  14.164 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.2525  0.1938  0.2404  0.5448 
Endog test, p-value  0.0397  0.1325  0.2079  0.7551 
Regression (2): Dep. Variable: ∆Net Enrolment Ratio for student in high school 
∆Mining Dependence 0.119*** 0.381***       
 (0.044) (0.119)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.198*** 0.282***     
   (0.060) (0.099)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.190*** 0.302***   
     (0.064) (0.106)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.102 0.206 
       (0.137) (0.229) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  12.266  9.046  16.081  14.164 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.3768  0.3757  0.2775  0.7943 
Endog test, p-value  0.0529  0.5067  0.3041  0.5978 
Regression (3): Dep. Variable:  ∆Institutional Quality 
∆Mining Dependence 0.700* 2.499***       
 (0.404) (0.889)       
∆Mining Revenue   1.583*** 3.208***     
   (0.585) (0.629)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.986 2.195**   




 (1) (𝟏’) (2) (𝟐’) (3) (𝟑’) (4) (𝟒’) 
VARIABLES OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
∆Coal Revenue       2.667*** 5.051*** 
       (0.967) (1.936) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  12.266  9.046  16.081  14.164 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.0665  0.0615  0.0982  0.0730 
Endog test, p-value  0.1681  0.0726  0.2110  0.1954 
Regression (4): Dep. Variable:  ∆Public spending on capital 
∆Mining Dependence 0.059 -0.066       
 (0.042) (0.140)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.058 0.001     
   (0.082) (0.128)     
∆OilGas Revenue     -0.069 0.015   
     (0.085) (0.149)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.453** 0.343 
       (0.182) (0.283) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  12.266  9.046  16.081  14.164 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.1269  0.1079  0.4936  0.0291 
Endog test, p-value  0.440  0.7246  0.4757  0.7665 
Notes: Year difference is 2007 and 2015. Instruments used for all resource dependence measures are district historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s 
(continuous form) and the change in physical production for oil, natural gas, and coal. The full results for each causal channel including the other control variables are 
attached in Appendices (3.2)-(3.8). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refers to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   




Table 3.4. Ordered probit results (with and without instruments) 
 Dependent Variable: Change in Institutional Quality (ordinal measure) 
Independent Variables Oprobit IV Oprobit Oprobit IV Oprobit Oprobit IV Oprobit Oprobit IV Oprobit 
∆Mining Dependence 0.779 2.397       
 (0.560) (2.210)       
∆Mining Revenue   1.986** 2.601     
   (0.834) (1.905)     
∆OilGas Revenue     1.256 0.613   
     (0.886) (0.775)   
∆Coal Revenue       6.033*** 12.002** 
       (2.189) (0.011) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Wald Chi2 24.71  31.06  26.52  31.69  
Prob > Chi2 0.0009 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0495  0.0548  0.0490  0.0560  
LR chi2  104.72  239.64  291.48  254.65 
Log likelihood  21.64  280.65  290.35  529.69 
Atanhrho, p-value  0.469  0.713  0.737  0.123 
Instruments p-value (1st 
stage regression) 
        
- Oil & gas 
abundance 
 0.000  0.000  0.000   
- Coal abundance  0.102  0.000    0.000 
- Oil production  0.001  0.000  0.000   
- Gas production  0.040  0.002  0.000   
- Coal production  0.428  0.000    0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  






Table 3.5. Ordered probit results (marginal effects) 
 Worsened Stayed same Improved 
Variable of interest M.E P value M.E P value M.E P value 
∆Mining Dependence -0.036 0.184 -0.198 0.165 0.235 0.162 
∆Mining Revenue -0.093 0.047 0.501 0.018 0.595 0.017 
∆OilGas Revenue -0.059 0.178 -0.320 0.159 0.379 0.156 
∆Coal Revenue -0.281 0.051 -1.527 0.005 1.809 0.006 
Observations 390  390  390  
Note: M.E is marginal effect 
Table 3.6 reports the step three regressions in which the four candidate transmission 
channels are added as control variables to the first step regressions. I again place OLS and 
IV-GMM estimations together for comparison. As before, I start by testing necessary 
conditions for whether my instruments for resource dependence are still valid. As shown in 
columns (1’)-(4’), the Kleibergen F values range from 8.165 (column 2’) to 14.541 (column 
4’), with 3 of four cases above 10. These values suggest the instruments remain relatively 
strong. According to overidentification tests, the instruments seem to satisfy the exclusion 
restriction criteria (see the high p values of the Hansen J statistics). Finally, the exogeneity of 
my resource dependence measures can be rejected in almost all cases at the .10 level or better, 
suggesting that the IV-GMM specifications are preferable to OLS. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
these validity test results are similar to those found in step one.    
Turning to the results of my final step, I first check whether the candidate transmission 
channels are in fact positively associated with the rate of economic growth within Indonesia 
over the 2007 to 2015 period. Across all resource dependence measures, growth in real 
manufacturing output has a positive sign, but is not significant. Similarly a rise in high school 
enrolment rates has a positive or negative sign across models, but is similarly never 
significantly associated with growth.  
In contrast, the share of public spending on capital appears to be positively associated 
with local growth for all models as expected, indicating that prioritising capital spending does 
significantly improve growth in three of four IV-GMM models. For example, the IV-GMM 
estimation in column (3’) finds that a standard deviation increase in the change in the share 
of government spending on capital increases per capita income between 2007 and 2015 on 
average by (0.099 * 0.470 = 0.046) 4.6 per cent. Since the share of public spending on capital 
was not itself found to be raised by increasing resource dependence in step 2, this would 




cannot be credited with acting through this particular channel to have raised growth in 
Indonesia. 
Finally, the candidate causal channel that is found to be must robustly positively 
associated with economic growth is institutional quality. In particular districts that garnered 
increases in auditor opinion scores between 2007 and 2015 had on average higher growth in 
per capita incomes. Taking model (3’) as an example, a standard deviation increase in the 
change in the audit opinion score is associated with a (=1.054*0.0365 = 0.037) 3.7 per cent 
increase in GRDP between 2007 and 2015. Given that rising resource dependence was found 
to increase institutional quality in step two, this would suggest that institutional quality may 
be a promising channel among these four candidates through which resource dependence is 
raising economic growth in Indonesia.  
With respect to control variables outside the four candidates, in step three initial income 
per capita (in 2006) again has a robust negative effect on subsequent growth rates statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level in all models. As in step one, earthquake incidents remain 
clearly harmful for district growth, while urban status (DURBAN) remains positively 
associated. Labour force participation rates and initial population remain mostly insignificant.  
Finally, I compare the residual direct effect of resource dependence on growth in the 
third step with what it was before the four candidates were introduced in step 1. The lower 
panel of Table 3.7 compares the overall effects and calculates the portion explained by the 
four factors collectively by substracting the coefficient on resource dependence between the 
first and final step. As reported, the residual direct effect remains quantitatively large meaning 
that the portion of resource dependence’s effects on growth captured by my four causal 
candidates is limited. The fall in coefficient values only ranges from 0.065 to 0.125, where 
the largest value refers to the effect of mining dependence on growth under the IV-GMM 
model. If we consider the change effects captured by my four candidates, according to model 
(1), for example, the proportion explained is 0.122 or 12.2 per cent. Thus, although 
institutional quality is shown both to be raised by rising resource dependence, and in turn to 
raise growth in GRDP per capita, neither it nor the other 3 candidate factors collectively can 
account for most of the positive effect resource dependence seems to have had on growth in 





Table 3.6. OLS and IV regressions: resource dependence, causal channels, and local per capita income 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
Independent Variables FD1 IV FD2 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV 
∆Mining Dependence 0.595*** 1.414***       
 (0.174) (0.512)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.0224 0.967**     
   (0.255) (0.390)     
∆OilGas Revenue     -0.118 1.030**   
     (0.364) (0.490)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.492 -0.502 
       (0.604) (0.710) 
∆Manufacturing output 0.277 0.0875 0.322 0.0685 0.335 0.0337 0.345 0.270 
 (0.219) (0.170) (0.229) (0.158) (0.231) (0.151) (0.233) (0.221) 
∆Net enrolment ratio 0.014 -0.161 0.112 -0.0598 0.124 -0.048 0.107 0.137 
 (0.149) (0.165) (0.144) (0.148) (0.145) (0.152) (0.151) (0.149) 
∆Institutions 0.0390*** 0.0294** 0.0462*** 0.0360** 0.0471*** 0.0365** 0.0445*** 0.0481*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.0160) (0.0157) 
∆Public spending on capital 0.531** 0.316* 0.598** 0.432** 0.595** 0.470** 0.564** 0.593** 
 (0.232) (0.186) (0.259) (0.196) (0.257) (0.224) (0.266) (0.247) 
Earthquake -0.0292** -0.0287 -0.0292** -0.0238** -0.0289** -0.0293** -0.0271** -0.0309** 
 (0.0133) (0.0185) (0.0120) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.204 0.187 0.213 0.332** 0.198 0.288* 0.234 0.174 
 (0.172) (0.170) (0.168) (0.145) (0.162) (0.166) (0.183) (0.176) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.158*** -0.129*** -0.180*** -0.133*** -0.188*** -0.109** -0.194*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0408) (0.0313) (0.0347) (0.0340) (0.0474) (0.0352) (0.0386) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) -0.00315 0.0187 -0.00943 0.0217 -0.0112 0.0233 -0.00837 -0.00403 
 (0.0261) (0.0197) (0.0288) (0.0192) (0.0290) (0.0214) (0.0284) (0.0265) 
DURBAN 0.0747* 0.0866* 0.0741* 0.0682 0.0781* 0.0523 0.0846* 0.0676 
 (0.0431) (0.0448) (0.0424) (0.0433) (0.0405) (0.0491) (0.0431) (0.0436) 
DJAVA 0.0586 0.116* 0.0127 -0.0209 0.0177 -0.0299 0.0182 0.00365 
 (0.0457) (0.0670) (0.0414) (0.0394) (0.0429) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0425) 
Constant 0.914*** 0.689*** 1.032*** 0.726*** 1.068*** 0.646*** 1.071*** 0.943*** 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.228) (0.171) (0.240) (0.201) (0.230) (0.228) 
Kleibergen F stat  10.893  8.165  12.926  14.541 
Hansen J, p value  0.3463  0.1168  0.2059  0.3340 
Endogeneity, p value  0.1872  0.0610  0.0472  0.0903 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 





Table 3.7. Residual Effects 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD1 IV FD2 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV 
Coefficients in the First Step (A)         
∆Mining Dependence 0.678*** 1.539***       
 (0.191) (0.483)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.211 1.032***     
   (0.272) (0.381)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.0385 1.119**   
     (0.384) (0.494)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.672 -0.642 
       (0.583) (0.699) 
Coefficients in the Third Step (B)         
∆Mining Dependence 0.595*** 1.414***       
 (0.174) (0.512)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.0224 0.967**     
   (0.255) (0.390)     
∆OilGas Revenue     -0.118 1.030**   
     (0.364) (0.490)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.492 -0.502 
       (0.604) (0.710) 
Residual Effects (A) – (B) 0.083 0.125  0.065  0.089   
Notes: For Table 3.6. and 3.7. Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Year difference is 2007 and 2015. Instruments used for all resource dependence 
measures are districts historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s (continuous  form) and the physical natural resources production for oil, natural gas, 




3.4.2 Institutional Quality Effects  
3.4.2.1 Split sample results: districts with stronger vs. weaker institutions 
In this section, I provide the results of testing the auxiliary hypothesis in the resource 
curse literature that resource dependence aids growth for jurisdictions that already have good 
institutions, but harms growth for those who do not. Following the strategy explained in 
Section 3.3.2.2, I start with the split sample strategy which shows the overall effect of changes 
in resource dependence between 2007 and 2015 on growth in local income per capita for 
districts that had stronger or weaker institutions in 2006. As before, I include OLS and IV-
GMM FD estimators. Results are shown in Table 3.8 for OLS, and Table 3.9 for IV-GMM. 
As shown in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.8 most resource dependence coefficients are 
positive for districts with stronger institutions, but none is significant. For districts with 
weaker institutions, the coefficients are indeed negative for two of four models, but not 
significant. They are positive for the other two models, significantly so for model (1). Thus 
without instruments, I find no evidence in support of the hypothesis that resource dependence 
is worse for growth in districts with poorer institutional quality.   
I next turn to Table 3.9 that reports analogous results under IV-GMM, addressing as 
before potential possible endogeneity of each resource dependence measure. I begin by 
checking whether my continuous form of historical resource abundance plus physical 
resources production are valid instruments for the split samples. For stronger institution 
districts, the Kleibergen-Paap rank F statistics range from 13.802 to 243.487, suggesting 
strong instruments. For weaker institution districts, the F statistic is only 1.021 for model (1), 
but for in excess of 10 for the other three measures. The p-values of Hansen J tests are well 
above p values of .10 in all models, consistent with exogeneity of my instruments. Using both 
criteria, my instruments pass necessary conditions for validity in 7 of 8 cases. With respect 
to exogeneity of my resource dependence measures, this can be rejected only for model (4’) 
among weaker institution districts. 
Discussing IV results nonetheless, as in Table 3.9, I do not find evidence that resource 
dependence has more positive effects on growth in districts with higher institutional quality 
than in districts with lower institutional quality. The four resource dependence coefficients in 
stronger institution districts in columns (1’)-(4’) are mostly positive but never significant. In 
contrast, rising natural resource dependence significantly raises income growth in two of four 




example, the case of rising government dependence on mining revenues, since it satisfies all 
criteria of instrument validity, exogeneity, and endogeneity. A standard deviation increase in 
the change in mining revenue dependence, on average, increases real income per capita in 
weaker institution districts between 2007 and 2016 by  (0.081*1.333 = 0.109) 10.9 per cent. 
Thus using split sample strategy, I do not find evidence that resource dependence is a 
“conditional blessing” when institutions are strong and a “conditional curse” when they are 
weak. 
Before I move to a second strategy for testing the conditional hypothesis of resource 
effects, I also try an alternative institutional quality measure, a local governance performance 
index, to check whether the previous results hold. As foreshadowed in Section 3.3.2.2., this 
index is more comprehensive but lacks values for years prior to 2010. As a consequence, I 
use the change in quantity outcomes between 2011-2015, with 2010 index values used to split 
the sample.  
Estimations reported in Table 3.10 summarise OLS results, and those in Table 3.11 for 
IV-GMM results. In general, my findings are similar to those in Table 3.8, where if anything 
higher local government dependence on total mining revenues, or oil and gas revenues in 
particular, are more likely to aid growth in per capita income in weaker institution districts. 
Moving to IV-GMM estimation results in Table 3.11, my instruments are weaker in models 
(1’), (4’), (5’) and (8’), but again exogenous. Regarding exogeneity of resource dependence, 
p-values across most specifications are greater than 0.10, except for models (1’) and (3’), 
where exogeneity is rejected. 
Only in Table 3.11, with the more comprehensive institutional quality index over fewer 
years, and instruments used, is some evidence found that partially supports the “conditional 
curse/blessing’ hypothesis. Here the coefficient on resource dependence appears larger for 
districts with stronger institutions, with values greater than 1, while in weaker institution 
districts the magnitude is generally less than 0.5. Even here, however, instrument validity is 
questionable for models (1’) and (4’) for both groups of districts, and while the instruments 
pass validity tests for model (2’), exogeneity of resource dependence cannot be rejected. Thus 
only for model (3’), the share of government revenues from oil and gas, does resource 
dependence seem to raise growth more in strong institution districts. 
In summary, whether with a limited institutional quality (capacity) measure over a 




find much evidence from the split sample method that districts who begin with stronger 




Table 3.8. FD-OLS results for both district sample groups with stronger and weaker initial institutions 
Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆Mining Dependence 0.0621    1.085***    
 (0.170)    (0.296)    
∆Mining Revenue  0.488    -0.187   
  (0.357)    (0.423)   
∆OilGas Revenue   0.547    -0.409  
   (0.371)    (0.686)  
∆Coal Revenue    -1.016    0.447 
    (1.112)    (0.654) 
Earthquake -0.00824 -0.00861 -0.00945 -0.00907 -0.0332 -0.0512 -0.0504 -0.0474 
 (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0324) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.793*** 0.903*** 0.914*** 0.806*** -0.00115 -0.132 -0.137 -0.0920 
 (0.267) (0.241) (0.242) (0.250) (0.225) (0.242) (0.233) (0.264) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.160*** -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.165*** -0.114*** -0.141*** -0.164*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0442) (0.0443) (0.0485) (0.0407) (0.0404) (0.0518) (0.0453) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.0306 0.0310 0.0316 0.0313 0.00452 0.00484 0.00294 0.00679 
 (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0316) (0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0349) 
DURBAN 0.0749 0.0608 0.0581 0.0749 0.0998* 0.0604 0.0729 0.0767 
 (0.0610) (0.0582) (0.0581) (0.0611) (0.0593) (0.0654) (0.0632) (0.0642) 
DJAVA 0.0993 0.0739 0.0656 0.0849 0.0163 -0.0327 -0.0183 -0.0278 
 (0.0601) (0.0546) (0.0552) (0.0571) (0.0973) (0.0937) (0.0961) (0.0930) 
Constant 0.680*** 0.624*** 0.620*** 0.702*** 0.765*** 0.944*** 1.033*** 0.974*** 
 (0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (0.178) (0.217) (0.244) (0.276) (0.246) 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.230 0.245 0.248 0.231 0.206 0.068 0.073 0.070 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2006. Year difference is 






Table 3.9. IV-GMM results for both district sample groups with stronger and weaker initial institutions 
Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES (1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) (5’) (6’) (7) (8’) 
∆Mining Dependence 0.346    3.576***    
 (0.316)    (1.148)    
∆Mining Revenue  0.317    1.333**   
  (0.244)    (0.657)   
∆OilGas Revenue   0.462    1.574  
   (0.291)    (1.079)  
∆Coal Revenue    0.0996    -0.294 
    (0.834)    (0.784) 
Earthquake -0.00773 -0.00541 -0.00750 -0.00645 0.00293 -0.0305 -0.0395 -0.0517 
 (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0725) (0.0302) (0.0323) (0.0320) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.586** 0.777*** 0.739*** 0.767*** 0.322 0.122 0.0311 -0.194 
 (0.259) (0.175) (0.184) (0.241) (0.271) (0.254) (0.278) (0.246) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.155*** -0.167*** -0.151*** -0.164*** -0.0810 -0.0765 -0.0228 -0.130*** 
 (0.0406) (0.0363) (0.0448) (0.0474) (0.0543) (0.0504) (0.0938) (0.0497) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.0346 0.0348 0.0312 0.0294 0.00734 0.0413 0.0399 0.0115 
 (0.0284) (0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0288) (0.0376) (0.0271) (0.0308) (0.0336) 
DURBAN 0.0948* 0.0974** 0.0816 0.0839 0.197*** 0.0419 0.0128 0.0622 
 (0.0550) (0.0492) (0.0530) (0.0592) (0.0735) (0.0607) (0.0813) (0.0620) 
DJAVA 0.107* 0.0742 0.0645 0.103* 0.134 -0.116 -0.143 -0.0457 
 (0.0564) (0.0487) (0.0494) (0.0541) (0.141) (0.0852) (0.0939) (0.0923) 
Constant 0.628*** 0.680*** 0.661*** 0.693*** 0.439 0.482** 0.328 0.873*** 
 (0.163) (0.154) (0.162) (0.174) (0.324) (0.245) (0.362) (0.257) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F statistics 22.283 14.848 13.802 243.487 1.021 64.885 126.197 17.760 
Hansen J Stat, p-value 0.5964 0.6028 0.3799 0.4427 0.6972 0.4339 0.3990 0.4017 
Endog test, p-value 0.3780 0.2787 0.4451 0.0905 0.0165 0.0588 0.0243 0.2778 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.208 0.237 0.242 0.228 -0.531 -0.032 -0.077 0.059 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2006. Year difference is 
2007 and 2015. Instruments used are districts historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s (continuous form) and the physical natural resources production 




Table 3.10. FD-OLS estimates between stronger and weaker institutions among districts, alternative institutional quality measure 
Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆Mining Dependence 0.0410    -0.0237    
 (0.586)    (0.0974)    
∆Mining Revenue  -0.579    0.197**   
  (0.812)    (0.0971)   
∆OilGas Revenue   -0.585    0.197**  
   (0.844)    (0.0942)  
∆Coal Revenue    -0.171    -0.0430 
    (1.392)    (0.252) 
Earthquake -0.0232* -0.0216* -0.0215* -0.0228* -0.0118** -0.0127*** -0.0125*** -0.0115** 
 (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.00474) (0.00460) (0.00462) (0.00482) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.393 0.445 0.439 0.399 -0.106 -0.0981 -0.0991 -0.108 
 (0.407) (0.405) (0.403) (0.397) (0.0679) (0.0644) (0.0642) (0.0663) 
GRDP per capita, 2010 (in logs) -0.00519 -0.0366 -0.0426 -0.00455 -0.0350*** -0.0251* -0.0246* -0.0345*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0365) (0.0416) (0.0373) (0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0123) 
Population, 2010 (in logs) -0.0642* -0.0667* -0.0650* -0.0653* 0.00195 0.00327 0.00333 0.00161 
 (0.0377) (0.0347) (0.0330) (0.0343) (0.00624) (0.00602) (0.00600) (0.00631) 
DURBAN -0.0373 -0.0178 -0.0135 -0.0386 -0.00686 -0.00743 -0.00834 -0.00610 
 (0.0670) (0.0487) (0.0430) (0.0658) (0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0227) 
DJAVA 0.0666* 0.0898* 0.0885* 0.0672* 0.0314** 0.0246* 0.0242* 0.0324** 
 (0.0380) (0.0489) (0.0480) (0.0386) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0139) 
Constant 0.634** 0.751** 0.764** 0.638*** 0.292*** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.291*** 
 (0.245) (0.297) (0.321) (0.195) (0.0568) (0.0617) (0.0623) (0.0574) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.035 0.048 0.047 0.035 0.081 0.101 0.101 0.080 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2010 based on 
local governance performance index. The year difference is 2011 to 2015. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 





Table 3.11. IV-GMM estimates comparing districts with stronger and weaker institutions. Years investigated 2011-2015 
Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES (1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) (5’) (6’) (7’) (8’) 
∆Mining Dependence 2.273*    0.0949    
 (1.269)    (0.163)    
∆Mining Revenue  1.495***    0.238*   
  (0.365)    (0.139)   
∆OilGas Revenue   1.905***    0.258*  
   (0.498)    (0.142)  
∆Coal Revenue    0.319    0.192 
    (1.814)    (1.977) 
Earthquake -0.0432 -0.0203 -0.0243* -0.0212* -0.0139*** -0.0142*** -0.0130*** -0.0119** 
 (0.0276) (0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0113) (0.00527) (0.00449) (0.00454) (0.00493) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.138 0.241 0.224 0.379 -0.127* -0.104* -0.0984 -0.102 
 (0.499) (0.387) (0.390) (0.392) (0.0697) (0.0598) (0.0624) (0.0689) 
GRDP per capita, 2010 (in logs) 0.0507 0.0388 0.0980* -0.0149 -0.0467*** -0.0275* -0.0220 -0.0340** 
 (0.0549) (0.0426) (0.0577) (0.0353) (0.0110) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0140) 
Population, 2010 (in logs) -0.0125 -0.0259 -0.0588 -0.0508* 0.00464 0.00500 0.00386 0.00177 
 (0.0269) (0.0280) (0.0380) (0.0266) (0.00697) (0.00589) (0.00595) (0.00639) 
DURBAN -0.0102 -0.0241 -0.103 -0.0131 -0.00814 -0.0132 -0.0110 -0.00807 
 (0.0588) (0.0569) (0.0842) (0.0528) (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0236) 
DJAVA 0.0563 0.00371 -0.00660 0.0638* 0.0347** 0.0197 0.0207 0.0329** 
 (0.0404) (0.0350) (0.0384) (0.0382) (0.0155) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0152) 
Constant 0.0477 0.247* 0.259* 0.578*** 0.319*** 0.253*** 0.237*** 0.288*** 
 (0.213) (0.150) (0.153) (0.153) (0.0544) (0.0647) (0.0659) (0.0635) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 2.673 41.769 44.835 0.882 4.478 18.940 30.436 0.813 
Hansen J Stat, p-value 0.8022 0.4960 0.2960 0.5359 0.1708 0.4663 0.5630 0.3224 
Endog test, p-value 0.0353 0.2287 0.0551 0.6511 0.5156 0.5926 0.6357 0.8437 
Observations 191 191 191 191 192 192 192 192 
R-squared -0.191 -0.140 -0.181 0.031 0.045 0.098 0.099 0.077 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2010 based on a local 
governance performance index. The year difference is 2011 to 2015. Instruments used are districts’ historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and 1980’s (continuous 
form) and change in the physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 




3.4.2.2 Interactions between resource dependence and institutions 
In the final part of this section, I use a second approach to test the conditional effects 
hypothesis. Here I do not split the sample of districts, but instead test for interaction effects 
between the four measures of resource dependence and institutional quality in their effects on 
district per capita growth. In doing so, I use initial levels of institutional quality either in 2006 
(Ins06) or 2010 (Ins10). To begin, I discuss the estimation results for the interaction term for 
my longer running, but less comprehensive measure of district government institutional 
quality, which again follows the periods 2007 and 2015. I concentrate here on the coefficients 
of interaction (RD1*Ins06 through RD4*Ins06). This tests whether the effect of, say mining 
dependence, on real income per capita depends on the initial level of institutional quality in 
2006.  
I begin with IV validity tests for Table 3.12. For comparison, IV-GMM results are also 
provided across columns which also show the tests of instruments validity and endogeneity 
of the main regressor. Here, the p-values of Hansen J tests fail to reject the exogeneity of my 
instruments in all models based on the 5% significance level, whereas the Kleibergen-Paap F 
statistic is also close to the required rule of thumb for columns (1’) and (2’) and exceeds it in 
column (3’). Endogeneity tests show that models (3’) and (4’) suffer from endogeneity, but 
cannot reject exogeneity for models (1’) and (2’), suggesting OLS is the preferred estimator.  
Moving to results in Table 3.12, as shown in column (1), with initial institutional 
quality its minimum value, a change from 0 to 100% share of mining in total GRDP is 
associated with an increase in income per capita on average of 223 per cent between 2007 
and 2015, significant at the 5 % level. A positive main effect is also found for coal revenue 
dependence, but is not significant nor are the main effects in models (2) and (3), though the 
signs are negative. Relevant here, however, the coefficients on the interaction term in columns 
(1) and (4) are negative and significant, suggesting higher institutional quality lowers the 
growth benefits of resource dependence. In particular, for a district with average institutional 
quality in 2006 (2.510), the overall effect of a change from 0 to 1 in mining dependence would 
be only a (2.226 - .624 (2.510) = .660) 66 per cent increase in income per capita. 
For the rest of the models, however, initial institutional quality does not seem to 
influence the effect that resource dependence has on growth. However, as I fail to prove that 




Finally, I present the results which use the same strategy as before but now with the 
more comprehensive quality measure available between 2011 and 2015, and use institutional 
performance in 2010 as a baseline. Table 3.13. presents coefficient estimates under OLS. I 
find that the main effect of resource dependence on growth is not significant across models 
(1) to (4). More importantly, the interaction terms, RD1*Ins10 throughout RD4*Ins10, are 
no longer significant, though still negatively signed. Thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that initial comprehensive institutional quality has no effect on the extent to which resource 
dependence causes growth. 
If we move to IV-GMM specifications, again although overidentification tests are 
consistent with excluded instruments being independent from errors, my instruments produce 
very low F statistics far below the recommended threshold of 10. This indicates that the 
instruments are weak. Persevering with them, I find that endogeneity tests fail to reject 
exogenous resource dependence in all models, suggesting that OLS estimation may be valid.  
Nonetheless, if I consider IV-GMM results for the better but shorter institutional quality 
measure, I find that the interaction between resource dependence and prior institutional 
quality is positive and significant in three of four cases. This could indicate the evidence for 
a “contingent curse”. However, I also notice that the instruments are weak and endogeneity 
is not indicated in any specification. Thus, whether I use a split sample or interaction term 
approach, (weak) instruments or OLS, and a longer/narrower or shorter/broader measure of 
institutional quality, I find little or weak evidence in support of the contingency hypothesis 
that resource dependence raises growth for stronger institution districts, and lowers growth 




Table 3.12. OLS and IV regression estimates with interaction terms, 2007-2015 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV FD2 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV 
∆Mining Dependence 2.226*** 3.579***       
 (0.808) (1.230)       
∆Mining Revenue   -0.178 0.903     
   (0.853) (0.972)     
∆OilGas Revenue     -0.773 1.595   
     (1.013) (1.317)   
∆Coal Revenue       1.926 0.309 
       (1.318) (1.069) 
Earthquake -0.0274** -0.014 -0.0294** -0.020* -0.0294** -0.029** -0.0299** -0.034*** 
 (0.0138) (0.018) (0.0119) (0.012) (0.0118) (0.012) (0.0121) (0.012) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.240 0.193 0.237 0.225 0.261 0.188 0.206 0.059 
 (0.170) (0.161) (0.190) (0.168) (0.192) (0.170) (0.198) (0.181) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.121*** -0.136*** -0.135*** -0.147*** -0.142*** -0.080* -0.166*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0294) (0.028) (0.0294) (0.028) (0.0350) (0.048) (0.0342) (0.037) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.0154 0.025 0.0153 0.034** 0.0134 0.033* 0.0124 0.015 
 (0.0193) (0.018) (0.0210) (0.017) (0.0211) (0.019) (0.0214) (0.021) 
Ins06 -0.00196 0.014 -0.0279 -0.026 -0.0127 -0.055 -0.0129 -0.016 
 (0.0187) (0.028) (0.0260) (0.023) (0.0291) (0.036) (0.0249) (0.026) 
DURBAN 0.0595 0.099*** 0.0506 0.090** 0.0490 0.039 0.0620 0.049 
 (0.0399) (0.038) (0.0414) (0.036) (0.0405) (0.045) (0.0427) (0.043) 
DJAVA 0.0711 0.080 0.0335 0.022 0.0265 -0.003 0.0375 0.013 
 (0.0445) (0.049) (0.0426) (0.039) (0.0429) (0.042) (0.0422) (0.044) 
RD1*Ins06 -0.624** -0.986**       
 (0.280) (0.434)       
RD2*Ins06   0.172 -0.278     
   (0.333) (0.370)     
RD3*Ins06     0.416 -0.300   
     (0.382) (0.422)   
RD4*Ins06       -0.759* -0.678 
       (0.448) (0.506) 
Constant 0.713*** 0.639*** 0.867*** 0.771*** 0.870*** 0.651*** 0.959*** 0.873*** 





 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV FD2 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  9.615  8.357  23.26  3.736 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.163  0.067  0.494  0.373 
Endog test, p-value  0.191  0.453  0.097  0.082 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.203 0.150 0.097 0.075 0.104 0.032 0.106 0.074 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Ins06 is the level of quality of institutions in 2006 for each district based on the audit opinion score of 
the Indonesia Audit Board. The interaction variable is denoted by RD*Ins06 , where RD1-RD4 are each measure of resource dependence (∆Mining Dependence, ∆Mining 
Revenue, ∆OilGas Revenue, ∆Coal Revenue). The year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are districts’ historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 
1980’s (continuous form) and the change in physical natural resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Interactions of these variables with Ins06 are also used as 
instruments for RD1*Ins06-RD4*Ins06. The IV technique uses IVREG2 provided by Schaffer, et al. (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  




Table 3.13. OLS and IV regression estimates with interaction terms, periods 2011-2015 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV FD2 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV 
∆Mining Dependence 0.139 -2.606       
 (0.566) (1.645)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.404 -0.485     
   (0.712) (0.643)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.216 -0.437   
     (0.596) (0.564)   
∆Coal Revenue       3.674 7.089 
       (3.238) (8.667) 
Earthquake -0.0175*** -0.020** -0.0175*** -0.015*** -0.0173*** -0.018*** -0.0178*** -0.018*** 
 (0.00563) (0.010) (0.00548) (0.005) (0.00547) (0.006) (0.00593) (0.006) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.0650 0.019 0.0681 0.012 0.0652 0.041 0.0698 0.058 
 (0.151) (0.155) (0.150) (0.139) (0.150) (0.142) (0.150) (0.149) 
GRDP per capita, 2010 (in logs) -0.0148 -0.000 -0.0273 0.006 -0.0297 0.036 -0.0151 -0.025 
 (0.0189) (0.021) (0.0189) (0.020) (0.0206) (0.027) (0.0198) (0.019) 
Population, 2010 (in logs) -0.0264* -0.006 -0.0277* -0.004 -0.0275* -0.019 -0.0265* -0.022* 
 (0.0145) (0.010) (0.0158) (0.011) (0.0156) (0.014) (0.0140) (0.012) 
Ins10 0.0883** 0.015 0.0770** 0.056 0.0798** 0.086** 0.0917*** 0.088** 
 (0.0375) (0.029) (0.0333) (0.036) (0.0338) (0.040) (0.0347) (0.037) 
DURBAN -0.0135 0.032 -0.0102 0.001 -0.00835 -0.031 -0.0128 -0.006 
 (0.0353) (0.026) (0.0301) (0.028) (0.0283) (0.037) (0.0331) (0.029) 
DJAVA 0.0405* 0.064*** 0.0545** 0.004 0.0534** -0.006 0.0386* 0.036* 
 (0.0232) (0.024) (0.0271) (0.020) (0.0266) (0.024) (0.0227) (0.021) 
RD1*Ins10 -0.0545 1.554**       
 (0.319) (0.785)       
RD2*Ins10   -0.280 0.531*     
   (0.466) (0.292)     
RD3*Ins10     -0.202 0.591**   
     (0.418) (0.273)   
RD4*Ins10       -1.390 -2.101 
       (0.991) (2.944) 
Constant 0.188* 0.138 0.264* 0.058 0.265* -0.024 0.182* 0.205** 




 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV FD2 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  0.819  0.788  0.401  0.090 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.330  0.358  0.262  0.758 
Endog test, p-value  0.949  0.527  0.218  0.495 
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 
R-squared 0.038 -0.156 0.044 -0.055 0.043 -0.071 0.040 0.019 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Ins10 is the level of quality of institutions in 2010 for each district based on the index of local government 
performance supplied by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Republic of Indonesia. The interaction variable is denoted by RD*Ins10, where RD1-RD4 are the sequence 
of each measure, ∆Mining Dependence, ∆Mining Revenue, ∆OilGas Revenue, ∆Coal Revenue. The year difference is 2011 to 2015. Instruments used are districts’ 
historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s (continuous form) and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Instruments 
used are districts’ historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s (continuous form) and the change in physical natural resource production for oil, natural 
gas, and coal. Interactions of these variables with Ins10 are also used as instruments for RD1*Ins10-RD4*Ins10. The IV technique uses IVREG2 provided by Schaffer, 
et al. (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  




3.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have examined whether the potential causal channels identified in the 
resource curse/blessing literature can account for the positive effects of resource dependence 
on per capita income in Indonesia. Using a three step strategy, I have found several interesting 
things.  
First, using a slightly narrower time frame in my first step, I again find that (non-coal) 
resource dependence is positively associated with per capita income in post-decentralisation 
Indonesia. By using an OLS approach, I find that three out of four resource dependence 
measures have positive coefficients, though only mining’s share of GRDP is significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Instrumenting for endogeneous resource dependence using historical 
resource abundance and change in physical output, I find significant positive effects for three 
of four resource dependence measures, leaving only coal revenue dependence not significant. 
These results are consistent with those found in the previous chapter which used the same 
regression equation and estimation techniques, but starting from 2006 rather than 2007. The 
positive benefits of the discovery of a large natural resource endowments, such as oil, or of 
high dependence on oil exports in developing countries has indeed been found by several 
studies (Larsen, 2006; Yates, 2006), but is still a debatable topic in the literature (Ablo, 2015). 
As this study covers a period of time in which decentralisation has moved government 
function to district level, several resource-based regions where mining production sites are 
situated have benefited greatly from activity associated with resource extraction, and from 
rent allocation compared to districts that have fewer mining activities. The higher rent 
allocation occurs according to Indonesia’s natural resource rent sharing law, whereby 
resource-rich districts are allocated higher revenues by Indonesia’s national government in 
their annual budgets compared to less resource-rich ones. This higher resource activity and 
rents seems to improve district income per capita on average.  
Second, I have found that most of my resource dependence measures have positively 
affected candidate factors often linked to growth in the resource curse/blessing literature. 
Beginning with the positive effect of resource dependence (other than coal revenue 
dependence) on the size of manufacturing output, my results contrast to the Dutch disease 
prediction of the resource curse literature. This positive association confirms some previous 
studies on Indonesia (see Usui (1997), Asanuma (2008), and Feryawan (2011)). These 




provincial or district level data, but they did not use panel regression methods or recent 
periods. This positive association of resource dependence with manufacturing may be caused 
by higher induced demand for resource-related manufactured good or be caused by well 
implemented macro policies implemented during the 1970’s oil bonanza, which protected a 
number of manufacturing firms deemed to produce nationally strategic products (part of an 
import-substitution strategy). Another possible explanation is the investment strategy driving 
Indonesian technocrats to attract foreign and domestic capital inflows to expand non-natural 
resource tradable sectors.79 This investment strategy has flourished during the 
decentralisation era where each local government is pressured to find non-resource sources 
of income to accelerate and maintain development. Those districts receiving greater resource 
rents may have been better able to attract manufacturing ventures, but the fact that coal 
dependence has negative effects on manufacturing size may signal that a Dutch disease 
phenomenon occurs at the local level.80  
I similarly find that (non-coal) resource dependence is positively rather than negatively 
associated with enrolment rates in secondary schools (including vocational schools). This 
result is contrary to the hypothesis that countries that experience a boom in natural resources 
are likely to have lower school enrolment rates, or higher dropout rates, as mining creates an 
incentive for young people to leave school for well paid jobs in this sector (Black et al., 2005; 
Gylfason, 2001). This contrary finding may be due to an increase in the supply of public 
education as local governments under decentralisation have more responsibility to provide 
basic education, which in turn may lead to higher local participation in schooling. Another 
possibility is that as district incomes have grown and the economy has developed, completing 
secondary education may be becoming viewed by employees and young people as “a basic 
need” to access job markets. Thus there may have been offsetting reasons why the demand 
for education has increased. 
Again of some surprise, I find evidence of a positive association between district 
resource dependence and quality of local institutions. Many previous studies at the country 
level, either using cross-section or panel investigations, have found a negative correlation 
between natural resource wealth and institutional quality (generally identified using rule of 
 
79 This policy is discussed further by Asanuma (2008), Hill (1992), and by Hill, Resosudarmo and 
Vidyattama (2008).  
80 As shown in descriptive statistics above, as local district governments have become less dependent on 
the revenues from the oil and gas sector (though not coal) we can see that manufacturing size, on average, 




law or government effectiveness measures). In contrast, I find that in almost all models, 
whether using OLS or IV-GMM models, and cardinal or ordered probit approaches, there is 
a positive impact of resource dependence measures, including coal, on measured quality of 
district-level institutions.81 Explanations to justify this finding are quite tentative given that 
previous country-level studies have often found the opposite. However, some studies I have 
cited as references have found a positive association, or found no link (Brunnschweiler, 2008; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; di John, 2011). As my 
institutional quality variable uses audit opinion scores taken from the Indonesia Audit Board 
based on the quality of local financial administration in each district, my findings might 
suggest that resource dependent districts are using the resource rents they receive to improve 
their administrative capacity, perhaps spurred on to do so because of additional 
responsibilities assigned to districts under decentralisation (Cust and Poelhekke, 2015).  
When I turn to ask if these four candidate causal channels actually raise growth rates 
in Indonesia, I find mixed evidence. First, I find a significant positive impact of increases in 
institutional quality on changes in per capita income. These results are consistent with the 
literature that says better institutions are strongly associated with better economic and 
development outcomes, especially where political power is decentralised (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2005). An increase in democracy is often associated with political 
redistribution of decision making power to the majority of the population, or in the case of 
decentralisation to sub-national bodies. Indonesia has implemented decentralisation 
administratively beginning in 2001, and by 2005 has effectively implemented it, as marked 
by widespread local district elections held every 5 years. Similarly, I also find that public 
spending on capital positively affects income growth on average. Since in the second step I 
fail to find a positive association between resource dependence and capital spending (other 
than coal revenue dependence), this would suggest that local public spending has raised 
growth in Indonesia, but that resource dependence has not acted to boost such spending.  
In contrast, I do not find evidence that growth in Indonesia has been driven by rising 
school enrolment rates, or higher manufacturing output per se. Given the four candidate 
channels aforementioned in this investigation, I have conclude that while most channels have 
been positively affected by rising resource dependence, of these only rising institutional 
 
81 I provide scatterplots, with a regression line, in Appendix O, Fig 4 and 5, which show the relationship 
between the average change in district GRDP per capita (with or without log transformation) and the 




quality in turn significantly affects growth in per capita income. At the same time, my four 
candidate causal mechanisms together account for only a small part of resource dependence’s 
positive effects on growth. In particular, the estimated positive coefficients of the direct 
remaining effects of resource dependence were only slightly reduced when the four candidate 
channels were controlled. Thus, I do find that resource dependence has worked through 
institutional quality to raise district per capita income in Indonesia, but that it has mostly 
worked through other means not here identified.82 
Still with institutional quality, I also test the auxiliary hypothesis that resource 
dependence does not affect institutional quality, but instead has effects on growth that are 
determined by pre-existing institutional quality. To test this, I split my sample distinguishing 
districts with stronger and weaker institutions in 2006 and repeat my first step regression. 
Using my (limited) institutions measure for the change between 2007 and 2015, I find that 
resources have been if anything a greater blessing for districts with weaker institutions than 
those with stronger ones, though this was not robust across the four different measures of 
resource dependence. When I move to the shorter period of 2011 and 2015 in order to use 
more comprehensive institutions measure, I again in almost all cases find that resource 
dependence effects are no stronger for better institution districts than weaker institution 
districts. 
I find a similar lack of support for the ‘conditional curse’ hypothesis when I instead 
include an interaction term between change in resource dependence and initial level of 
institutional quality. In general, the interaction term is not significant, or in some cases is 
negative and significant. When I repeat this exercise for fewer years using a more 
comprehensive district government performance measure, the interaction term is never 
significant without instruments, though it is significantly positive with instruments that are 
extremely weak and exogeneity is rejected. 
 
82 A few studies discuss service sector GDP as one channel to explain a resource blessing (Cust and 
Poelhekke, 2015; Cust and Rusli, 2016). For Indonesia in particular, another channel is probably connected 
with the high migrant movements as resource-rich provinces became a magnet to those seeking better 
incomes (Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama, 2008). This pattern would probably contribute to increase 
sectoral growth as migrants in Indonesia often open their own business and eventually become more 
prosperous than non-migrants. However, as in all regression models (Step 1-3), I have controlled local 
population at the initial year, which seems to be closely related with the number of migrants, though not 
using the ideal measure such as share of migrants in total population. My regressions show that initial 




In short, I find evidence that resource dependence spurs growth in post-decentralisation 
Indonesia working in small part through improving institutional quality and mostly in ways 
not identified. Resource dependence seems as beneficial for weaker institution districts as it 








Appendix 3.1. Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
∆ Real GRDP per 
capita (in logs) 
The natural logarithm of difference of real GRDP per capita, 
formulated as: 




INDO DAPOER World Bank (can be downloaded here: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/indonesia-
database-policy-and-economic-research)  The Indonesian 
National Statistical Agency (BPS) (see 
https://www.bps.go.id/)  
Earthquake  The number of earthquake events at the district level 
Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management 




The change in labour force participation rate between 2015 and 
2007 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
GRDP per capita, 2006 
(in logs) 
Natural logarithm of initial GRDP percapita in 2006 INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
Population, 2006 (in 
logs) 
Natural logarithm of initial population in 2006 BPS 
DURBAN 
Dummy urban status (municipalities) = 1 if urban districts, = 0 
if non-urban/rural district 
Identity of urban district/municipality is taken from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Republic of Indonesia 
DJAVA 
Dummy of Java Island = 1 if the districts are located on Java 
Island, = 0 otherwise 
- 
∆Mining Dependence 
The difference in mining dependence between 2015 and 2007 
 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit 
Board of the Republic of Indonesia 
∆Mining Revenue 
The difference in mining revenue shares, between 2015 and 
2007 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit 




Variable Definition Source 
∆OilGas Revenue 
The difference in oil and gas revenue shares, between 2015 and 
2007 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit 
Board of the Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
∆Coal Revenue The difference in coal revenue shares, between 2015 and 2007 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit 
Board of the Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
OilGas_binary 
Dummy variable, = 1 if at least one major oil or gas field 
operated there during 1970’s, = 0 otherwise.  
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
Coal deposit_binary 
Dummy variable, =1 if at least 20% of district is covered by a 
“first generation” coal agreement contract during the 1970’s, = 
0 otherwise. 
Leeuwen (1994); Friederich & Leeuwen (2017) 
OilGas_continuous 
The number of major and minor oil and gas fields in the 1970’s 
production period in all Island of Indonesia. Major oil and 
natural gas fields is weigted by 1, and all minor fields are 
weighted by 0.25. So, if district A has a 10 minor oil/gas fields 
location, therefore: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐴 = 10 × 0.25 = 2.5 
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
Coal deposit_continous 
The share of coal deposit areas (shown by first generation coal 
agreement contract introduced by Leeuwen (1994, 2017)) of 
total area of respective district. 
Leeuwen (1994); Friederich & Leeuwen (2017) 
∆Public spending 
The difference in public capital spending shares, between 2015 
and 2007 
Ministry of Finance 
∆Net enrolment ratio The difference in net enrolment ratio between 2015 and 2007 
Ministry of Education and Culture, the Republic of 
Indonesia 
∆Manufact  (in 10’s of 
trillions of IDR) 
The difference in GRDP of manufacturing sector between 2015 
and 2007 




Variable Definition Source 
∆Institutional Quality 
The difference in the result of audit opinion score of each 
district between 2015 and 2007. The opinion ranges from the 
worst to the best: cannot give any opinion, here scored as 1, to 
some degree acceptable = 2; perform well/qualified, but 
corrections needed = 3; qualified without any exception = 4.  
The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia 
(www.bpk.go.id)  
InsQual06 
The initial institutional quality of district in 2006 based on the 
audit opinion score. 
The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia 
(www.bpk.go.id) 
InsQual10 
The initial institutional quality of district in 2010 based on 
score of local governance performance index. 







Appendix 3.2. OLS and IV regressions: resource dependence and manufacturing size 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD1 IV-GMM FD1 IV-GMM FD1 IV-GMM FD1 IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.081 0.319*       
 (0.053) (0.184)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.183** 0.255**     
   (0.074) (0.122)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.378*** 0.385**   
     (0.119) (0.167)   
∆Coal Revenue       -0.595*** -0.710* 
       (0.209) (0.367) 
Earthquake -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.033 0.073* 0.062 0.116** 0.073* 0.105** 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.053) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) 0.062** 0.032* 0.066** 0.026 0.083*** 0.071** 0.076*** 0.077** 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
DURBAN -0.001 0.019 -0.003 0.014 -0.013 0.005 -0.016 -0.020 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) 
DJAVA 0.056*** 0.054** 0.045** 0.019 0.034** 0.020 0.043** 0.040** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Constant -0.482*** -0.352*** -0.503*** -0.315*** -0.562*** -0.502*** -0.496*** -0.494*** 
 (0.136) (0.091) (0.136) (0.082) (0.142) (0.127) (0.131) (0.140) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.200 0.122 0.204 0.153 0.227 0.219 0.219 0.218 
Kleibergen F-stat  12.27  9.046  16.08  14.16 
Hansen J P-val  0.252  0.194  0.240  0.545 
Endog P-val  0.0397  0.133  0.208  0.755 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Manufacturing GRDP. The year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are districts historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and 
the 1980’s (binary form) and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal minerals. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, ***refer to  




Appendix 3.3. OLS and IV regressions: resource dependence and net enrolment ratio 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.119*** 0.381***       
 (0.044) (0.119)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.198*** 0.282***     
   (0.060) (0.099)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.190*** 0.302***   
     (0.064) (0.106)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.102 0.206 
       (0.137) (0.229) 
Earthquake -0.011** -0.010* -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
∆Labour force partic.rate -0.080 -0.089* -0.049 -0.040 -0.060 -0.052 -0.075 -0.069 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.031*** -0.022** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.024** -0.017 -0.038*** -0.041*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
DURBAN -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 -0.023 -0.026 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
DJAVA -0.008 0.016 -0.023 -0.022 -0.025 -0.028* -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 0.298*** 0.256*** 0.283*** 0.282*** 0.275*** 0.255*** 0.329*** 0.335*** 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.063) (0.055) (0.055) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.083 -0.002 0.082 0.079 0.079 0.074 0.067 0.065 
Kleibergen F-stat  12.27  9.046  16.08  14.16 
Hansen J P-val  0.377  0.376  0.278  0.794 
Endog P-val  0.0529  0.507  0.304  0.598 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Net Enrolment Ratio, High School.The year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are districts historical resource abundance in 
the 1970’s and the 1980’s (binary form) and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal minerals. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 




Appendix 3.4. OLS and IV regressions: resource dependence and institutional quality 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.700* 2.499***       
 (0.404) (0.889)       
∆Mining Revenue   1.583*** 3.208***     
   (0.585) (0.629)     
∆OilGas Revenue     0.986 2.195**   
     (0.698) (1.003)   
∆Coal Revenue       2.667*** 5.051*** 
       (0.967) (1.936) 
Earthquake -0.00480 -0.0118 -0.00162 0.00203 -0.00729 -0.0144 0.00474 0.0176 
 (0.0471) (0.0470) (0.0481) (0.0474) (0.0478) (0.0473) (0.0481) (0.0484) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.284 0.326 0.532 0.966** 0.389 0.592 0.421 0.556 
 (0.491) (0.479) (0.501) (0.481) (0.498) (0.495) (0.494) (0.492) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) 0.317*** 0.392*** 0.349*** 0.429*** 0.355*** 0.436*** 0.221** 0.166* 
 (0.0794) (0.0829) (0.0775) (0.0760) (0.0876) (0.0986) (0.0869) (0.0956) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) -0.130* -0.123* -0.115* -0.106 -0.127* -0.123* -0.123* -0.122* 
 (0.0677) (0.0674) (0.0686) (0.0681) (0.0681) (0.0680) (0.0684) (0.0676) 
DURBAN -0.475*** -0.481*** -0.489*** -0.518*** -0.510*** -0.562*** -0.419*** -0.360** 
 (0.137) (0.135) (0.136) (0.133) (0.138) (0.137) (0.143) (0.147) 
DJAVA 0.340*** 0.487*** 0.239* 0.224* 0.246* 0.204 0.321** 0.379*** 
 (0.129) (0.138) (0.129) (0.128) (0.132) (0.135) (0.128) (0.127) 
Constant 0.640 0.250 0.466 0.0990 0.538 0.249 0.930* 1.042** 
 (0.515) (0.548) (0.521) (0.521) (0.533) (0.570) (0.507) (0.509) 
Kleibergen  12.266  9.046  16.081  14.164 
Hansen  0.0665  0.0615  0.0982  0.0730 
Endog  0.1681  0.0726  0.2110  0.1954 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.064 0.013 0.070 0.055 0.061 0.053 0.066 0.058 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Institutional Quality.The year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are districts historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and 
the 1980’s (binary form) and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal minerals. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, ***refer to  




Appendix 3.5. OLS and IV regressions: resource dependence and public spending on capital 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
VARIABLES FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM FD IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.059 -0.066       
 (0.042) (0.140)       
∆Mining Revenue   0.057 0.001     
   (0.082) (0.128)     
∆OilGas Revenue     -0.069 0.015   
     (0.085) (0.149)   
∆Coal Revenue       0.453** 0.343 
       (0.182) (0.283) 
Earthquake 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.005 0.007 0.014 0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.028 0.035 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) 0.024** 0.015 0.025** 0.017* 0.018* 0.021* 0.010 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.012* 0.013** 0.012* 0.013** 0.011* 0.011* 0.013** 0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
DURBAN -0.012 -0.006 -0.013 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
DJAVA -0.007 -0.019 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant -0.163*** -0.130** -0.163*** -0.140*** -0.133** -0.143*** -0.127** -0.152*** 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.038 0.009 0.034 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.066 0.063 
Kleibergen F-stat  12.27  9.046  16.08  14.16 
Hansen J P-val  0.127  0.108  0.494  0.0291 
Endog P-val  0.440  0.725  0.476  0.767 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ public capital spending shares. The year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are districts historical resource abundance in the 
1970’s and the 1980’s (binary form) and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal minerals. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 




Appendix 3.6. Results for IV Ordered Probit 





                                                                                  
          rho_12    -.2199618   .2939476                     -.6799574     .364272
           sig_2     .1249608   .0044768                      .1164875    .1340504
                                                                                  
    /atanhrho_12     -.223616   .3088928    -0.72   0.469    -.8290347    .3818027
        /lnsig_2    -2.079755   .0358253   -58.05   0.000    -2.149972   -2.009539
        /cut_1_2     .7528505   .7927874     0.95   0.342    -.8009842    2.306685
        /cut_1_1    -.6676711   .8583157    -0.78   0.437    -2.349939    1.014597
                                                                                  
           _cons      .126777   .0635278     2.00   0.046     .0022647    .2512893
d_coalproduction      .000012   .0000151     0.79   0.428    -.0000177    .0000417
 d_gasproduction     4.22e-07   2.05e-07     2.05   0.040     1.93e-08    8.25e-07
 d_oilproduction     7.02e-06   2.07e-06     3.39   0.001     2.96e-06    .0000111
   coalabundance     .0007927   .0004853     1.63   0.102    -.0001585    .0017438
 oilgasabundance    -.0438286   .0120591    -3.63   0.000    -.0674641   -.0201931
           DJAVA    -.0820586   .0176259    -4.66   0.000    -.1166048   -.0475123
          DURBAN    -.0188399   .0174848    -1.08   0.281    -.0531094    .0154297
         lpop_06    -.0034159   .0079672    -0.43   0.668    -.0190314    .0121995
   lgdp_percap06    -.0163473   .0115238    -1.42   0.156    -.0389336    .0062389
       Dlabforce     .0354972   .0572194     0.62   0.535    -.0766508    .1476452
      Earthquake    -.0012076   .0069572    -0.17   0.862    -.0148436    .0124283
Dmindep           
                                                                                  
           DJAVA     .7908863    .233389     3.39   0.001     .3334522     1.24832
          DURBAN     -.443077   .1842651    -2.40   0.016    -.8042299    -.081924
         lpop_06    -.1192947   .0881295    -1.35   0.176    -.2920252    .0534359
   lgdp_percap06     .4899879   .1291693     3.79   0.000     .2368207    .7431552
       Dlabforce     .3123822   .6050338     0.52   0.606    -.8734622    1.498227
      Earthquake     .0103826    .072201     0.14   0.886    -.1311288    .1518939
         Dmindep     2.397385   2.210105     1.08   0.278    -1.934342    6.729112
insqual           
                                                                                  
                        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood =  21.643745                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =     104.72





Table 4.C. IV Ordered Probit results (2) 
 
  
                                                                                  
          rho_12      -.05311   .1443435                     -.3246787    .2265485
           sig_2     .0644932   .0023093                      .0601223     .069182
                                                                                  
    /atanhrho_12    -.0531601   .1447518    -0.37   0.713    -.3368683    .2305482
        /lnsig_2    -2.741195   .0358065   -76.56   0.000    -2.811374   -2.671015
        /cut_1_2     .8632438   .7715399     1.12   0.263    -.6489466    2.375434
        /cut_1_1    -.5955566   .7846803    -0.76   0.448    -2.133502    .9423887
                                                                                  
           _cons     .1190843   .0324601     3.67   0.000     .0554636    .1827049
d_coalproduction     .0000289   7.74e-06     3.74   0.000     .0000137    .0000441
 d_gasproduction     3.28e-07   1.04e-07     3.15   0.002     1.24e-07    5.33e-07
 d_oilproduction     7.62e-06   1.05e-06     7.24   0.000     5.56e-06    9.68e-06
   coalabundance     .0009079   .0002516     3.61   0.000     .0004148    .0014011
 oilgasabundance    -.0507079   .0058776    -8.63   0.000    -.0622279    -.039188
           DJAVA     .0209335   .0090777     2.31   0.021     .0031414    .0387255
          DURBAN    -.0016027   .0090116    -0.18   0.859    -.0192652    .0160597
         lpop_06    -.0075759   .0041022    -1.85   0.065    -.0156161    .0004643
   lgdp_percap06    -.0203369     .00588    -3.46   0.001    -.0318615   -.0088123
       Dlabforce    -.1205604   .0295237    -4.08   0.000    -.1784257   -.0626951
      Earthquake    -.0023459   .0035897    -0.65   0.513    -.0093815    .0046897
Dminrev           
                                                                                  
           DJAVA     .5517758     .20153     2.74   0.006     .1567843    .9467673
          DURBAN    -.5150217   .1837818    -2.80   0.005    -.8752274    -.154816
         lpop_06    -.1103272   .0892259    -1.24   0.216    -.2852067    .0645523
   lgdp_percap06     .5401938   .1433795     3.77   0.000     .2591751    .8212124
       Dlabforce     .7608558   .6957397     1.09   0.274     -.602769    2.124481
      Earthquake     .0104012   .0727478     0.14   0.886    -.1321818    .1529843
         Dminrev     2.601611   1.905236     1.37   0.172    -1.132583    6.335804
insqual           
                                                                                  
                        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood =  280.65654                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =     239.64
Mixed-process regression                          Number of obs   =        390
Fitting full model.




Table 4.D. IV Ordered Probit results (3) 
 
  
                                                                                 
         rho_12      .052298   .1555126                     -.2480082    .3434342
          sig_2     .0626708    .002244                      .0584235     .067227
                                                                                 
   /atanhrho_12     .0523457   .1559391     0.34   0.737    -.2532893    .3579808
       /lnsig_2    -2.769859   .0358062   -77.36   0.000    -2.840038    -2.69968
       /cut_1_2     .4408273   .8231766     0.54   0.592    -1.172569    2.054224
       /cut_1_1    -1.011128   .8264118    -1.22   0.221    -2.630865    .6086095
                                                                                 
          _cons     .1381888    .030726     4.50   0.000      .077967    .1984105
d_gasproduction     4.30e-07   9.71e-08     4.43   0.000     2.40e-07    6.20e-07
d_oilproduction     6.58e-06   1.03e-06     6.36   0.000     4.55e-06    8.60e-06
oilgasabundance    -.0475285   .0054851    -8.67   0.000     -.058279    -.036778
          DJAVA     .0271339   .0086761     3.13   0.002     .0101291    .0441387
         DURBAN     .0154619   .0085464     1.81   0.070    -.0012887    .0322125
        lpop_06    -.0017773   .0039496    -0.45   0.653    -.0095184    .0059639
  lgdp_percap06     -.039004   .0052649    -7.41   0.000     -.049323   -.0286851
      Dlabforce    -.0737529   .0284768    -2.59   0.010    -.1295665   -.0179394
     Earthquake     .0004046   .0034697     0.12   0.907    -.0063959    .0072051
Doilgasrev       
                                                                                 
          DJAVA     .5995634   .2086618     2.87   0.004     .1905938    1.008533
         DURBAN    -.4988813   .1922271    -2.60   0.009    -.8756396   -.1221231
        lpop_06    -.1340765   .0870751    -1.54   0.124    -.3047405    .0365875
  lgdp_percap06     .4646745   .1763289     2.64   0.008     .1190763    .8102728
      Dlabforce     .4076728   .6556223     0.62   0.534    -.8773232    1.692669
     Earthquake     .0054346   .0725938     0.07   0.940    -.1368467    .1477159
     Doilgasrev     .6132104   2.147491     0.29   0.775    -3.595794    4.822215
insqual          
                                                                                 
                       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
Log likelihood =   290.3589                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     291.48
Mixed-process regression                          Number of obs   =        390
Fitting full model.




Table 4.E. IV Ordered Probit results (4) 
                                                                                  
          rho_12    -.2609826   .1612128                     -.5414666    .0717794
           sig_2     .0341828   .0012239                      .0318662    .0366679
                                                                                  
    /atanhrho_12    -.2671625   .1729958    -1.54   0.123    -.6062282    .0719031
        /lnsig_2    -3.376031   .0358058   -94.29   0.000     -3.44621   -3.305853
        /cut_1_2     .0329332   .6470993     0.05   0.959    -1.235358    1.301224
        /cut_1_1    -1.393666   .6547879    -2.13   0.033    -2.677026   -.1103049
                                                                                  
           _cons    -.0016231   .0163555    -0.10   0.921    -.0336794    .0304332
d_coalproduction     .0000391   3.92e-06     9.98   0.000     .0000314    .0000468
   coalabundance     .0007928   .0001262     6.28   0.000     .0005455    .0010402
           DJAVA    -.0055631   .0047717    -1.17   0.244    -.0149155    .0037894
          DURBAN    -.0128514   .0047052    -2.73   0.006    -.0220735   -.0036293
         lpop_06    -.0056004   .0021503    -2.60   0.009    -.0098148   -.0013859
   lgdp_percap06     .0135194   .0028925     4.67   0.000     .0078502    .0191885
       Dlabforce    -.0536498   .0155017    -3.46   0.001    -.0840326   -.0232671
      Earthquake    -.0028144   .0019016    -1.48   0.139    -.0065414    .0009127
Dcoalrev          
                                                                                  
           DJAVA     .6974851   .1905797     3.66   0.000     .3239558    1.071015
          DURBAN    -.2800355   .2002686    -1.40   0.162    -.6725546    .1124837
         lpop_06    -.0832725   .0884121    -0.94   0.346    -.2565569     .090012
   lgdp_percap06     .2071915   .1495523     1.39   0.166    -.0859255    .5003086
       Dlabforce      .802738   .6370638     1.26   0.208    -.4458841     2.05136
      Earthquake     .0476252    .073787     0.65   0.519    -.0969946     .192245
        Dcoalrev     12.00295   4.748857     2.53   0.011     2.695365    21.31054
insqual           
                                                                                  
                        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood =  529.69383                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =     254.65
Mixed-process regression                          Number of obs   =        390
Fitting full model.




Appendix 3.7. Information of several scatterplots on several variables 
Fig 3.  Scatterplot of average share of oil and gas revenues in total local government 
budget on net enrolment ratio in high school, with regression line, between 2007-
2015 
 
Fig 4.  Scatterplot of average institutional quality (auditor opinion score) on district’s 








Fig 5.  Scatterplot of average of institutional quality (auditor opinion score) on district’s 







4 CHAPTER FOUR 






The positive impact of natural resources on income growth has been found in a number 
of studies both cross-country (e.g. Brunnschweiler (2008); Brunnscheweiler and Bulte 
(2008); Ouoba (2016); Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012)) and within-country (e.g. 
Weber (2012); Libman (2013); Fleming & Measham (2015); Cust and Rusli (2016)). A recent 
investigation by Hilmawan and Clark (2018) also finds evidence of a “resource blessing” at 
the district level for Indonesia. They find using district first differences that a greater 
dependence on resources positively affects income per capita, whether dependence is 
measured as the proportion of mining in district GRDP or as a fraction of oil revenues in 
district government budgets. 
Recent resource curse/blessing studies have also attempted to investigate the effects of 
resource dependence beyond per capita income on other wellbeing and development 
indicators. Some have looked at the effects of resources-based activities on poverty rates (e.g. 
Zhang, Xing, Fan & Luo, 2008; Weber, 2012; Partridge, Betz & Lobao, 2013; Bhattacharya 
and Resosudarmo, 2015), education/human capital (Weber, 2014; Douglas and Walker, 2016; 
Edwards, 2016a; Carpenter, Anderson and Dudensing, 2019), or health outcomes (Edwards, 
2016a; Cotet and Tsui, 2013; El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2015). However, most existing income 
studies, and all broader effect studies of which I am aware, have focused only on the own 
country/district effects of resources, i.e. the impact of resources in region i on outcomes of 
interest in the same region.  
Yet resource effect scholars have increasingly shifted to within-country studies, testing 
the localised effect of resource dependence while holding constant national characteristics 
that affect growth (e.g. van der Ploeg, 2011; Fleming, Measham & Paredes, 2015; Douglas 
& Walker, 2016). As the unit of observation for resource dependence effects has grown finer, 




geographical variables have been used in some resource growth studies, they have been 
limited to coarse binary measures such as whether the geographic unit is landlocked, or 
tropical (e.g. van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; Daniele, 2011), rather than addressing 
spatial dependence more generally. In contrast, other areas of applied economic research have 
long considered spatial-related factors, inspired by methods developed in regional science 
and urban economics, where economic activities and geographical positions have long been 
recognized as mutually dependent. This dependence is widely known as Tobler’s Law, after 
Tobler (1970, p.236) who proposed the “first law of geography” that “everything is related 
to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.” 
Is having more resource dependent neighbours beneficial or harmful to a host region’s 
income? This question has been posed against a backdrop of wider debate as to whether 
natural resources help or hurt a country’s economic growth and development. Yet spatial 
effects could have a bearing on this broader debate. For example, suppose that district i is a 
resource-poor region with low income per capita but geographically surrounded by oil-rich 
districts as its nearest neighbours. During an oil boom, potential labour in district i could 
migrate to its neighbours, lowering economic production in i and reducing growth. 
Conversely, the same home district’s economy could benefit if the mining sector in adjacent 
areas produces spillovers to district i, such as higher derived demand for supporting goods or 
services. The last possibility is that no spatial spillovers are produced, such as when both 
home and neighbour districts simply compete, or lack infrastructure that connects them. This 
last possibility, if supported, might suggest that mining or oil and gas-based extraction has 
low productive linkages with other sectors in proximity. 
Investigations which test for spatial spillovers have been used in economic studies of 
crime (Öcal and Yildirim, 2010; Torres-Preciado, Gaytán & Zermeño, 2017), foreign direct 
investment (Madariaga & Poncet, 2007), institutions (Bosker and Garretsen 2009; Hall and 
Ahmad, 2012; Ganau, 2017), and in economic growth, such as the effects of regional 
instability on home area economic growth (Chua & Ades (1993); Ades & Chua (1997);  
Murdoch & Sandler, 2016), or the effect of neighbouring countries on home country growth 
more generally (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Gibson, 2007; Abderrezak, 2005).  
In contrast, studies of resource effects have been slower to incorporate spatial effects. 
The few studies that do are focussed on developed countries, primarily the United States (e.g. 




aware of any resource effect studies in developing countries that have examined spatial 
spillovers in within-country studies. A working paper by Carmignani (2014) is the first that 
includes spillovers in a sample that includes developing countries, but is a between-country 
study. Since developing countries are generally more reliant on commodity-based sectors, 
and have poorer transportation networks, the issue of resource effect spillovers seems likely 
to play a greater role there. This makes a study of a large resource-based developing economy 
such as Indonesia especially relevant. 
For Indonesia in particular, district level decentralisation was fully implemented in 
2005, including local elections of district governments. This has meant that each district has 
had authority to manage its local budget. As a result, resource-rich districts tend to get higher 
revenues from this policy. This may improve the quality of governance of such districts, 
which might raise own per capita incomes or affect their key development indicators, and 
possibly create spillover effects to nearby districts. For example, suppose one district has had 
its GRDP historically dominated by oil extraction. Does this reliance benefit the district itself? 
Does it generate major external benefits (or costs) to nearby districts? 
Indonesia provides an excellent opportunity for both within-country analysis of 
resource effects, but also spatial analysis. Indonesia is grouped in five big islands stretching 
from west to east, comprising more than 500 districts across the Indonesian archipelago as of 
2017. Thus, the inter-district interactions among “nearest” neighbour districts may be intense 
in the big islands but limited for smaller or isolated island districts.83 Second, as natural 
resource endowments are distributed unevenly across islands, they provide a source of 
exogenous variation regarding where resources extraction activities take place. This is true 
for onshore and offshore wells of oil or gas drilling activities, or the sites of mining 
operations. Abundance is a necessary condition for extraction and dependence.  
From the view of my wider dissertation, this chapter tries to finalise investigations of 
the impact of local resource dependence on income in Indonesia by also including spatial 
spillovers of resource dependence, but also to broaden the outcomes of interest beyond per 
capita income to other development indicators. Recall that the first chapter measured the 
 
83 The Indonesia administrative hierarchy starts from Province, then Sub-Province or District, Sub-District 
(or Kecamatan) and Village (Kelurahan/Desa). The latter two administrative units are regularly reported 
by the Indonesia Statistics Office (BPS) but the variables provided are limited and not available for wide 
time intervals. See an illustrative map of Indonesia in Appendix 4.3., Figure A1 to see how the potential 




direct effect of resource dependence on income and found it positive, while the second chapter 
has sought to identify some potential causal mechanisms for these beneficial effects. This 
chapter will identify whether these beneficial effects of own district resource dependence on 
own district outcomes are augmented or reduced when spatial spillovers from adjacent 
districts are considered. 
This study thus makes three contributions. First, it fills the gap in the resource effects 
literature regarding spatial spillover effects for a developing country. Second, it investigates 
the effects of resource dependence on key development indicators for Indonesia, including 
poverty, education and health outcomes. This would be the first within country resource effect 
study of Indonesia to do so. Finally, methodologically, by trying three different spatial 
weighting specifications to identify ‘nearest neighbours’, it contributes to the discussion of 
whether choice of neighbour measure matters. Most spatial effect studies use a single spatial 
weighting method, yet different studies use different methods (Carmignani (2014); Weber 
(2014); Bosker & Garretsen (2009)). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews recent 
within-country studies of the effects of resource dependence on income, emphasizing those 
that have included spatial effects. It also reviews those resource studies that have examined 
broader development outcomes. Section 4.3 describes the data and estimation strategy used 
in my regression analysis. Section 4.4 provides initial descriptive analysis and my main 
regression results for each outcome of interest. Section 4.5 will then discuss my main findings 
and Section 4.6. concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
In this section, I review studies focusing not only the effects of natural resources on 
income per capita or economic growth in general, but also on social development measures. 
I will select empirical studies that use cross-country data comparison in a specific continent, 
but since more recent works have emphasized within-country analysis, the latter will be 
prioritized.  
In most studies reviewed, natural resources are measured using “dependence” or 
“extraction” despite criticisms of the potential endogeneity of such measures (i.e. poor 
countries might be more reliant on mining due to low savings and investments in 




is harder to posit that endowments trapped in the ground untouched would affect a country’s 
economic or development outcomes (Marchand and Weber (2018), Douglas and Walker 
(2016)).84  Nonetheless, recent within-country studies have shifted to exploit available 
abundance information related to the numbers of oil or/and gas wells, or drilling activities. 
Unfortunately, these studies consider only developed economies such as the United States 
(see detailed discussion, for example Marchand and Weber (2018)).85 Another reason for 
using resource dependence measures is that in developing countries, resource abundance data 
such as oil reserves or locations of drilled wells are often not available over time, or not 
publicly available. 
Below, I will focus on studies of the effects of resource dependence/extraction on 
income, and on variables associated with other development outcomes. I will then focus on 
the limited number of resource effect studies that have controlled for spatial effects. 
 
4.2.1 Resource Dependence Effects on Development Outcomes 
4.2.1.1 Effects on Income 
A cross-country study by Ouba (2016) examines the effect of resource dependence, 
measured as a share of resource rents in total GDP, on income. Ouba overcomes the 
endogenous nature of his dependence measure by using instrumental variables. Focusing on 
a sample of resource-rich countries in the period 1985-2010 (in averaged five year intervals), 
and controlling for human capital, institutional quality, and foreign direct investment, Ouba 
finds that resource rents positively affect income per capita using either IV-2SLS or Driscoll-
Kraay (D-K) techniques. He uses the instruments of trade openness and the presidential 
system. For other examples of cross-country studies, see the review paper by Bjorvatn, et al. 
(2012). 
Studies that have looked at resource effects on income have recently shifted to exploit 
within-country variations, but perhaps owing to issues of data availability, the majority of 
 
84 By default, resource dependence is defined as a flow derived from natural resource endowments (e.g. oil, 
gas, or coal), so often as a share of GDP or percentage of government revenues or share of mining 
employment in total employment (see for example the within-country studies of James and Aadland (2011); 
James and James (2011); Weber (2012); and Betz et al. (2015)), or the between country studies of Edwards 
(2016a), Ouoba (2016), or Bjorvatn, Farzanegan, and Schneider (2012).  
85 Alternatively, resource effect scholars use resource abundance measures. These are estimates of resource 
stocks, such as proven reserves. Although one can argue that such endowments would not affect a country’s 
economy while trapped in the ground, some researchers use abundance to measure an exogenuous natural 




these have been done in developed states (e.g. Hajkowich, Heyenga and Moffat (2011) and 
Fleming and Measham (2015) for Australia, Boyce and Emery (2011), James & Aadland 
(2011), Weber (2012, 2014), Lee (2015) and Douglas and Walker (2016) for the United 
States, and Libman (2013) for Russia). However, there are also a few within-country studies 
for developing countries, such as Aragón and Rud (2013) for Peru, Cust and Rusli (2016) for 
Indonesia, and more recently Hota and Behera (2019) for India. 
To illustrate, James and Aadland (2011) investigate whether United States counties’ 
dependence on natural resources, measured as a share of mining, agriculture, forestry and 
fishing earnings in 1980, affects annual growth of per capita personal income between 1980 
and 1995 for 3,092 counties. They perform two-stage generalized least squares (GLS) and 
control for initial income per capita, population, poverty and education in 1980. James and 
Aadland find that resource dependence lowered subsequent growth. The results remain robust 
even when the period is separated using a 5, 10, or 15-year interval. In contrast, Libman 
(2013) investigates the effect of oil and gas extraction, measured by the share of oil and gas 
value in total gross regional product (GRP), on the growth of the GRP of 72 Russian regions, 
averaged over the period 2000- 2006. Using cross-section regression for the sampled regions, 
he finds a positive effect of oil and gas dependence on growth under an OLS estimator, but 
the positive effect is no longer significant once regional fixed-effects are included.  
In a more locally focussed study, Fleming and Measham (2015) evaluate the local 
economic impacts of new coal seam gas (CSG) extraction in southern Queensland, Australia. 
They evaluate the impact of this extraction on several indicators of income and employment 
between 2001 and 2011. The first OLS estimates reveal that the presence of CSG-related 
wells (a binary variable) has a positive and significant effect on growth in median per capita 
or family income. They control for initial (2001) population density, median per capita 
income, and education. Agglomeration effects caused by the large Brisbane economy are also 
controlled by including the distance (in km) between the respective local area and Brisbane.  
While not spatial, Fleming and Measham’s analysis also demonstrates how growth in 
mining employment can spill over to growth in non-mining employment. Contrary to a 
‘Dutch disease’ prediction of crowding out, where resource booms are predicted to hurt 
tradable sectors such as manufacturing exports, Fleming and Measham find a CSG boom 
leads to growth in some other local goods sectors. In particular, by applying 2SLS and using 




job growth had positive spillovers in the construction and professional services sectors, but 
negative spillovers for agriculture, and no net effect on the manufacturing sector. 
Still in Australia, Hajkowich, et al. (2011) test the effect of mineral production based 
on gross value on indicators reflecting regional quality of life, using local government 
boundaries. Their study reveals no evidence of negative effects on the outcome measures. By 
using cross-correlation analysis, for instance, Hajkowich et al. find that the gross value of 
minerals production has strong positive and statistically significant (at 1 % level) correlation 
with household income. 
In another within country study, Weber (2014) examines the effects of the change in 
natural gas production (in billions of cubic feet) on the change in total employment and 
earnings per job in the south-central United States, using a difference in difference approach: 
a change from 2000 to 2010 minus the change from 1995 to 2000. Weber uses 362 non-
metropolitan counties in Arkansas, Lousiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, and by using a GMM 
estimator finds that natural gas development is positively correlated with both outcome 
measures. Recognizing that potential endogeneity of gas production may occur, Weber’s 
study uses location of unconventional gas reservoirs over the investigated counties as an 
instrument. Another within-country study in the United States by Douglas and Walker (2016) 
concentrates on the more homogenous counties of the Appalachian region where coal mining 
activities have dominated the overall economy. Douglas and Walker (2016) find that coal 
mining dependence, measured as the fraction of resource revenue in total personal income, 
adversely affects growth of per capita personal income over the period 1970-2010 (in 
annualized 10-year intervals), regardless of whether analysis is conducted with instruments 
using GMM-Fixed Effects or without instruments based on pooled OLS. 
Finally, a recent study by Hota and Behera (2019) concentrates on the effects of mining 
extraction on development indicators including income across 30 districts in the state of 
Odisha, India. Hota and Behera focus on Odisha as the largest mineral producing state in 
India. They find that mining has been a dominant contributor to local government revenues, 
which they argue has caused different patterns of growth performance among states. To more 
formally examine this conjecture, Hota and Behera perform a simple ANOVA test, where 
mining-reliant districts are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. As expected, the results show that 
mining-based districts have a greater income per capita than their counterparts, and mining’s 




4.2.1.2 Effects on Poverty  
While most resource researchers have tested the effect of natural resource dependence 
on growth in income per capita, a smaller number have tried to also test the impact of 
resources on broader development indicators. For example, do positive associations found 
between mining or oil dependence and income per capita also result in positive effects on 
reducing poverty rates and raising living standards?   
In line with the belief that a reliance on oil or mining attenuates economic growth, Auty 
(1994) has argued that resource dependent countries tend to suffer from low development 
outcomes, including widespread poverty. Alternatively, according to a more traditional view,  
a nation endowed with oil and minerals that extracts large revenues from them should have a 
greater capacity to reduce poverty. Two papers examining this issue find there is evidence of 
slow but sustained poverty alleviation in resource-reliant nations (Ross, 2003; Stevens, 2003). 
Specifically, Ross (2003) discusses potential links between mineral extraction and 
poverty and notes that economic theories have conflicting views with respect to this 
relationship. On the one hand, nations that are largely reliant on natural resources have often 
experienced lower growth performance, which could increase poverty rates. On the other 
hand, resource wealth tends to offer “instant” sources of income linked with an increase in 
government revenues, enabling local governments to provide transfer programmes that are 
pro-poor or invest in public goods such as education or health that benefit the poor.  
Ross also provides some arguments on why mineral wealth possibly raises poverty. 
First, Ross argues that linkages between mining and non-mining sectors are relatively weak, 
which leads to less labour being demanded. Additionally, the mineral sector is particularly 
vulnerable to external shocks in world commodity prices. Countries that are economically 
reliant on natural resources are thus more likely to be affected by negative world price shocks, 
particularly the poor households in those countries. Third, although mining extraction may 
provide greater economic rents for governments, that income may be disproportionately 
distributed, potentially raising income inequality and doing little to alleviate poverty. Caselli 
and Michaels (2013) also emphasize the development implications of increased oil and gas-
based production among Brazilian municipalities. They find that while greater oil production 
may increase government revenues, there is no significant evidence that this raises local 





Moving to resource/poverty studies in developed countries, Black et al. (2005) examine 
the effects of coal booms and busts at the county level in the 1970’s and 1980’s in the 
American states of Pensylvania, West Virginia, Colorado, Ohio and Kentucky. Black et al. 
find that during a boom, coal counties experienced income increases faster than non-coal 
counties. Interestingly, poverty rates were alleviated during the boom, but increased to pre-
boom levels during the subsequent bust. A study by Weber (2012) also investigates the effect 
of resource booms at the United States county level, measured using the change in gas 
production, on poverty rates in Colorado, Texas and Wyoming. Weber finds that with OLS 
or IV methods, there is no significant evidence poverty rates are affected by boom events. 
More comprehensively, Patridge, Betz and Lobao (2013) compare all counties in the United 
States and the Appalachian region in particular for the respective 2000 and 2010 census years. 
These authors find no strong evidence that poverty rates in 2000 and 2010 were affected by 
share of employment in oil and gas in their full sample. Nonetheless, when using Appalachian 
counties only, they find higher oil and gas employment shares are associated with higher rates 
of poverty in 2010. Using the same regression, however, Patridge, et al. find that coal’s share 
of employment lowered the poverty rate in 2000, though with no significant effect in 2010. 
Some within-country studies have also tested for resource effects on poverty rates in 
the context of Asia. Comparing provinces in China, Zhang, Xing & Fan (2008) investigate 
the effect of initial resource dependence in 1985, measured as the percentage of resource 
(coal, oil, and natural gas) production in total GDP, on changes in the incidence of rural 
poverty from 1988 to 1999. They find initial resource dependence raises the subsequent 
poverty rate in rural areas, though the authors caution that with only 25 observations used in 
the poverty specification, the results may not be robust.  
Returning to the study for India by Hota and Behera (2019) but now regarding poverty, 
these authors find that for the specific state of Odisha, the share of mining in district GDP is 
negatively associated with the percentage in poverty in rural areas. Although this study can 
shed light on the experience of one emerging nation in Asia, Hota and Behera do not address 
the potential endogeneity of their resource dependence measure. 
Focusing on Indonesia, Bhattacharya and Resosudarmo (2015) use fixed effects 
analysis at the provincial level between 1977 and 2010, and find growth in mining GRDP per 
capita (as measured by the difference between real overall GRDP per capita and non-mining 




the estimated sign suggests poverty reduction. Bhattacharya and Resosudarmo’s measure of 
mining includes oil, natural gas, and minerals, but they provide no instruments in case it is 
endogenous. Continuing with Indonesia, now at the district level for the single year of 2009, 
Edwards (2016a) finds less happy resource effects. Edwards finds that mining dependence 
significantly raises the incidence of poverty. In particular, a one percent increase in mining 
share in GRDP raises the percentage of people living under the poverty line by 0.052 percent.  
 
4.2.1.3 Effects on Education  
Once again, a few resource effects studies have examined the effects of resource 
dependence on education outcomes. As particular studies about this topic are rare, I review 
both cross-country and within-country studies. Blanco and Grier (2012), for example, 
estimate the effects of ‘resource dependence’, measured as the share of exports of primary 
products in total GDP, on an education measure, using a panel of 17 Latin American countries 
from 1975 to 2004, averaged into 5 year periods. They find that resource dependence has no 
significant effect on the mean years of primary education completed by the population aged 
15 or more.  
A more recent study by Edwards (2016a) uses cross-sectional analysis in 2005 of 188 
countries to examine the impact of mining’s share in total GDP on educational attainment. 
Even though a cross country study results in more resource dependence measures being 
feasible, Edwards argues that mining’s share in GRDP is a better proxy for resource 
dependence than mining’s share in exports, as it reflects mining’s contribution to the overall 
economy. Edwards finds that resource dependence increases the percentage of people with 
no education either using OLS or IV estimation, where he instruments for dependence using 
national per capita fossil fuel reserves as of 1971. In particular, a one percentage point 
increase in mining share leads to a 0.671 increase in the percentage of people with no 
education. For robustness, Edwards also looks at whether mining’s share of GRDP 
undermines average years of education. He again finds a negative association, statistically 
significant at 1 percent level, using  instrumental variables. He concludes that mining sector 
dependence is detrimental to education. 
Moving to within-country tests of resource dependence and education, Weber (2014) 
tests for the South Central United States whether rising extraction of natural gas affects 




rates of the adult population. He finds that a change in natural gas production from 2000 to 
2010 is positively associated with the proportion of adults who have completed high school 
and college education, and negatively associated with the proportion with less than high 
school education. In contrast, Douglas and Walker (2016) argue that resource booms, 
especially in (coal) mining, create an incentive for young people to leave school, reducing 
educational outcomes. Douglas and Walker test this view using panel fixed effects regression 
and employing a longer time period (1970-2010) for the Appalachian counties in the United 
States. They find that a higher coal mining intensity is associated with an increase of the share 
of young adults without high school diplomas and a decrease in the share that have bachelors 
degrees. These findings remain consistent in both OLS Fixed-Effects and under GMM-FE. 
This result is similar to that of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) described earlier, though at state 
rather than county level. 
Additional recent studies of resource use and education using United States counties 
have also been taken by Zuo, Schieffer and Buck (2019) and by Carpenter, Anderson and 
Dudensing (2019). Both studies use variation in number of oil and gas wells across counties 
to test their effects on education indicators. Zuo et al. (2019), for instance, use 1,170 counties 
within the 15 states that contribute almost 85% of overall oil and gas production in the United 
States. The authors use drilling density, defined as the share of the number of newly drilled 
oil and gas wells divided by total size of labour force in 2000, and also use the share of 
geographic shale formation over the county area as an instrument for potential endogeneity. 
Similar to Douglas and Walker, Zuo et al. find that higher drilling activity is negatively 
correlated with high school enrollments for grades 11 and 12 between 2000 and 2013.  
For their part, Carpenter et al. (2019) select counties in Texas to examine the effect of 
oil-driven economic activities on high school drop-out rates. The authors use the number of 
newly operating oil wells or “spuds” to measure oil dependence. Newly operating wells are 
believed to have strong local employment effects as they require more labour to be hired than 
when wells are more established. Their start ups create incentives for young local residents 
to enter the labour market, which could potentially lower rates of high school enrollments. 
Using pooled OLS and panel fixed-effects regression over the period 2010-2014 in 203 
counties and controlling for population and ethnicity (Latino and non-Latino), the authors 
find no evidence that general drop-out rates are affected by Texas’s dependence on oil, though 





4.2.1.4 Effects on Health  
With regards to resource effects on health, I find only a few cross-country and within-
country studies. One between country study by Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) using 
1971 cross-sectional data, finds that natural resources, either measured as point resources 
(exports associated with fuels and minerals) or diffuse resources (exports in conjunction with 
agricultural products), have no effect on life expectancy in 2001.  More recently, Cotet and 
Tsui (2013) explore the effect of a country’s oil dependence on two health outcomes: infant 
mortality and life expectancy. Interestingly, by using pooled cross-country regression over 
1960-1980, Cotet and Tsui find that oil rents (defined as [production – cost] x global oil price) 
improve longevity within the population and reduces infant mortality. Cotet and Tsui also try 
instruments for oil dependence by using the product of oil production and initial oil reserves, 
and try country fixed-effects, and find similar positive results.  
Another dependence study by El Anshasy and Katsaity (2015) distinguishes resource 
dependence by type (namely hydrocarbon, mineral, or agricultural) as a percentage of each 
country’s GDP and test their effects on health outcomes in a cross-country study. These 
authors also find that in general oil rents improve health outcomes such as reductions in the 
rates of obesity and diabetes, while they have no effects on life expectancy. In contrast, 
dependence on agriculture has a positive effect on life expectancy and diabetes rates, but no 
effect on obesity. El Anshasy and Katsaity’s regression approach is based on cross-section 
OLS regression for 118 countries, regressing health status in 2008 on resource intensity in 
1980. Edwards (2016a) also exploits data among nations and uses IV with the limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator by regressing life expectancy and infant 
mortality separately on mining’s share in total GDP. In contrast to the previous studies, 
Edwards shows that a greater share of mining in total GDP significantly lowers life 
expectancy and is associated with increased rates of infant mortality.  
Moving to within-country studies, as with Edwards (2016a) the results are less 
optimistic. Al Rawashdeh, Campbell, and Titi (2016) descriptively examine the case of cities 
within the Middle Eastern country of Jordan. They find that the value of mining per capita is 
positively associated with the rate of infant mortality. Unfortunately, Al Rawashdeh, et al. 
provide no regression analysis with controls, other than in simple bivariate form. More 
promisingly but not directly related with life expectancy, or infant mortality, Zhan, Duan and 
Zeng (2015) follow the provinces of China from 1999 to 2009 and control unobserved 




increased share of mineral industrial output in GDP reduces expenditure on overall health 
care (a combination of services from hospitals, community medical clinics for urban and rural 
areas, epidemic prevention, maternity and child care, and drug administration).  
 
4.2.2 Spatial Effects in Economic Studies  
Before I discuss incorporating spatial spillovers of resource dependence in section 
4.2.3, I first explore why spatial effects have emerged in economic studies more generally. 
Traditionally, studies in economic growth have implicitly assumed that economic activities 
in one area are not affected by spatial factors, including activities occuring within close 
proximity. These studies define acceptable growth as a condition where greater production 
(led by many sectors) is achieved compared to the level of output in previous years. In famous 
conventional growth models (e.g. Temple (1999)), the rate of an area’s growth is determined 
by its physical and human capital, and also by its rate of technological progress. In other 
growth models such as Barro (1991), initial income per capita also plays an important role in 
predicting convergence dynamics in growth rates between different areas. In both cases, 
factors relating to geographic spillovers are not accounted for. 
In the 2000’s, however, growth researchers began to incorporate geographical 
indicators which might also explain variations in countries’s growth rates. For example 
Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that geographical factors alongside trade openess and institutions 
influence economic growth. Measures ranged from dummies regarding geographical features 
(e.g landlocked/remote), climate, latitude, or agglomeration externalities. While geographical 
features soon became widely adopted in empirical research (e.g. landlocked status in Sachs 
& Warner (1999); Acemoglu et al. (2005), Daniele (2011)), they were confined to absolute 
locational characteristics, rather than allowing for effects from adjacent jurisdictions.  
Abreu, de Groot and Florax (2005) recognise this distinction in their survey of the 
growth literature by categorizing spatial effects as based on relative rather than absolute 
location. Factors such as longitude, latitude, being landlocked are categorised as absolute. In 
contrast, when relevant characteristics of the nearest neighbouring areas are taken into 
account, such as those areas that share a common border, they are known as relative factors. 
Absolute and relative spatial factors can act as complementary exogenous variables when 





Therefore, if spatial heterogeneity in absolute features affects growth and should be 
controlled for, then so too should spatial heterogeneity in relative features of surrounding 
areas, weighted by distance. As inspired by Tobler’s Law that says that “near” things are 
more related than distant things, the relative notion of space based on proximity or 
neighbourhood effects has since become increasingly incorporated in regression analysis. An 
early exposition of a spatial econometric approach is provided by Anselin ((1988) in Anselin 
& Rey (2014)). Nearness of potential relevance is measured based on contiguity factors of 
neighbouring regions, based on the construction of spatial weights.86 
The use of spatial spillovers has then spread from studies of growth to studies by urban 
economists and economic geographers. A paper by Moreno & Trehan (1997) is frequently 
cited as the first exploring spatial spillover effects on growth. These authors used spatial 
weighting and OLS regression to estimate whether relative locational proximity matters for 
long-term economic growth. They construct their weights using a distance-based 
neighbourhood, equally weighting all countries that share a border with the home region. 
Using a standard econometric model, this study finds that nearby countries that have larger 
markets than the home country contribute positively to the home country’s growth. Similarly, 
Easterly and Levine (1997) investigate a spatial contagion effect on growth performance in 
which they find similar beneficial results of large neighbours.87 Looking instead at contagion 
effects of civil war, Murdoch and Sandler (2016) find that the closer the distance between 
home country and adjacent neigbours that experienced civil war, the more negative the impact 
on growth in the home country.  
Other studies have considered spatial spillover effects of other neighbour 
characteristics on home area growth. For example, Ades and Chua (1997) analyse the impact 
of political instability (measured using the mean annual number of revolutions and coups 
between 1960 and 1985) of neighbouring countries on home country per capita growth. Ades 
and Chua use the inverse of the number of neighbouring countries that share a border with 
 
86 These spatial weights are used to construct the “neighbourhood” for each unit of analysis, such as a 
county. Spillover effects can then be examined by testing whether outcomes of interest for area  i are 
affected by explanatory variables for area i, and for its constructed neighbourhood. 
87 Spillover effects of neighbours with entreprenurial capital have also been investigated by Pijnenburg & 
Kholodilin (2014). These authors try to isolate the effect of knowledge spillovers on regional economic 
performance in Germany. Using OLS and a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), they find their results are very 





the home country as each neighbour’s equal weight, and then regress per capita GDP on 
domestic and neighbour political instability. They find a low correlation between domestic 
and neighbour instability, and that the effect of neighbour instability on domestic growth is 
significantly less than the effect of domestic political instability.  
The spillover effects of the quality of neighbour countries’ institutions on domestic 
growth has also been investigated. Bosker and Garretsen (2009), for example, seek to extend 
the analysis of Rodrik, et al. (2004) already mentioned by adding  spatial institutional quality. 
Bosker and Garretsen use the simple average of neighbour country institution quality, where 
each contiguous country receives an equal weight. Bosker and Garretsen compare their results 
both under OLS and 2SLS on the basis of single year cross-section regression analysis. When 
using 2SLS, they instrument for both home country’s institutional quality, and that of 
neighbouring countries. Bosker and Garretsen find that neighbour institutional quality 
significantly raises home country GDP per capita. In addition, when neighbour institutional 
quality is added, the effect of a country’s own institutional quality remains significantly 
positive but smaller. This implies countries benefit not only from the quality of their own 
institutions but also from the quality of institutions of countries nearest to them. 
 
4.2.3 Including Spatial Effects in Resource Effect Studies 
As recognition of spatial spillover effects has grown in empirical analysis, resource 
effect researchers are also beginning to incorporate them. As mentioned in the introduction, 
a few studies looking for resource effects on income have included spatial effects, but none 
has done so when looking for resource effects on broader development outcomes. For these 
other outcomes I thus turn to review the importance of spatial effects from other cognate 
areas.  
The existing resource curse/blessing studies focused on income that have tested spatial 
spillovers of which I am aware are by Carmignani (2014), Weber (2014), and Lee (2015), 
with a few others that I will discuss in turn.  
A working paper by Carmignani (2014) is the first I know of that considers the effects 
of neighbourhood resource intensity on domestic income, though using country level data. 
Carmignani (2014) tests over 147 countries whether resource “intensity” (stock over GDP in 
1970) in country j affects real domestic income growth in country i between 1970 and 2005. 




contiguous neighbours. Specifically, he uses a spatial weight matrix 𝑊 based on the fraction 
of shared border length of each neighbour of the home country, divided by i’s total border 
length.88 Concentrating on the outcome of real per capita GDP in 2005, Carmignani finds 
that, controlling for other geographical factors like landlocked status and latitude, and for 
initial per capita GDP in 1970, a home country’s resource intensity has no significant effect 
on its GDP growth, while its neighbourhood resource intensity has a significant negative 
effect. That is, Carmignani finds a spatial resource curse, flowing from the resource intensity 
of a country’s neighbours rather than from its own resource endowment.  
The model developed by Carmignani is interesting because it is the first to allow the 
resource dependence of neighbouring areas to play a role. In the language of spatial regression 
analysis, the neighbourhood variable constructed is known as the spatial lagged explanatory 
variable, or an SLX model (Elhorst, 2010; Halleck Vega & Elhorst, 2015). However, 
Carmignani’s model differs from a formal SLX model in considering the spatial lag of only 
his key variable, rather than all explanatory variables.  
Beyond Carmignani’s cross country study, the few other resource effects studies to 
control for spatial effects have been within-country, generally the United States (Weber, 
2014; Deller, 2014; Lee, 2015; Douglas and Walker, 2016; and Weinstein, Patridge and 
Tsvetkova, 2018) or Australia (Fleming, et al. 2015). These studies mainly focus on the 
regional economic and development impact of oil, natural gas, or mining in general. 
Weber (2014), as described previously, for example, aims to investigate the impact of 
natural gas production (in billions of cubic feet) on labour market outcomes such as total 
employment, employment in mining and manufacturing, population, and earnings per job, in 
the 362 counties of the south-central United States (Arkansas, Lousiana, Oklahoma, and 
Texas). Weber limits his focus to this region for greater homogeneity of unobserved features 
in the sample. Recognizing a lag from the time when gas is drilled to the time it becomes 
commercialised, Weber performs a difference in difference analysis substracting a change in 
1995-2000 from the change of 2000-2010. Relevant here, Weber also adds spatial lagged gas 
production as well as spatial lags for all regressors, a full SLX model. Weber also tries 
instrumental variables for home and neighbour gas production using the location and growth 
in production of unconventional gas reservoirs in home and neighbour countries. Weber thus 
 
88 The weighted average is then created by a multiplication of the constructed spatial weight matrix with 




follows a similar IV strategy as that used by Bosker and Garretsen (2009) in their study of 
institutional quality spillovers. 
In contrast to Carmignani, Weber finds no significant effect from the spatial lag of gas 
production on his various dependent variables, except for earnings per job which is negatively 
affected. Interestingly, Weber finds that the change in earnings in the home county is greatly 
affected by change in gas production in its neighbourhood, though the domestic effect of gas 
production is positive. Regarding the impact on education, Weber finds no evidence that the 
spatial lag of gas production affects a home county’s education completion rates, looking 
specifically at the adult population who separately completed less than high school, high 
school, college and more. Weber thus finds a resource blessing for various development 
outcomes, such as educational attainment of the adult population, but not from spatial 
spillovers effects per se. 
In a similar vein, Lee (2015) adapts Weber’s study, restricting attention to Texas, but 
extending it to include oil dependence effects on the local economy. Using annual county-
level data, Lee begins his baseline model using a 2014-2009 first-differenced model where 
he uses numbers of active oil or gas drilling wells as the key regressor, and considers the 
effects on local employment and income over the 6-year period. Lee also considers county 
fixed effects. Finally, Lee considers a spatial panel model by including a weighted average 
of all explanatory variables in neighbouring counties, as done by Weber (2014). Lee arranges 
his spatial weight based on simple contiguity (i.e. all counties contiguous with the home 
country are equally weighted). Lee finds in his non-spatial fixed effects model that the number 
of oil and gas wells has a positive and significant effect on employment and income. The 
estimated effects are consistent whether oil and gas are considered separately or aggregated. 
The results are fairly similar with regards to a cross-section 2014-2009 first-differenced 
model. In the final spatial model, Lee differs from Weber in finding that an increase in oil 
and gas wells in neighbouring counties raises home county employment and income. 
Douglas and Walker (2016) also consider spatial effects for the effect of coal 
dependence on long term income growth (1970-2010) in the Appalachian counties of the 
United States. Douglas and Walker also use simple equal weighted contiguity for their spatial 
weight matrix, as applied in Weber and Lee, to construct their spatially lagged regressors. 
Using GMM estimation, Douglas and Walker find that both home county coal dependence 




Lastly for the United States, a recent study by Weinstein, Patridge & Tsvetkova (2018) 
extends the studies by Weber and by Lee, examining the effects of oil and gas well 
proliferation on oil and gas earnings as well as employment. Unlike the previous studies, 
Weinstein et al. also create a spatially lagged dependent variable. In particular, they include 
energy earnings growth in bordering counties to capture spatial spillover effects of the 
dependent variable on home county earning growth. They use the same difference-in-
difference strategy for 2001-2013 as Weber (2014) and Lee (2015) and divide the sample 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas within all 48 states of the continental 
United States. Weinstein et al. find that counties that are surrounded by oil and gas dependent 
neighbours receive a small positive effect on their earnings. Metropolitan areas tend to be 
more affected than non-metropolitan areas. The results are similar when they use an 
instrumental variable approach, using the abundance of oil and gas endowments across 
counties.89  
In one non-United States study, Fleming, Measham and Paredes (2015) control for 
spatial effects when studying the effect of mining employment on median family income and 
non-mining employment in Australia. Fleming at al. use 449 non-metropolitan local 
government areas (LGA), using census data in 2001 and 2011. The authors, however, control 
for spatial neighbourhood effects not for the key variable of interest, but instead for other 
initial year control variables such as the unemployment rate, population, and family median 
income in adjacent LGAs. Fleming, et al. find that an increase in mining employment 
positively affects both changes in family income and non-mining employment. They also find 
that spatial lags of other related control variables tend to positively affect both respective 
dependent variables. 
To my knowledge, no resource effect studies have yet controlled for spatial effects in 
a developing country in general, nor Indonesia in particular. The closest relevant study for 
Indonesia has been a within-country growth study by Vidyattama (2014), which tests if the 
spatial lag of growth in neighbouring provinces affects home province growth. Vidyattama 
(2014) uses a spatial autoregressive lag model (SAR) of growth in the nearest neighbourhood, 
and then considers a spatial autoregressive error model (SEM). The author selects distance-
based weighting to form a spatial weight matrix, using the distance between the geographic 
 
89 Weinstein, et al. (2018) use five instruments that can approximate for the level of oil and gas abundance: 
percent of a county area over a shale play, estimated amount of recoverable shale gas, estimated amount of 




centroid of each province. Albeit not related to resource effects, this study provides an 
attractive alternative method for identifying neighbourhoods.  
Not surprisingly, with the few resource effect studies that have included spatial effects, 
there is as yet no firm consensus as to their relevance, nor to the best way to construct 
neighbourhoods. Counter-examples to Tobler’s law can be found. For example, Abderrezak 
(2005)  finds that the growth rates of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are more affected by the 
growth rates of distant countries than by that of adjacent neighbours. 
With no evidence regarding spatial spillovers of resource dependence in developing 
countries, I turn now to my investigation for Indonesia using similar approaches to neighbour 
construction as used by recent studies. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Estimation Strategy 
4.3.1 Data 
 
Most of the data for this investigation are obtained from the Indonesia Central Bureau 
of Statistics (BPS) and the Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-
DAPOER) from the World Bank. Data from BPS is freely accessible though for some 
indicators it must be purchased at the household level from Indonesia’s National Labour 
Force Survey (Sakernas) or National Social Economic Survey (Susenas) and then aggregated 
to district level.90 I also use data obtained from relevant publications across ministries of the 
Republic of Indonesia, e.g. from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MoEMR), 
the Ministry of Finance, and from the National Audit Board (Table A1 in Appendix 4.1 
compiles a full list of variables used and their definitions).  
These data will be used to provide measures of district-level resource dependence, and 
control variables such as the change in labour force participation rate, initial district income 
per capita and initial local population of each district, as well as earthquake incidence. The 
period of observation is generally between 2006 and 2015, with 2005 values used as a 
baseline period, though in some cases of limited data availability, 2007 is both the initial year, 
and the start point of 2007-2015 differences. 
The reasons the district level data are restricted to 2006 onward is primarily data 
availability and reliability. District data was not available at sufficient completeness prior to 
 




the implementation of decentralisation in 2004-2005. One challenge of following districts 
over time has been the splitting of ‘parent’ districts into ‘child’ districts between 2007 and 
2014, a proliferation allowed under decentralisation. To follow districts consistently over 
time, I collapse ‘child’ districts back to their parent districts, reducing the number of districts 
to 390.  
As absolute geographical factors tend to be controlled for in the broader growth 
literature (e.g. Rodrik et al. (2004); Bosker and Garretsen (2009), Carmignani (2014), Weber 
(2014), Fleming and Measham (2015)), I will also control for them here. I thus collect data 
on three geographic measures for each district: (1) a dummy if it is landlocked; (2) the straight 
line distance between its centroid and that of its corresponding provincial capital, and (3) the 
distance between its centroid and that of Indonesia’s capital Jakarta.91 These variables are 
constructed using the shapefile data of Indonesia’s administrative district map taken from the 
Indonesia Survey and Mapping Board (Bakosurtanal) and the Indonesia Geospatial Board 
(BIG), modified to the 390 district boundaries used in this study. This approach thus covers 
all original (as of 2003) ‘parent’ districts in Indonesia consistently over time.  
As foreshadowed, a key methodological objective of this chapter is to allow for spatial 
spillover effects when examining the effect of resource dependence on income and other 
development indicators in Indonesia. As a result, constructing a spatial weights matrix to 
identify the ‘neighbourhood’ of each district plays a key role in my analysis. For robustness, 
I use three spatial weighting methods and resulting matrices. I will describe these thoroughly 
in the next section, but in summary they are based on: (1) a simple queen contiguity weight;  
(2) a length-border based weight; and (3) a centroid distance based weight. 
To pursue my other key objective for this chapter. I analyse the impact of resource 
dependence beyond its effect on per capita income, to also consider effects on poverty, 
education and health. For data related to the poverty rate, I use the proportion of individuals 
having expenditures below the poverty line following Bhattacharyya and Resosudarmo 
(2015) and Miranti (2017). This poverty data comes from BPS, derived from the National 
Socio-economic Survey (Susenas). For education outcomes, I use district data on the 
highschool and university graduation attainment of adults. This information is constructed 
 
91 Measuring distance using physical features such as road length is difficult given the nature of the 




from household level data at each district, sourced from Sakernas starting only in 2007.92 For 
health outcomes, I use district level life expectancy information. Data for life expectancy are 
taken from Human Development Publications published regularly by BPS.  
4.3.2 Estimation Strategy 
I will use three econometric models to estimate the effects of resource dependence on 
development outcomes. I begin with a baseline first-differenced regression model without 
controls for spatial spillovers. I will then include a spatial effect only of my key resource 
dependence measure. Finally I will include spatial lags of all independent variables as 
discussed by Vega and Elhorst (2015). To be able to estimate spatial spillovers, I begin by 
explaining how I construct various spatial weights matrices that are used to create a 
‘neighbourhood’ for each district.  
4.3.2.1 Constructing Spatial Weight Matrices  
A spatial weights matrix (𝑊𝑖𝑗) is a key element for conducting spatial analysis in 
regression models. For a study of N areas, 𝑊𝑖𝑗  contains information of dimension 𝑁 × 𝑁. 
Each row of the matrix provides information concerning the importance (relatedness) of area 
i to each of its neighbours (e.g. countries, regions, districts, etc.). Each column provides 
information concerning the importance of each of its neighbours to i (Anselin & Bera, 1998).   
The size of the matrix is thus sensitive to the number of areas being used here, 390. 
Depending on the exact weighting criteria, many districts will have no measured relatedness 
to another. For Indonesia in particular for some weighting rules some island districts will 
have no ‘neighbourhood’, affecting the sample size in regressions with spatial lags.  
As the purpose of constructing 𝑊𝑖,𝑗 is to weight the impact of nearby districts, and by 
definition each district has zero distance from itself, the diagonal elements of (𝑊𝑖𝑗) are zero. 
Table 4.1 illustrates. 
Table 4.1. An Illustration of Spatial Weighting Matrix 𝑊𝑖,𝑗 
 District A District B District C District D 
District A 0    
District B  0   
District C   0  
District D    0 
 
92 The Sakernas data samples representative households from every province in Indonesia. This survey only 




As foreshadowed in section 4.3.1, this study exploits three different weighting rules 
separately for each regression model as a check for robustness. Following the standard 
literature in this area, these weighting rules vary from the basic queen contiguity rule to one 
of two distance-based weights, using a specific bandwidth from home district to define 
eligibility. 
4.3.2.2 The Queen contiguity weight 
The first spatial weights matrix (SWM) is simple and commonly used in econometrics 
analysis. As pointed out in Anselin & Bera (1998), or recently Anselin and Rey (2014), the 
“queen contiguity” treats districts i and j as neighbours if they share any common border.93 
All adjoining districts to district 𝑖 are then equally weighted to define 𝑖's neighbourhood. 
More specifically, a binary matrix is used initially, where if district i (in Figure 4.1, the 
district with the dark green colour) shares any land border with another district, the matrix 
value for those districts are 1, and 0 otherwise.94 
Figure 4.1. Neighbours based on queen contiguity 
 
 
To construct this weight, I used shapefile data of the 390 districts in Indonesia (as of 
2003) to carefully identify the neighbours of each home district.  
The binary contiguity matrix constructed using this rule is then normalised by a row 
standardisation which effectively gives an “equal weight” to each contiguous neighbour of a 
home district. Thus, the elements of a row-standardized weights matrix are 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝑗 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗⁄  
 
93 The term “queen” is inspired by the chess game where the queen can move in any direction, including 
corner moves (Anselin & Rey, 2014). In general, most studies applying spatial analysis will try this weight 
first before moving to another weighting rule to check robustness. 
94 A related, but less common rule is “rook” contiguity, where areas sharing only a corner point in common 




(Anselin & Bera, 1998).  This weighting method has also been used in Weber (2014), Lee 
(2015), and Weinstein, et al. (2018). It is simple, but has the disadvantage of treating as 
equally important neighbours who may vary greatly in their border overlap with the home 
district. In addition, Queen contiguity excludes island districts who lack adjacent districts. 
4.3.2.3 Length of border-based weight  
Though less common, I also try two alternative weighting rules that place greater 
weight on ‘nearer’ neighbours than on more distant ones. The first is based on the proportion 
of a home district’s total border that is shared with each adjacent neighbour (Carmignani, 
2014; Carmignani and Kler, 2016; Murdoch and Sandler, 2016). ArcGIS is used to measure 
the length in kilometres of the border that district 𝑖 shares with each adjacent district. The 
border length of district 𝑖 is used as the denominator. Note that for districts who partially 
border the ocean, that coastal length of border will not be counted in the denominator. 
More formally, following Ades and Chua (1997) and Carmignani (2014), the length-





Here 𝑙𝑖,𝑗 is the length of the land border between districts i and j. The length-of-border 
weighting matrix has the advantage of giving greater weight to adjacent districts that share 
more of districts 𝑖's border. Nonetheless, for a country like Indonesia, the largest archipelagic 
nation in the world, there remains the problem that districts that are physically surrounded by 
the sea are classed as having no neighbours and are thus ineligible for spatial analysis. This 
can be handled as in Carmignani (2014), by excluding such districts from analysis throughout. 
This ensures consistent treatment, but reduces the number of districts observed.  
4.3.2.4 Distance-based weight  
A third approach for weighting neighbours uses the distance between the ‘centroid’ of 
a home district and the centroids of nearby neighbours within some pre-determined radius. 
Arbitrarily, I use 200 km as my centroid threshold radius to select which districts are eligible 
to be treated as neighbours as illustrated in Figure 4.2. I choose this radius because the average 
centroid distance between some remote non-populous districts in Indonesia does not exceed 
250 km. This means that most, but not quite all, island districts can have a neighbourhood 




Figure 4.2. Weight based on centroid point distance with 200 km radius limit 
 
 
Following studies such as Gamboa (2013), Pijnenburg and Kholodilin (2014), Yildirim 
& Öcal (2016), and Gerolimetto and Magrini (2016), the latitude and longitude of the centroid 
point of each district can be identified, and then the distance between the centroids of each 
home district and its neighbours.  
Eligible neighbour districts are assigned weights that take the form of the inverse of the 
distance between centroids, or  𝑤𝑖,𝑗 = 1 𝑑𝑖,𝑗⁄ , such that nearby districts with closer centroids 







This method identifies neighbours for island districts, so long as the distance between 
their centroids is within 200 km (see e.g. Bosker and Garretsen, 2009).  
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy 
4.3.3.1 First-Difference Model: Non Spatial Regression 
To begin, I perform my analysis using an ordinary least squares (OLS) first-difference 
model over two different periods of time to control for unobserved heterogeneity across 
districts that may affect growth (Wooldridge, 2016).95 I use a 9 year difference, 𝑡2015 − 𝑡2006.  
 
95 To see the equivalence between two period fixed effects and first difference models, I can follow Wooldridge 




For any given outcome of interest, I run my FD model first without and then with spatial 
effects, initially just for resource dependence, and then for all explanatory variables. This is 
a resource effect specific-to-general approach (Elhorst, 2010) and has been implemented in 
resource effect studies such as Lee (2015) and Weber (2014). 
Beginning with growth in income, my initial specification is as follows:  
 ∆𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖) = 𝛾 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜎 +  ∆ 𝑖 ......................... (3) 
  
Here ∆𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,2015) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,2006), and measures the difference in log 
GRDP between 2006 and 2015. For other development indicators, I will use the change in 
district poverty rate (∆𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦), the change in education attainment (∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖), measured as 
the proportion of the district population aged 15 or over that has at least graduated from high 
school, and the change in the log of life expectancy (∆𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝). 
 ∆𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛾 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜎 + ∆ 𝑖 ......................... (4) 
 ∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 = 𝛾 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜎 + ∆ 𝑖 ......................... (5) 
 ∆𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 = 𝛾 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜎 + ∆ 𝑖 ......................... (6) 
For compactness, each dependent variable can be more generally labelled 
∆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖. 
The key explanatory variable in models (3) to (6) is ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖. As in previous chapters, I 
use four alternative measures to capture the extent to which each district is dependent on point 
source type natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and coal. These measures are MINDEP, 
which is the share of oil, natural gas and coal including other minerals in district GRDP, 
district government dependence on oil and gas revenues (OILGASREV), which is the share 
of local government budget revenues deriving from oil and gas rents and royalties, district 
government dependence on coal revenues (COALREV), defined analogously, and finally 
district government dependence on oil, gas and coal revenues combined (MINREV).96 The 
∆𝑋′𝑖 stands for a set of control variables, including changes in the labour force participation 
 
96 I follow Edwards (2016a,b) in the use of MINDEP and Cust and Rusli (2016) in the use of budget 
dependence measures. I acknowledge that some papers cited have used the number of oil or gas wells as a 
dependence measure for the county-level case in the U.S. However, due to incomplete information 




rate, initial population level (in logs), and the cumulative incidence of earthquakes between 
2006 and 2015. Additional controls are included to capture the absolute geographic position 
of districts, namely urban status (if a municipality) (DURBAN), location on Java Island 
(DJAVA), and whether districts lack coastal access (LANDLOCKED). I also control for the 
absolute distance of the centroid of each district from its provincial capital (DIST_PROV), 
as well as from the national capital Jakarta (specifically the Indonesian Presidential Palace) 
(DIST_NAT). All distance measures are in km. The 𝑖 is the idiosycractic error term that 
reflects omitted variables.  
As commonly used in growth models and the resource effects literature, I also control 
for the baseline conditions (BASELINE) of each outcome of interest in 2005, whether the log 
of GRDP per capita in 2005, or the log of poverty rate or education or life expectancy 
measures. I follow Barro (1991) in including initial income per capita as an explanatory 
variable to capture its long term effects on change in GDP, and a possible convergence effect. 
Controlling for baseline income per capita is also common in resource effect studies (e.g. 
Sachs and Warner, 1995; Douglas and Walker, 2016; Edwards, 2016a). 
As has become standard in the resource effects literature, I also address the possible 
endogeneity of my resource dependence measures, ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 , by using instruments.
97 I use two 
categories of instruments: historical measures of resource abundance, 𝑅𝐴1970𝑠, and changes 
in physical resource output. Specific combinations of these instruments will be applied 
depending on the resource dependence measure considered and the outcome variable in 
question (see Appendix 4.2 Tables A2 and A3 for the list of instruments used). Both types of 
instruments have been commonly used in resource effect investigations (e.g. Edwards (2016), 
Cust and Rusli (2014), Weber (2014), Caselli and Michaels (2013)). More details about the 
ex ante appropriateness of these instruments can be found in Chapter 1 (or 2).98  
When instruments are used, the first and second stages can be expressed as follows: 
 ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝜙 + 𝛾𝑅𝐴1970𝑠 +  𝛾∆𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖 +  𝛾∆𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖 +  𝛾∆𝐶𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝛽2 +  ∆ 𝑖 (7) 
 
97 Some researchers argue that when it comes to the local level, mining dependence measured at the regional 
level can be treated as exogenous (Edwards, 2016a; Fleming, et al., 2015). 
98 By looking at the 2005 maps provided by the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
showing the main locations and comparing it with earlier and later maps, it is clear that no dramatic shifts 
have occurred. Thus, there is no way for district governments to experience resource windfalls in 2015 




 ∆𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝜋1∆𝑅?̂?𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜋2 + ∆ 𝑖 (8) 
 
An instrumental variable method based on the two steps GMM (IV-GMM) is used to 
perform this regression using the ivreg2 command to ensure all stages are correctly calculated 
and standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity. When the instruments 
employed are sufficiently strong, and endogeneity problems occur, the IV-GMM estimator is 
preferred to OLS. Validity tests for weakness will be checked using the first-stage regressions 
using the F-statistics following Staiger and Stock’s rule of thumb (Wooldridge, 2016), while 
Hansen’s J statistic will be used to test whether instruments are overidentified, which is a 
necessary condition for being uncorrelated with the error term.99 To be conducted, 
overidentification tests require the number of instruments to exceed the number of suspected 
endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are run using the Hausman-type endogtest in Stata 
ivreg2. 
4.3.3.2 Controlling for Resource Dependence in Neighbouring Districts 
From baseline first difference models (with and without instruments), I next turn to 
accomodate the potential spatial spillover effects of the resource dependence of neighbouring 
districts on home district outcomes of interest. Using the spatial weights matrices decribed in 
section 4.3.2.1. to define the neighbours, I extend the first difference models expressed in Eq. 
(3)-(6) by including variables that can capture variations of resource dependence in the 
neighbourhood of own district i. This enters as a multiplication of the spatial weights matrix 
(𝑊) with the matrix of district ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 .
100 This creates a spatial lagged variable that is defined 
as the weighted average of resource dependence in the neighbourhood areas of district i.  
This approach follows Carmignani (2014), and is similar to Weber (2014) and Lee 
(2015), though the latter papers also include spatial lags for all independent variables. 
We can write this extension formally as: 
 ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 = 𝜎 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝛽 + ∆𝑅𝐷𝑁𝜃 + ∆𝑋′𝑖 𝜎 + ∆ 𝑖 ......................... (9) 
 
 
99 I use the ivreg2 command in the Stata module developed by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007). The 
ivreg2 command provides diagnostics to check for instrument relevance and overidentification. 
100 Elhorst (2010) offers a cross-section spatial model as 𝑌𝑖 =  𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝑖𝜃 + 𝑢, also known as 
the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) for panel data. The 𝑊𝑌𝑖 and 𝑊𝑋𝑖 capture the spatial lagged effects of the 





where 𝑅𝐷𝑁 is the spatial lag of 𝑅𝐷𝑖  , subscript 𝑖 represents own district and 𝑁 corresponds to 
i’s neighbourhood. The equation can thus test the direct effect of spatial spillover captured by 
𝜃 on each dependent variable, ∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖.  
As explained in Bosker and Garretsen (2009) and Weber (2014), if endogeneity is a 
concern for a home district variable, then it is also a concern for the spatial lag of that variable. 
I will therefore instrument for 𝑅𝐷𝑁 as I do for 𝑅𝐷𝑖 . This is the approach taken by Bosker and 
Garretsen (2009), Weber (2014), Lee (2015), and Weinstein, et al. (2018). I will thus use the 
spatial lag of historical measures of resource abundance, 𝑅𝐴1970𝑠, for oil, gas and coal, and 
for changes in physical resource output as instruments for 𝑅𝐷𝑁. Here again the precise 
combination of abundance and production change instruments used will differ depending on 
the resource dependence and outcome measure used (see Appendix 4.2 Tables A2 and A3).  
 
4.3.3.3 Controlling for Spatial Lags of the Explanatory Variables 
As a final step, rather than testing for neighbourhood effects for only the key variable 
of interest, ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖 , I will also include spatial lags of all explanatory variables as a robustness 
check. Controlling all spatial lags for independent regressors allows me to check whether 
spatial spillovers associated with resource dependence measures persist. This model is 
believed to be a good choice as a point of departure into spatial econometrics as it imposes 
less complexity compared to the inclusion of a spatial lag of the dependent variable (e.g. the 
SAR model of Anselin (Anselin & Bera, 1998)). The spillover effects captured by this model 
are more straightforward to interpret (see Elhorst (2010), Halleck Vega & Elhorst (2015), and 
Elhorst & Vega (2016), Gibbons and Overman (2012)).  
Numerous recent empirical studies which include spatial spillovers have used the fuller 
spatial lag of X (SLX) model with all explanatory variables (e.g. Weber (2014); McCoy, 
Lyons, Morgenroth, Palcic, & Allen (2018); Araújo, Goncalves, Almeida (2018)).101 In 
contrast to standard OLS, the SLX model estimates for each explanatory variable both its 
direct effect on the outcome of interest, and its indirect effect via neighbouring areas. The 
direct effects refer to the coefficient estimates of the non-spatial variables, whereas the 
spillover effects are those associated with the spatially lagged explanatory variables (Elhorst, 
2010; Vega and Elhorst, 2015; Elhorst and Vega, 2016). Note, however, that when the spatial 
 
101 Another reason to use SLX is that there is still debate about the interpretation of spillovers in the Spatial 
Lag Model using the autoregressive (SAR) or error (SEM) forms (for additional detail, see Elhorst (2010); 




lags of all explanatory variables are included, the estimated direct effects are not simply 
equivalent to the 𝛽𝑘 in a model without spatial lags, such as OLS (Vega and Elhorst, 2015). 
The SLX model takes the form: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑋𝛽 +  𝑊𝑋𝜃 +  𝑖 ……….                                (10) 
here 𝑊 is the SWM containing N elements of the 𝑁 𝑥 𝑁 non-negative matrix, and 𝑊𝑋 
identifies the weighted average neighbour characteristics for all expanatory variables. These 
indirect effects are estimated by 𝜃. This model assumes no autoregressive component 𝜌 = 0, 
but that 𝜃 ≠ 0 as discussed in Vega and Elhorst (2015). With regards to potential endogeneity 
of some explanatory variables, the SLX model can use standard instrumental variable 
techniques such as 2SLS or IV-GMM for both 𝑋 and 𝑊𝑋 variables suspected of endogeneity.  
Applied here, the SLX model becomes : 
∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖  = 𝜂 +  𝛽(∆𝑅𝐷𝑖)+𝜃(∆𝑅𝐷𝑁) + ∆𝑋′𝜎 + 𝑊∆𝑋′𝑖𝛿 + ∆ 𝑖                             (11) 
 
here 𝑊∆𝑋′ represents the spatial lag of all other explanatory variables for the neighbourhood 
of district i. Again I will focus on the parameters 𝛽, 𝜃, and 𝛿, which capture the relevant 
impacts of resource dependence and its spatial lag.  
4.4 Results 
Table 4.2 reports information related to key variables used in subsequent regression 
analysis. To highlight, growth in per capita GRDP has shown a positive trend, with a 41.4 % 
increase on average between 2006 and 2015. The average change in the share in poverty has 
been a drop of 6.2 % on average, while life expectancy (expressed in logs) has increased on 
average by 2 percent (or without a logarithmic transformation, it has increased by 1.54 years). 
Educational attainment has also generally improved, with an average 11.5% increase in the 






Table 4.2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs) 390 0.414 0.345 -0.852 2.685 
∆Mining Dependence 390 0.012 0.142 -0.614 0.795 
∆OilGas Revenue 390 -0.029 0.091 -0.528 0.224 
∆Coal Revenue 390 0.015 0.048 -0.119 0.359 
∆Mining Revenue 390 -0.013 0.084 -0.523 0.256 
∆Poverty rate 390 -0.062 0.073 -0.272 0.536 
∆Life expectancy (log) 390 0.020 0.044 -0.158 0.119 
∆Educ_attain 390 0.115 0.079 -0.190 0.393 
Distance to prov. capital 390 136.962 132.930 0.000 718.173 
Distance to Jakarta 390 1163.885 850.831 19.033 3787.245 
Landlocked 390 0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000 
DURBAN 390 0.208 0.406 0.000 1.000 
DJAVA 390 0.303 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Population, 2005 (in logs) 390 3.937 0.704 1.951 7.684 
GRDP per capita, 2005 (in logs) 390 12.721 1.029 9.450 15.227 
Instruments:      
oilgasabundance 390 0.154 0.660 0 7 
coalabundance 390 3.660 14.327 0 94.214 
∆oilprod 390 -103.164 3805 -22751 64381 
∆gasprod 390 267.544 31094 -402890 378035 
∆coalprod 390 92.619 508.369 -45.277 5845.853 
Note: see Appendix 4.1. Table A1 for a full list of variables and definition. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 4.3 depicts the location of oil wells over the 390 
districts of Indonesia as of 2003. The wells are those classified as “development wells”, 
defined as non-exploration wells associated with drilling activities over at least the last 5 
years.  Gas wells are also added in Figure 4.3. The districts containing these productive oil 
and gas wells are identified according to annual accumulated production data, which is used 
by the government for a post-decentralisation funding formula. That is, oil and gas activities 
in the point-of-origin districts generate resource windfalls that they use to fund the provision 




Figure 4.3. Oil and Gas Wells (Onshore and Offshore) 
 
Source: MoEMR, modified into map by author. 
While I could obtain data on the number of wells in each district, I could not access the 
exact date at which each well began operation, nor the amount of oil or gas produced per well. 
Instead, I could access the total physical production from all wells per district.102 As a result, 
I cannot identify variations in active wells over the time period of this study. As shown in 
Figure 4.3, most wells are located onshore rather than offshore, with a majority concentrated 
on Sumatra and Kalimantan Islands (see Appendix 4.3 Figure A1, for the names of 
Indonesia’s islands). Significantly, these figures are very similar to the maps illustrated by 
Bee (1982), Leeuwen (1994), and Friederich & Leeuwen (2017), which I use to correlate 
historical oil and gas field locations in the 1970’s with Indonesia’s district boundaries map in 
2003. This suggests that over 50 years of oil and gas discoveries in Indonesia, vital well 
locations have spread slightly, but are still predominantly concentrated over the same islands 
as previously. 
I would therefore argue that the locations of these active wells represent exogenous 
variation in oil and gas-based activities based on abundance. There is no tendency for drilling 
activities to increase when district growth or education increases, nor when poverty rates 
change. The fact that most wells are located onshore is also not surprising, as the cost to 
construct and operate offshore wells for deep sea explorations is estimated to be USD 100-
 
102 I illustrate the position of every well from  https://geoportal.esdm.go.id of the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources. There are 583 oil wells (with development type) in total. Of these 269 wells are onshore 
for oil and 43 wells are offshore, while the rest are classified as non-producing new fields. For gas, there 




120 million per well to operate, with no guarantee that oil will be found at the desired level 
for commercial production.  
Figure 4.4. Relationship between share in oil and gas revenues and development indicators 
 
Source: Author’s construction 
I next present simple scatter plots of the change in oil and gas revenues’ share in district 
government budget versus each development outcome of interest (change in local GDP (in 
logs), poverty, educational attainment, and life expectancy (in logs)). As highlighted in Figure 
4.4, oil and gas dependence shows a slight positive relationship with local income and with 
life expectancy, and a negative relationship with the poverty rate, (i.e. with a decrease in the 
proportion of the population below the poverty threshold). In contrast, there appears to be a 
negative relationship between oil and gas dependence and attainment of at least high school 
completion across districts. 
To test these associations between resource dependence and development outcomes 
more formally, I move next to regression results. I begin without spatial effects, then include 

















































































4.4.1 Result 1: The Effects of Resource Dependence on Development 
Indicators Without Spatial Lags  
 
This section considers the effects of resource dependence in Indonesian districts on 
development indicators as described in Section 4.3.3.1. I begin without spatial effects. Table 
4.3 presents resource effects on the first outcome: local GDP (GRDP) per capita. Again I 
present first difference models to remove district fixed effects and then IV-GMM to account 
for potential endogeneity of my measure of resource dependence. With a greater emphasis on 
spatial factors in this chapter, I now also control for three absolute geographic factors as 
controls. 
For efficient exposition, I move first to the instrument validity and endogeneity tests 
provided in IV-GMM results. Using the instruments listed in Appendix 4.2. Table A2, I find 
as in Chapter 1 that in all specifications (5) – (8), the instruments are individually significant 
in first stage regressions, and that the majority of first-stage F statistics are at or well above 
10, suggesting that the instruments are sufficiently strong. Overidentification tests based on 
Hansen J also fail to reject the null, meaning that my instruments for each resource 
dependence measure pass necessary conditions for validity. Using these instruments, p-values 
in endogeneity tests shown show that three out of four measures of resource dependence are 
endogenous, leaving the preferred specifications to be (1), (6), (7) and (8). Here, again as I 
found in Chapter 1, an increase in budget dependence on resources significantly raises GRDP 
per capita for three of four resource dependence measures, showing a blessing effect on 
growth. For example, from (1), an increase in mining’s share of district GRDP significantly 
increases GRDP per capita. In particular, a standard deviation increase in a change in 
mining’s share is associated with a 10.5 (=0.141*0.745 = 0.105) percent increase in income 
per capita. Only rising coal revenue dependence is not associated with a rise in income. 
Next, Table 4.4 reports the OLS estimates of resource dependence on change in the 
poverty rate, change in educational attainment and change in life expectancy. Corresponding 
IV-GMM results are presented in Table 4.5. I begin again by examining the validity of my 
instruments, and results of tests for endogeneity. As seen from the IV-GMM estimates in 
Table 4.5, the first-stage F statistic for each resource dependence measure for all outcomes 
generally exceeds 10, with the exception of columns (10)-(11) for life expectancy. 
Particularly for column (11) (life expectancy) this may raise the issue of weak identification, 
where my instruments are only weakly correlated with GRDP resource dependence. 




specifications shows them to be jointly significant, which indicates that the instruments are 
at least significantly correlated with the specified resource dependence measure. The p-values 
of Hansen J-statistics indicate that the instruments used have passed the over-identification 
test for all resource dependence measures where they can be run, with values ranging from 
0.188 to 0.810. Note that for specifications in columns (7) and (11), the p-values cannot be 
calculated as the specifications become just-identified. Tests for endogeneity shows that, 
except for columns (1), (7), (10) and (11), the p-values can not reject the null hypothesis that 
resource dependence measures are exogenous for these broader development outcomes, 
suggesting that the OLS estimator is preferable. The preferred specifications are thus columns 
(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9) and (12) from Table 4.4 and columns (1), (7), (10) and (11) from 
Table 4.5. 
Moving to the results, neither in OLS nor in IV-GMM do I find that the poverty rate 
(columns (1) – (4)) is significantly influenced by variations in resource dependence. The 
insignificant effects imply that the blessing effects of resource reliance on local GRDP per 
capita have not been transmitted to improving living standards for people with the lowest 
incomes. Even more striking than resource dependence’s lack of effect on poverty, all 
measures are negatively associated with the share of the local population at least completing 
high school, though generally only significant  at the 10% level in columns (5) – (8) of the 





Table 4.3. OLS and IV-GMM, Dep Var: ∆GRDP per capita (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev 
∆Mindep 0.745***    1.359***    
 (0.191)    (0.466)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.225    1.735**   
  (0.457)    (0.814)   
∆Coalrev   0.671    -0.425  
   (0.550)    (0.736)  
∆Minrev    -0.087    1.303** 
    (0.372)    (0.587) 
lgdp_percap05 -0.108*** -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.136*** -0.036* -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.032*** 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.036) (0.032) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
lpop_05 0.035 0.029 0.035 0.028 0.015 0.015 -0.041 0.178 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.191) (0.232) (0.203) (0.177) 
Earthquake -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.040*** -
0.100*** 
-0.032 -0.121*** -0.083** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.067) (0.039) (0.040) 
DURBAN 0.065 0.061 0.073 0.056 0.051** 0.039 0.030 0.060*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) 
DJAVA 0.107** 0.066 0.063 0.059 0.091** 0.036 0.048 0.074* 
 (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.046) (0.043) 
∆labforce -0.012 -0.029 0.039 -0.033 0.133** -0.040 0.048 -0.012 
 (0.190) (0.198) (0.192) (0.210) (0.062) (0.056) (0.048) (0.046) 
dist_to_prov 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.025 0.008 0.028 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023) (0.027) 
dist_to_jakarta 0.006* 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.001 0.006* 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
landlocked -0.079 -0.065 -0.079 -0.061 -0.073 -0.019 -0.040 -0.071 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.064) (0.060) (0.064) (0.080) (0.064) (0.066) 
Constant 0.281 0.529 0.452 0.503 0.019 0.057 0.444 -0.101 
 (0.306) (0.342) (0.332) (0.342) (0.329) (0.406) (0.310) (0.313) 
First stage, F stat     16.26 24.60 20.08 14.07 
Hansen, P-value     0.349 0.387 0.577 0.262 
Endog test, P-val     0.227 0.012 0.102 0.073 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.182 0.100 0.103 0.098 0.122 -0.091 0.087 -0.003 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In column (7) of Table 4.5, for example, I find a standard deviation increase in a change 
in share of coal revenues in government budget is associated with a 1.4 (=0.046*(-0.324) = 
0.014) percentage point drop in educational attainment. The magnitude of the effect is smaller 
for other resource dependence measures broader than coal, which may suggest that it is coal 
dependence in particular that is most strong negatively associated with high school 
completion, just as it is not positively associated with growth in per capita income. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that a higher dependence on resource extraction may have 
benefitted growth in per capita income within Indonesia in recent years, but has had no 
beneficial effect in reducing poverty, and may even have lowered high school completion. 
Results regarding life expectancy are less consistent than those for poverty, but again 
with some evidence of a negative effect. In particular, while the point estimates of all four 




(without instruments), is close to being significant, at the 10% level, as shown in column (9). 
For example, a standard deviation increase in a change in mining’s share reduces life 
expectancy by (0.141*(-0.019) = 0.0019) 0.19 percent. I thus find weak evidence of a curse 
effect of resource dependence on life expectancy.  
4.4.2 Results 2: The Effect of Resource Dependence on Development 
Indicators with Selective Spatial Lags 
 
I turn next to the effects of resource dependence on development indicators when 
district spatial effects are taken into account. Initially I will consider only the spatial effects 
of neighbour resource dependence. The spatial lag measure is calculated based on the 
weighted average of district i's neighbouring districts with regard to their resource 
dependence. The exact neighbour definition itself will depend on the spatial weight 
assumptions used.  
In Table 4.6, I first present estimation results of local and neighbour resource 
dependence on growth in GRDP per capita based on first difference OLS (Panel A) and IV-
GMM (Panel B). Three spatial definitions are used side by side as a robustness check, and 
these definitions slightly affect the number of observations. For instance, when eligible 
neighbours are defined as those districts whose centroids lie within 200 km of the centroid of 
the home district, this allows island districts not sharing physical borders with neighbouring 
districts to be included in the regressions. It is interesting to observe that, at least for the OLS 
estimates, regardless of the spatial definition used, the estimated effect of home district 
resource dependence on income is generally similar whether neighbour effects are included 






Table 4.4. Effects of resource dependence on development indicators, OLS Results 
Dep Var: ∆Poverty Rate ∆Educational Attainment ∆Life Expectancy (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev 
∆Mindep 0.046    -0.044*    -0.020    
 (0.035)    (0.026)    (0.012)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.127    -0.067*    -0.055***   
  (0.085)    (0.035)    (0.014)   
∆Coalrev   0.054    -0.050    0.143***  
   (0.111)    (0.052)    (0.030)  
∆Minrev    -0.137*    -0.084**    -0.024 
    (0.074)    (0.035)    (0.018) 
Baseline -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.391*** -0.397*** -0.386*** -0.394*** -0.442*** -0.455*** -0.435*** -0.441*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
lpop_05 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.058*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.006** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.005** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Earthquake -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004** -0.003** -0.003* -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DURBAN 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
DJAVA -0.012 -0.007 -0.014* -0.008 -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.028*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
∆labforce 0.013 0.013 0.019 -0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.008 -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.032* -0.050*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
dist_to_prov 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
dist_to_jakarta -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
landlocked -0.018** -0.017** -0.018* -0.015** -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant -0.564*** -0.545*** -0.559*** -0.547*** 0.234*** 0.225*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 1.818*** 1.866*** 1.761*** 1.813*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.158) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.328 0.343 0.322 0.344 0.303 0.302 0.298 0.305 0.513 0.521 0.529 0.511 
Note : Baseline controls the initial level of poverty rate and life expectancy in 2005, and educational attainment in 2007 depending upon which dependent variable is 
used. Columns (1) to (4) and (9) to (12) use change between 2006 and 2015. Columns (5) to (8) use change for the period 2007-2015. Robust standard errors are in 




Table 4.5. Effects of resource dependence on development indicators, IV-GMM Results 
Dep Var: ∆Poverty Rate ∆Educational Attainment ∆Life Expectancy (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev 
∆Mindep -0.041    -0.202**    -0.019    
 (0.039)    (0.081)    (0.023)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.023    -0.126    -0.016   
  (0.039)    (0.077)    (0.025)   
∆Coalrev   -0.060    -0.324*    -0.131  
   (0.068)    (0.187)    (0.146)  
∆Minrev    -0.044    -0.186**    -0.029 
    (0.046)    (0.075)    (0.024) 
Earthquake -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆labforce -0.001 -0.004 0.010 -0.002 0.014 -0.003 -0.011 -0.018 -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.061*** -0.048*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) 
Baseline -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.401*** -0.397*** -0.370*** -0.404*** -0.441*** -0.438*** -0.429*** -0.443*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.050) (0.053) (0.049) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
lpop_05 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.056*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 0.006** 0.006** 0.004 0.006** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
DURBAN 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.087*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
DJAVA -0.018** -0.014* -0.015** -0.014* -0.045*** -0.025** -0.039*** -0.023** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
dist_to_prov 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.008** -0.009** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
dist_to_jakarta -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
landlocked -0.014** -0.016** -0.015* -0.014** -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Constant -0.532*** -0.532*** -0.561*** -0.531*** 0.245*** 0.213*** 0.284*** 0.247*** 1.811*** 1.799*** 1.781*** 1.819*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) (0.075) (0.072) (0.080) (0.073) (0.161) (0.158) (0.156) (0.160) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.300 0.327 0.317 0.332 0.233 0.298 0.277 0.293 0.513 0.515 0.455 0.511 
First-stage F-stat 14.33 19.89 29.08 12.40 14.78 12.56 10.62 11.92 22.72 9.969 9.121 11.57 
Hansen P-val 0.414 0.188 0.810 0.380 0.256 0.514 - 0.294 0.438 0.695 - 0.496 
Endog P-val 0.0580 0.371 0.194 0.532 0.262 0.414 0.086 0.221 0.929 0.0762 0.0156 0.775 
Note : Baseline controls for poverty rate and life expectancy in 2005, and educational attainment in 2007, respectively. Columns (1) to (4) and (9) to (12) use change between 2006 and 
2015. Columns (5) to (8) use change for the period 2007-2015. For ∆Educational Attainment, the instrument related with change in physical coal production is dropped. For ∆Life 




I first check the instrument validity and endogeneity tests in Panel B to identify the 
most credible specifications. The instruments are the same as those used in Table 4.3, and 
listed in Appendix 4.2, where now twinned to include analogous neighbour measures of 
historical abundance and change in physical production. In each specification, my 
instruments are strongly correlated with the two potentially endogenous regressors in each 
model, home and neighbour resource dependence. The tests based on Hansen’s J again fail 
to reject overidentification, with p-values all above 0.10. With my instruments have passed 
necessary conditions for validity for all four dependence measures across all 3 spatial 
definitions, endogeneity tests reject the exogeneity of resource dependence measures for 
columns (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8) and (10).  I will therefore refer to OLS Panel A of Table 4.6 
for columns (1), (5), (9), (11) and (12), and Panel B for the rest. 
In general, results in Table 4.6 partially confirm that home district resource dependence 
positively affects per capita income, regardless of which spatial definition is used. However, 
this is now found strongly only for mining dependence in GRDP and oil/gas revenue 
dependence. I find even less significant association between neighbour resource dependence 
and home income growth. Specifically, I now find only mining dependence in GRDP of 
neighbour districts significantly affects real per capita income (positively), and only for two 
of three spatial definitions used. Home district oil and gas revenue dependence generally 
shows the largest effect, with point estimates ranging from 1.892 when contiguity is weighted 
using border length to 2.872 when spatial definition follows centroid distance. Taking the 
simple weighting of column (2) as an example, a one standard deviation increase in a change 
in the share of the oil and gas revenues (0.089) increases growth in per capita income by 
(2.216*0.089 =) 0.197 or almost 19.7 percent over the period 2006-2015, ceteris paribus. 
Interestingly, when neighbour resource dependence does affect home district income growth, 
namely for GRDP dependence under spatial definitions 1 or 3, the magnitude of neighbour 
district effect is greater than that of home district effect. For example, from column (1) home 
per capita income increases by (0.121*0.675 =) 0.081 or 8.17 percent when a change in the 
share of mining in real GRDP of the neighbouring area increases by one standard deviation. 
Whereas it only increases by (0.144*0.495) = 0.071) 7.1 percent when the home district’s 
mining dependence increases by a standard deviation. If correct, this would imply that it is 
good for home district income growth to have GRDP reliant on mining, but even better if 




Moving to the effect of local and neighbourhood resource dependence on broader 
development indicators, I start with Table 4.7 (columns (1)-(12), Panel A and B) which 
focuses on resource effects on poverty. As before, I first focus on instrument validity and 
Hausman tests to identify the appropriate specifications. Happily, virtually all F tests indicate 
that weakness is not a problem, and Hansen’s J statistics can not reject the null of 
overidentification. With necessary conditions for validity satisfied, endogeneity tests indicate 
that OLS specifications are adequate for all but oil and gas resource dependence under the 
simplest first spatial definition (column (2)), where IV-GMM is preferable. 
I find as before that home district resource dependence has no significant effects on 
changes in poverty. For neighbour resource dependence, I also find that all revenue-based 
dependence measures have no effect on home district poverty. However, for two of three 
spatial definitions, I find that neighbouring GRDP resource dependence is associated with 
higher levels of poverty in the home district as shown in columns (1) and (5). In particular, 
in column (1), a standard deviation increase in a change in neighbour district resource share 
of GRDP is associated with a (0.119* 0.108) = 0.012 or 1.2 percentage point increase in the 
home district poverty rate. To conclude, I find little evidence that district reliance on mining 
(in GRDP or government budget), either with or without spatial considerations, affects home 
district poverty, with some exception for mining dependence in neighbouring districts. 
Moving from poverty to education, Table 4.8 provides estimation results for the effects 
of resource dependence on the proportion of adults with high school or higher education 
(college or university) declared as their highest education, for OLS in Panel A and IV-GMM 
in Panel B. Again I first check whether my instruments pass validity tests and whether 
resource dependence measures are endogenous. I find that the instruments used pass 
relevance F tests, despite some mild evidence of weakness in column (9), and satisfy 
necessary conditions for exclusion restrictions. With these instruments, I find that in 
specifications presented by columns (2), (6) and (9), the p-values are lower than 0.100, 
indicating rejections of the null that specified endogenous regressor are exogenous. In 
addition, exogeneity of home or neighbour resource dependence is also almost rejected in 
columns (1) and (8). I therefore emphasize upper panel OLS estimates for models (3), (4), 





Turning to the results, I again find with RD spatial effects added that education 
completion is negatively affected by three of four home resource dependence measures for 
all three spatial definitions between the two periods. The exception is coal revenue 
dependence by district governments.  
Taking column (2) results under IV-GMM as an example, a one standard deviation 
increase in a change in home oil and gas revenues as a share of district government budget 
reduces the rate of high school completion by (0.087*(-0.305) =) -0.026 or 2.6 percentage 
points, holding all else constant. The magnitude of the point estimate falls slightly when 
neighbour construction is based on spatial definition 2 (share of contiguous border). 
Interestingly, while the impact of home district resource dependence on achievement rates is 
generally found to be negative, the impact of neigbour resource dependence is generally 
found not to be significant. Exceptions are a positive effect of oil and gas budget dependence 
for two of three spatial definitions (columns (2) and (6)), or mining revenue dependence more 
generally for spatial definition 2 in column (8). In column (2), for example, the effect of a 
standard deviation increase in a change in the share of oil and gas revenue dependence in 
neighbouring districts on the change in the share of adults with at least a high school education 
in the home district is a (0.087*0.270 = 0.023) 2.3 percentage point increase. 
To conclude, using the appropriate OLS or IV-GMM specification, when I add spatial 
effects of resource dependence I still find negative effects of home district resource 
dependence on home district education achievement, whereas only the effects of neighbour 






Table 4.6. Effects on ∆GRDP Per Capita, OLS and IV-GMM, With Spatial Lag of Resource Dependence, All Spatial Definitions 
 
 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: OLS             
∆Mindep 0.495**    0.471**    0.542**    
 (0.231)    (0.226)    (0.248)    
∆Oilgasrev  0.105    0.050    0.699   
  (0.809)    (0.785)    (0.581)   
∆Coalrev   0.096    0.103    0.277  
   (0.931)    (1.164)    (1.074)  
∆Minrev    -0.040    -0.042    0.514 
    (0.561)    (0.596)    (0.462) 
∆Mindep_neighb 0.675**    0.668**    0.952*    
 (0.287)    (0.277)    (0.488)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  -0.504    -0.439    -1.607*   
  (0.784)    (0.692)    (0.880)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   0.860    0.745    0.603  
   (1.198)    (1.369)    (1.407)  
∆Minrev_neighb    -0.133    -0.144    -1.280 
    (0.544)    (0.554)    (0.808) 
Control Variabels YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.210 0.094 0.097 0.089 0.217 0.096 0.098 0.091 0.207 0.118 0.096 0.107 
Panel B: IV-GMM             
∆Mindep 0.966**    1.181**    1.132**    
 (0.453)    (0.530)    (0.483)    
∆Oilgasrev  2.216*    1.892*    2.872**   
  (1.274)    (1.148)    (1.402)   
∆Coalrev   -0.843    -1.251    -0.879  
   (1.239)    (1.716)    (1.531)  
∆Minrev    1.944*    1.595    1.942* 




 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
∆Mindep_neighb 0.411    0.185    -0.064    
 (0.321)    (0.340)    (0.625)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  -0.904    -0.569    -2.434   
  (1.167)    (1.021)    (1.717)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   0.407    0.779    0.459  
   (1.222)    (1.643)    (1.797)  
∆Minrev_neighb    -0.863    -0.596    -1.420 
    (0.911)    (0.902)    (1.337) 
Control Variabels YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First-stage F stat - 1 12.21 22.51 31.35 20.43 12.84 14.97 36.50 14.72 12.89 27.17 45.05 22.22 
First-stage F stat - 2 20.45 18.74 38.05 31.75 23.23 9.75 56.36 23.81 15.23 24.71 68.42 42.41 
Overid, P-val 0.291 0.547 0.803 0.549 0.430 0.526 0.722 0.487 0.220 0.486 0.500 0.452 
Endog P-val 0.672 0.0227 0.0491 0.0476 0.505 0.0218 0.0643 0.0976 0.737 0.0383 0.104 0.111 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.175 -0.067 0.075 -0.042 0.144 -0.053 0.072 -0.016 0.138 -0.037 0.072 0.002 
Note: Spatial Definitions 1 to 3 are defined as common border (queen contiguity), length-based, and centroid distance within 200 km radius, respectively. 
Controls include number of earthquakes, change in district labour force, dummies for urban district and Java district, distance from each district to its 
provincial capital, distance of each district to Indonesia’s capital, and a landlocked district dummy. Initial population and income per capita in 2005 are 
also controlled. First-stage F statistics (1 and 2) reports the strength of instrumental variables on each endogenous variable. The null hypothesis for 
overidentification tests is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (instruments are valid), while the null hypothesis for endogeneity test 
is that the suspected endogenous variables are exogenous.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the  10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 




Table 4.7. Effects on ∆Poverty Rate, OLS and IV-GMM, With Spatial Lag of Resource Dependence, All Spatial Definitions 
 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev 
Panel A: OLS             
∆Mindep 0.005    -0.001    -1.186    
 (0.033)    (0.034)    (1.199)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.117    -0.123    -3.492   
  (0.076)    (0.075)    (3.574)   
∆Coalrev   0.009    -0.029    -23.687  
   (0.255)    (0.335)    (21.144)  
∆Minrev    -0.088    -0.097    -7.170 
    (0.060)    (0.066)    (6.895) 
∆Mindep_neighb 0.108*    0.110*    5.874    
 (0.059)    (0.063)    (5.586)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  0.005    0.014    -3.135   
  (0.077)    (0.068)    (3.489)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   0.145    0.177    39.046  
   (0.299)    (0.363)    (34.674)  
∆Minrev_neighb    0.003    0.017    5.475 
    (0.063)    (0.068)    (5.612) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.328 0.317 0.308 0.310 0.332 0.317 0.309 0.310 0.065 0.077 0.143 0.077 
Panel B: IV-GMM             
∆Mindep -0.050    -0.025    -0.145     
 (0.040)    (0.038)    (1.075)     
∆Oilgasrev  -0.092    -0.086     -0.386   
  (0.070)    (0.069)     (2.357)   
∆Coalrev   -0.036    -0.065     -9.499  
   (0.190)    (0.345)     (16.012)  
∆Minrev    -0.083    -0.081     -0.011 
    (0.064)    (0.060)     (2.163) 




 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev 
∆Mindep_neighb 0.057    0.003    0.392     
 (0.042)    (0.043)    (3.016)     
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  0.100*    0.074     0.559   
  (0.059)    (0.053)     (3.434)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   -0.020    -0.001     14.234  
   (0.193)    (0.337)     (22.619)  
∆Minrev_neighb    0.081    0.050     0.019 
    (0.052)    (0.047)     (3.394) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385  385 385 385 
R-squared 0.297 0.294 0.291 0.292 0.282 0.298 0.284 0.295 0.005  0.004 0.087 0.001 
First stage, F stat - 1 9.69 16.69 22.89 11.93 12.24 15.22 26.29 9.43 11.22  25.72 36.64 12.42 
First stage, F stat - 2 24.68 46.14 42.35 35.42 19.05 53.00 62.39 32.87 18.27  71.02 66.60 50.12 
Overid P-val 0.348 0.113 0.250 0.416 0.288 0.125 0.151 0.337 0.997  0.902 0.671 0.997 
Endog P-val 0.186 0.054 0.189 0.551 0.235 0.148 0.428 0.677 0.975  0.907 0.899 0.974 
Note: Spatial Definitions 1 to 3 are defined as common border (queen contiguity), length-based, and centroid distance within 200 km radius, respectively. 
Controls include number of earthquakes, change in district labour force, dummies for urban district and Java district, distance between each district to its 
provincial capital, distance of each district to Indonesia’s capital, and a landlocked district dummy. Initial population and income per capita in 2005 are 
also controlled. First-stage F statistics (1 and 2) reports the strength of instrumental variables of each endogenous variable. The null hypothesis for 
overidentification tests is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (instruments are valid), while the null hypothesis for the endogeneity 
test is that the suspected endogenous variable is exogenous.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the  10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  




Table 4.8. Effects on ∆Educational Attainment, OLS and IV-GMM, With Spatial Lag of Resource Dependence, All Spatial Definitions 
 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev Mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev 
Panel A: OLS             
∆Mindep -0.060*    -0.058*    -0.062**    
 (0.031)    (0.031)    (0.031)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.094*    -0.093*    -0.093*   
  (0.053)    (0.050)    (0.048)   
∆Coalrev   -0.049    -0.050    -0.014  
   (0.081)    (0.093)    (0.102)  
∆Minrev    -0.086*    -0.085**    -0.075* 
    (0.045)    (0.043)    (0.043) 
∆Mindep_neighb 0.043    0.033    0.076    
 (0.030)    (0.029)    (0.051)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  0.038    0.035    0.052   
  (0.060)    (0.054)    (0.067)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   -0.006    -0.004    -0.050  
   (0.109)    (0.118)    (0.152)  
∆Minrev_neighb    0.005    0.002    -0.017 
    (0.060)    (0.055)    (0.074) 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.285 0.281 0.277 0.283 0.284 0.281 0.277 0.283 0.303 0.300 0.295 0.301 
Panel B: IV-GMM             
∆Mindep -0.265***    -0.261***    -0.193**    
 (0.085)    (0.091)    (0.092)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.305**    -0.262**    -0.300*   
  (0.138)    (0.117)    (0.166)   
∆Coalrev   0.453    0.618    0.608  
   (0.392)    (0.679)    (0.538)  
∆Minrev    -0.381***    -0.327***    -0.336** 
    (0.119)    (0.100)    (0.141) 




 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev Mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev 
∆Mindep_neighb 0.067    0.064    -0.084    
 (0.093)    (0.080)    (0.170)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  0.270***    0.212***    0.352*   
  (0.103)    (0.079)    (0.190)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   -0.587    -0.705    -0.820  
   (0.362)    (0.606)    (0.611)  
∆Minrev_neighb    0.278***    0.203**    0.306* 
    (0.101)    (0.081)    (0.177) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.170 0.261 0.242 0.237 0.176 0.267 0.234 0.252 0.210 0.277 0.255 0.260 
First stage, F stat - 1 10.22 16.33 22.07 14.76 11.18 14.99 26.00 11.36 9.83 24.94 33.12 17.41 
First stage, F stat - 2 18.01 46.72 44.36 41.23 24.77 52.36 64.30 40.95 11.04 68.31 63.65 35.56 
Overid  P-val 0.231 0.678 0.205 0.246 0.208 0.608 0.245 0.510 0.104 0.364 0.170 0.143 
Endog P-val 0.126 0.038 0.246 0.191 0.213 0.080 0.600 0.118 0.075 0.149 0.708 0.187 
Note: Spatial Definitions 1 to 3 are defined as common border (queen contiguity), length-based, and centroid distance within 200 km radius, respectively. 
Controls include number of earthquakes, change in district labour force, dummies for urban district and Java district, distance between each district to its 
provincial capital, distance of each district to Indonesia’s capital, and a landlocked district dummy. Initial population and income per capita in 2005 are 
also controlled. First-stage F statistics (1 and 2) reports the strength of instrumental variables of each endogenous variable. The null hypothesis for 
overidentification tests is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (instruments are valid), while the null hypothesis for the endogeneity 
test is that the suspected endogenous variable is exogenous.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the  10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
  




Finally, Table 4.9 reports the estimated effects of resource dependence and its spatial 
lag on life expectancy. Since instruments perform strongly for relevance and for 
overidentification, and the null hypothesis of resource dependence being exogenous is 
rejected in columns (2)-(3), (6)-(7) and (10)-(11), I will emphasize IV-GMM results for these 
specifications, and OLS for the remaining cases.  
With spatial effects, I again find that the home district of neighbourhood oil and gas 
budget dependence has no significant effect on life expectancy regardless of the spatial 
definition used. I find similar results for mining revenue dependence more generally. As 
without spatial effects, I again find that home district coal revenue dependence has a positive 
and significant effect on life expectancy, but now also that neighbour district coal dependence 
has a significantly negative effect on life expectancy. This result persists for all three spatial 
measures. Taking column (3) under IV-GMM, for example, a standard deviation increase in 
the change in neighbour coal revenue dependence is associated with a (0.043*(-0.698) = - 
0.030) 3.0 percent decrease in life expectancy. To put this in context, the reported average 
life expectancy in Indonesia in 2015 stood at 61.7 years, so a 3.0 percent decrease is 
equivalent to 1.9 years, lowering average longevity to 59.8 years. Similar to oil and gas 
revenue dependence, I find little evidence that home or neighbouring GRDP dependence 
affects home district life expectancy, with the exception of a negative home dependence effect 






Table 4.9. ∆Life exp (log), OLS and IV-GMM, with spatial lag of RD, All Spatial Definitions 
 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev 
Panel A: OLS             
∆Mindep -0.021    -0.018    -0.034**    
 (0.015)    (0.015)    (0.014)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.006    -0.009    -0.019   
  (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.022)   
∆Coalrev   0.107*    0.110*    0.069  
   (0.059)    (0.064)    (0.056)  
∆Minrev    0.021    0.018    -0.010 
    (0.034)    (0.035)    (0.031) 
∆Mindep_neighb -0.005    -0.014    0.043    
 (0.018)    (0.017)    (0.028)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  -0.068***    -0.062**    -0.073**   
  (0.025)    (0.024)    (0.036)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   0.073    0.061    0.131*  
   (0.069)    (0.070)    (0.069)  
∆Minrev_neighb    -0.053    -0.047    -0.012 
    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.046) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.518 0.529 0.539 0.517 0.519 0.529 0.539 0.516 0.517 0.523 0.535 0.509 
Panel B: IV-GMM             
∆Mindep -0.032    -0.027    -0.031    
 (0.032)    (0.031)    (0.031)    
∆Oilgasrev  -0.049    -0.042    -0.060   
  (0.038)    (0.032)    (0.043)   
∆Coalrev   0.669***    0.916**    0.933***  
   (0.194)    (0.421)    (0.314)  
∆Minrev    -0.023    -0.031    -0.030 
    (0.050)    (0.049)    (0.044) 




 Spatial Definition 1 Spatial Definition 2 Spatial Definition 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev minrev mindep oilgasrev coalrev miningrev 
∆Mindep_neighb -0.043    -0.033    -0.100    
 (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.090)    
∆Oilgasrev_neighb  0.033    0.019    0.069   
  (0.054)    (0.044)    (0.081)   
∆Coalrev_neighb   -0.698***    -0.876**    -1.109***  
   (0.236)    (0.425)    (0.410)  
∆Minrev_neighb    -0.022    -0.007    -0.025 
    (0.053)    (0.052)    (0.070) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 385 385 385 385 
R-squared 0.506 0.514 0.362 0.513 0.514 0.517 0.310 0.512 0.473 0.505 0.224 0.506 
First stage, F stat - 1 15.63 21.70 15.74 17.87 16.03 14.73 14.22 16.70 15.39 19.86 19.26 14.31 
First stage, F stat - 2 12.64 12.59 14.24 28.12 16.68 10.47 15.40 25.95 9.20 24.40 17.82 61.90 
Overid P-val 0.665 0.905 0.293 0.346 0.824 0.807 0.289 0.624 0.736 0.997 0.306 0.332 
Endog P-val 0.422 0.007 0.000 0.507 0.695 0.0101 0.00343 0.446 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.337 
Note: Spatial Definitions 1 to 3 are defined as common border (queen contiguity), length-based, and centroid distance within 200 km radius, respectively. 
Controls include number of earthquakes, change in district labour force, dummies for urban district and Java district, distance between each district to its 
provincial capital, distance of each district to Indonesia’s capital, and a landlocked district dummy. Initial population and income per capita in 2005 are 
also controlled. First-stage F statistics (1 and 2) reports the strength of instrumental variables of each endogenous variable. The null hypothesis for 
overidentification tests is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (instruments are valid), while the null hypothesis for the endogeneity 








4.4.3 Results 3: The Effects of Resource Dependence on Development 
Indicators with Full Spatial Lags 
 
This final section highlights results when all explanatory regressors are spatially 
lagged, rather than just resource dependence. This is to serve as a robustness check regarding 
the effects of resource dependence on key development indicators in Indonesia. To conserve 
space, I report results only for oil and gas budget dependence and GRDP mining dependence. 
Full results for the remaining measures are reported in Appendix 4.4 Tables A4 and A5. 
Table 4.10 reports direct effects of the oil and gas dependence measure, again 
comparing OLS (Panel A) and IV-GMM estimates (Panel B). The first three columns show 
the effect of oil and gas budget dependence on growth in GRDP using the three contiguity 
definitions, and so similarly for other development indicators in subsequent columns. The 
first-stage F statistics show promising values and the exclusion restriction is always satisfied. 
As shown, tests of endogeneity show rejections of the null in columns (1)-(4), (7), and (10)-
(12), indicating that these oil dependence measures should not be treated as exogenous. For 
per capita income, even after controlling for spatial lags of all independent variables, the 
effect of home district oil and gas dependence is positive for all spatial definitions, with no 
evidence that neighbour budget dependence has an effect. For poverty, as before there is no 
significant evidence that it is affected by oil and gas budget dependence in home or neighbour 
districts. Similarly, budget dependence remains negative for high school or higher education 
completion under two of three specifications, though it is possible that such dependence in 
neighbouring districts is beneficial for home district education completion. In particular, 
neighbour oil and gas revenue dependence positively affects home district education 
achievement for two of three spatial definitions. 
Regarding the alternative resource dependence measure based on mining’s share in 
GRDP, results with full spatial lags are reported in Table 4.11. Once again, the instruments 
used seem to be valid, with first-stage regressions in all specifications having F-statistic 
values generally close to or above 10. Unlike for oil and gas revenue dependence, I do not 
find strong evidence that the suspected measure is endogenous since p-values are generally 
higher than 0.10 across all columns, except for columns (7), (9) and (12). Taking columns (1) 
to (3), for example, growth in GRDP dependence or mining is again positive for growth if it 
occurs in the home district, but unlike for oil and gas revenue dependence, also if it occurs in 




home district effects. Using the length-based border definition (SD2, column (2)), the spatial 
spillover effect is almost twice the size. These results are consistent with the specifications 
when only spatial effects of resource dependence are considered.  
Regarding the other development outcomes, I again find similar results as when spatial 
effects were only added for resource dependence as in Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, where poverty 
is unaffected, education attainment is negatively affected, and life expectancy is negatively 







Table 4.10. Effect of the share of oil and gas revenues in local government budget on economic and development indicators, all spatial lags of 
explanatory variables included. 
Dep. Variable: ∆GRDP per capita ∆Poverty Rate ∆Educational Attainment ∆Life Expectancy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 
Panel A: OLS             
(1) ∆Oilgasrev 0.078 0.044 0.628 -0.115 -0.117 -3.804 -0.074 -0.098** -0.091** -0.009 -0.015 -0.019 
 (0.796) (0.747) (0.585) (0.079) (0.077) (3.792) (0.050) (0.040) (0.045) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) 
(2) ∆Oilgasrev_neighb -0.521 -0.455 -1.537 0.007 0.019 -1.695 0.069 0.042 0.104 -0.063** -0.055** -0.076** 
 (0.812) (0.714) (0.963) (0.073) (0.066) (2.767) (0.055) (0.046) (0.073) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 
R-squared 0.115 0.120 0.143 0.331 0.342 0.110 0.321 0.372 0.344 0.542 0.546 0.576 
Panel B: IV-GMM             
(1) ∆Oilgasrev 2.396** 2.239** 2.228* -0.100 -0.092 -0.791 -0.303** -0.265** -0.213 -0.065 -0.067** -0.078* 
 (1.215) (1.126) (1.243) (0.078) (0.077) (2.968) (0.134) (0.121) (0.147) (0.041) (0.034) (0.043) 
(2) ∆Oilgasrev_neighb -0.606 -0.320 -0.841 0.099 0.076 1.068 0.301*** 0.244*** 0.177 0.058 0.048 0.084 
 (1.044) (0.942) (1.576) (0.063) (0.056) (4.101) (0.100) (0.081) (0.192) (0.059) (0.048) (0.083) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 
R-squared -0.092 -0.094 -0.018 0.308 0.322 0.015 0.299 0.302 0.336 0.522 0.529 0.558 
First-stage F stat - 1 21.28 14.70 30.38 17.28 15.59 25.04 16.77 14.90 22.63 21.82 15.38 20.19 
First-stage F stat - 2 14.70 27.08 19.75 48.07 52.23 76.38 46.71 49.95 28.80 12.13 10.26 21.93 
Hansen P-val 0.507 0.530 0.373 0.208 0.238 0.894 0.517 0.455 0.362 0.974 0.883 0.685 
Endog P-val 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.057 0.153 0.917 0.075 0.116 0.221 0.004 0.005 0.002 





Table 4.11. Effect of mining dependence on economic and development indicators, all spatial lags of explanatory variables included. 
Dep. Variable: ∆GRDP Per capita ∆Poverty Rate ∆Educational Attainment ∆Life Expectancy (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 
Panel A: OLS             
(1) ∆Mindep 0.474** 0.430* 0.549** 0.001 -0.006 -1.373 -0.061** -0.050** -0.072** -0.022 -0.019 -0.032** 
 (0.237) (0.236) (0.250) (0.035) (0.035) (1.341) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
(2) ∆Mindep_neighb 0.735** 0.730*** 0.883* 0.113* 0.116* 5.408 0.045 0.025 0.102** -0.005 -0.013 0.025 
 (0.291) (0.273) (0.471) (0.061) (0.062) (5.018) (0.032) (0.025) (0.052) (0.017) (0.016) (0.028) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 
R-squared 0.236 0.243 0.229 0.345 0.361 0.103 0.328 0.373 0.353 0.533 0.537 0.570 
Panel B: IV-GMM             
(1) ∆Mindep 1.074** 1.252** 1.067** -0.063 -0.047 -0.122 -0.169* -0.179* -0.186** -0.041 -0.043 -0.044 
 (0.482) (0.554) (0.542) (0.053) (0.057) (0.966) (0.088) (0.099) (0.081) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) 
(2) ∆Mindep_neighb 0.202 -0.008 0.000 0.042 0.002 10.871 -0.072 -0.040 -0.012 -0.049 -0.030 -0.127 
 (0.431) (0.456) (0.834) (0.043) (0.043) (9.953) (0.117) (0.101) (0.166) (0.044) (0.043) (0.095) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First-stage F stat - 1 13.89 14.76 16.74 9.75 12.42 12.81 15.70 16.71 16.96 14.47 14.36 13.67 
First-stage F stat - 2 19.55 22.45 14.01 24.57 16.97 12.77 16.53 20.22 12.22 10.95 12.93 6.35 
Observations 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 374 374 385 
R-squared 0.171 0.142 0.158 0.294 0.275 0.006 0.244 0.250 0.293 0.513 0.527 0.515 
Hansen P-val 0.162 0.344 0.111 0.398 0.318 0.996 0.232 0.121 0.407 0.321 0.469 0.222 
Endog P-val 0.572 0.316 0.783 0.220 0.225 0.974 0.054 0.139 0.095 0.281 0.457 0.059 





4.5 Discussion  
My results in this chapter provide some evidence that, with the exception of coal 
revenue dependence, my resource dependence measures have had a positive impact on district 
per capita income over the 2006 to 2015 period, regardless of whether resource dependence 
is measured based on the share of local GDP or the oil and gas royalty shares of government 
budgets. This positive effect has also persisted when the resource dependence of 
neighbouring districts has been controlled for, defining neighbours based on simple 
contiguity boundaries, share of common border, or districts whose centroids are within a 
maximum distance. These many results are summarised qualitatively in Table 4.12. This 
robust positive association seems to contrast with Carmignani’s cross-country study but is 
consistent with some within-country studies that have focused on local income, such as 
Hajkowich et al. (2011), Fleming, Measham & Paredes (2015), Weinstein et al. (2018), and 
Hota and Behera (2019). 
For spatial effects of neighbour resource dependence on home district income, I do not 
find strong evidence of positive or negative spillovers, which is in line with Weber (2014) 
who finds no spillovers caused by resource activities in neighbouring areas. When resource 
dependence is measured as mining’s share in district GDP, however, I find evidence that 
neighbour dependence spillovers positively affect home per capita income. The magnitude of 
pro-growth effects can actually be larger from the neighbourhood’s resource dependence than 
that of the home district. These spillovers support Weinstein et al. (2018) for the United States 
who find that counties that are surrounded by oil and gas dependent neighbours may have 
positive effects on their earnings.  
Regarding resource dependence’s effects on poverty, in all specifications tested, I find 
no significant effect, regardless of resource dependence measure or spatial neighbour 
definition. This finding is similar to that of some studies, such as Bhattacharya and 
Resosudarmo (2015) for the case of Indonesian provinces, and confirms some findings from 
Weber (2012) and Patridge et al. (2013) using county-level data for the United States. The 
one exception I find is when controlling for spatial effects, where neighbour GRDP 
dependence on mining is found to be positively associated with the poverty rate. This adverse 
result is consistent with findings by Patridge et al. (2013), Edwards (2016a) and Hota Berera 
(2019), though these studies do not include spatial variables for home area resource 




Table 4.12. Summary of results with spatial effects 
 Dep. 
Variable: ∆GRDP ∆Poverty Rate 
∆Educational 












SD3 SD1 SD2 
SD
3 
SD1 SD2 SD3 
Home effects 
(Spatial RD or 
all X 
Variables)                         
∆Mindep + + + ◦ ◦ ◦ - - - ◦ ◦ - 
∆OilGasRev + + + ◦ ◦ ◦ - - - ◦ ◦ ◦ 
∆CoalRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ + + + 
∆MinRev + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ - - - ◦ ◦ ◦ 
              
Neighbouring 
effects (Spatial 
RD only)             
∆Mindep + + + + + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 
∆OilGasRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ + + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 
∆CoalRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ - - - 
∆MinRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 




variables)             
∆Mindep + + + + + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 
∆OilGasRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ + + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 
∆CoalRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ - - - 
∆MinRev ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ + ◦ - ◦ ◦ 
Note: (+) positive effect found; (-) negative effect found; (◦) no significant effect found; SD is spatial 
definition 
 
Perhaps the most robust negative effects of resource dependence are in the area of 
education achievement. I find that, on average, holding other factors unchanged, the share of 
district adults with at least a high school degree falls when there is an increase in the share of  
mining in local GDP, or the share of oil and gas revenues in district budgets, or the share of 
oil, gas and coal, leaving only the share of coal that is insignificant in any specifications used. 
These results for home district resource dependence persist when neighbour resource 
dependence measures are also controlled. My results confirm the majority of resource effects 
on education studies such as Edwards (2016a), Douglas and Walker (2016), and more 





Figure 4.5. Scatter plot between mining dependence and education expenditure 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
One might wonder whether lower educational attainment in more resource dependent 
districts is being driven by demand or supply-side effects. For example, perhaps more 
resource dependent district governments see higher education provision as less necessary, 
and so fund fewer high schools or post-secondary institutions (see e.g. Gylfason (2001), Stijns 
(2005), and James (2017)). Alternatively, perhaps the parents of teens or the teens themselves 
in more resource dependent districts opt not to go to the schools and institutes provided. I 
investigate this briefly using some available data associated with district per capita education 
expenditures during the period 2006-2012. 
As presented in Figure 4.5, I find a positive correlation between resource dependence 
and education spending by district government, contrary to a supply side explanation. Perhaps 
commodity booms create an incentive for young people to delay continuing their education 
to a higher level, or for young adults to drop-out of college or university in favor of entering 
entry-level resource jobs (see Douglas and Walker, 2016). This might suggest that negative 
effects of resource dependence on educational achievement is working on the demand side. 
Note that demand-side explanations do not necessarily mean that oil, gas and coal companies 
alone tend to hire direct entry workers, since there may also be more demand for entry level 
workers from sectors that closely support resource extraction activities. For example, oil 
down-stream and up-stream activities have long been identified as contributing to growth in 
regions where resource extraction occurs, including employment demand for low skill 
workers as constrasted with employment demand induced by non-mining sectors (see 




found a positive effect of mining growth on non-mining sectors (Weber, 2014; Fleming et al. 
(2015), Weinstein, 2015). Unfortunately a detailed examination of resource sector effects on 
employment of school leavers is outside the scope of this chapter, owing in part to 
incompleteness of district level data within the time period considered. 
With respect to spatial effects of resource dependence on education, I find in contrast 
that an increase in neighbour’s share of oil and gas revenue increases the share of adults with 
at least a high school degree, in two of three spatial definitions used. These findings differ 
from the insignificant spatial effects found by Weber (2014) on education in the United 
States, though the author focused only on changes in natural gas production. As the existence 
of empirical studies controlling spatial spillovers of resource dependence on education for 
developing countries is lacking, it is hard to speculate why neighbour government 
dependence on oil and gas is likely to improve home district high school completion rates of 
adult residents. One possibility is that an oil boom experience by neighbouring district(s) may 
increase demand for more highly skilled adults in upstream or downstream industries that 
locate in only rough proximity to oil extraction sites. Home district governments in non-
resource districts may also react by spending more in education to compete with mining-
based neighbouring areas to maintain their regional economy and attract non-mining based 
industries. This possibly would lead to a better supply of education in the home district that 
would promote better school completion rates for local young residents.  
Finally with respect to resource dependence’s effect on health outcomes. I find no 
compelling evidence that mining’s share in GRDP or oil and gas revenue dependence affects 
average life expectancy at birth in home districts. However, I find that home district coal 
revenue dependence in government budgets is positively associated with life expectancy, 
while neighbour coal dependence is negatively associated with home district life expectancy. 
I will discuss each in turn. My home coal dependence results are similar to those found by 
Alexeev and Conrad (2011), Cotet and Tsui (2013), and El Anshasy and Katsaiti (2015), for 
cross-country investigation, though these studies test for the effect of hydrocarbons generally 
rather than coal. The positive effects found by these studies also become insignificant when 
resources are measured aggregately, and geographic factors are also controlled. As argued by 
Acemoglu et al. (2019), positive effects may result as resource wealth enables jurisdictions 
to allocate more spending on healthcare services. Higher public spending may also reflect 
better political and economic institutions, which themselves are believed to benefit 




Figure 4.6. Scatter plot between health spending and coal revenues, period 2006-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Figure 4.7. Scatter plot between life expectancy and spending on health, period 2006-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
For Indonesia, coal mining actitivies have expanded since the 2000’s due to a rapid 
growth in overseas demand from China, India, and some European countries. District 
governments dominated by coal mining operations are very likely to have received higher 
government budgets as a result, which under decentralisation funding schemes generate 
resource royalties that are partially returned to districts of origin. Such coal revenues may 
possibly help local governments to spend more on health infrastructure such as community 
health centres in sub-district areas and villages, as well as hospitals in targetted areas. More 
money for health expenditures may also come in the form of Corporate Social Responsibility 




awareness regarding the benefits of child immunisation and breasfeeding. To test this 
conjecture, I again use health expenditure data of district governments and link it to the 
average share of coal revenues in 390 districts over 2006-2012. As shown in Figure 4.6, I 
find a slight positive correlation between coal budget dependence and district budget 
spending on public health. Subsequently, I also plot the correlation between public health 
spending and change in life expectancy in Figure 4.7. Not surprisingly, this shows a strong 
positive correlation, implying that spending on health increases life expectancy at district 
level.  
It might initially seem odd that neighbour district coal revenue dependence lowers 
home district life expectancy, when home district dependence raises it. A negative impact of 
coal on health outcomes appears in many empirical studies that link it with, for example, 
worsened spending on human capital investments due to poor institutional development in 
resource-abundant countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, 2019), or a destructive effect 
of air pollution caused by the toxins and pollutants released when coal is burned. The first 
argument seems not strongly supported by the correlation evidence in Figure 4.7. The latter 
argument is also weak for Indonesia as the country does not operate many coal-fired power 
plants and more than 80% of coal produced is exported overseas.103 One might argue that 
coal mining activities have burned land, but the deforestration associated with coal mining is 
greatly limited compared to that for palm oil plantations. 
I argue instead that two other factors may cause neighbour district dependence on coal 
revenues to negatively affect home district life expectancy or health. The first regards 
contamination of air and water. Coal mining activities in Indonesia, particularly for small-
scale companies, rely on trucks for transporting coal from the mining sites (generally in 
remote areas) to centralised storage locations before being loaded onto barges. Their transport 
often uses road facilities in adjacent districts, which pollutes the air inhaled by adjacent local 
residents. A prime example is contamination from coal dust particles. Similarly, significant 
reductions in water quality have resulted from barge transport through main rivers. Water 
 
103 Coal domestic consumption in Indonesia during the period this study observed was on average around 
20%. Only since 2018 the Indonesian government, under the new plan strategy, announced it would build 






from rivers has been the main source for local water companies in downstream districts to 
supply “clean” water to local residents.104   
A second potential reason for neighbour coal dependence to depress home district life 
expectancy is economically-motivated migration by healthy young people. Work-related 
migration is common in Indonesia and coal-boom districts may provide better work 
opportunities that attract young ambitious adults. People with better health may be more 
likely to move as they are better capable of adapting to the new area. Such out-migration from 
non-coal districts may reduce the number of healthier adults there, and this could possibly 
depress estimates of life expectancy in the home district.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has tested for effects of natural resource dependence on development 
indicators beyond income, using unique district level data in Indonesia between 2006 and 
2015. As in previous chapters, I have used four major measures of resource dependence and 
addressed possible endogeneity of these measures using instruments based on historical 
abundance and change in physical production. I also especially controlled for spatial spillover 
effects of neighbouring districts on home district outcomes, using three common methods of 
identifying and weighting relevant neighbours. This work is novel, as to my knowledge no 
empirical resource effect studies that incorporate spatial effects have yet been conducted in 
developing countries. 
As in previous chapters, I have found that GRDP dependence on mining or government 
budget dependence on oil and gas contributed significantly to raising income per capita, now 
also when neighbour dependence is included, using three alternative definitions of neighbour. 
This finding, however, does not tell us about the distribution of the additional income across 
households or individuals. 
I address this omission by examining the effects of resource dependence on broader 
development indicators, beginning with poverty. In contrast to per capita income, I find that 
rising resource dependence failed to affect poverty rates at district level, neither lowering nor 
increasing the proportion of poor households. Even less happily, almost all my measures of 
resource dependence have a negative impact on the share of adults with at least high school 
 




education. However, there is some evidence that rising neighbour oil and gas revenue 
dependence, or aggregate mining revenue dependence are positively associated with home 
district education achievement. There is also an opposite divergence between home and 
neighbour resource dependence effects on life expectancy for coal revenue dependence in 
particular, where home dependence raises it but neighbour dependence lowers it.  In some 
specifications I find neighbour effects seem to matter, although it is hard to generalise as it 
sometimes has an opposite effect of the home dependence coefficient. 
To conclude, it is worth investigating the impact of resource dependence on multiple 
development indicators in developing countries. This is because natural resources have the 
potential to play a critical role in the development process. Yet as finer within-country 
jurisdictions are used in such studies, it becomes more necessary to control for spatial 
spillovers of characteristics of one area on the development of its neighbours. While including 
spatial effects, my study does not test potential channels through which spillovers may be 
occuring, such as local labour markets and migration patterns. These factors may serve as 
important causal mechanisms through which resource reliance in one district influences 
measured education completion rates in another, or life expectancy. This question of causal 







Appendix 4.1. Table A1. Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
∆ Real GRDP 
per capita (in 
logs) 
The natural logarithm of 
difference of real GRDP per 
capita, formulated as: 





INDO DAPOER World Bank (can be downloaded 
here: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/indonesia-
database-policy-and-economic-research)  The 
Indonesian National Statistical Agency (BPS) (see 
https://www.bps.go.id/)  
∆Poverty rate 
The difference in poverty 
rate, between 2015 and 
2006 
BPS, Poverty Publications 
∆Life 
expectancy (log) 
The difference in life 
expectancy between 2015 
and 2006 
BPS, Human Development Publications 
∆Educ_attain 
The difference in the share 
of district population that 
finished at least high school, 
between 2015 and 2007 
BPS, National Survey of Labour Force (raw data), 
2007 and 2015 
Earthquake  
The number of earthquake 
events at the district level 
Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management 




The change in labour force 
participation rate between 
2015 and 2006 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
GRDP per 
capita, 2005 (in 
logs) 
Natural logarithm of initial 
GRDP per capita in 2005 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
Poverty Rate, 
2005  
Initial poverty rate in 2005 BPS, Poverty Publications  
Life Expectancy 
(in logs), 2005 
Natural logarithm of initial 
life expectancy in 2005 




Share of local population 
that has secondary 
education degree or better 
in 2007 
BPS, National Survey of Labour Force (raw data), 
2007  
Population, 
2005 (in logs) 
Natural logarithm of initial 
population in 2005 
BPS 
DURBAN 
Dummy urban status 
(municipalities) = 1 if city 
status, = 0 if regency 
Identity of urban district/municipality is taken from 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Republic of 
Indonesia 
DJAVA 
Dummy of Java Island = 1 if 
the districts are located on 





Calculated by measuring 
straight line distance (in 
km) between each district 
and its respective province 
within provincial boundary. 
Shapefile administrative district data from Indonesia 
GeoSpatial Portal (Geospatial Information Board of 
Indonesia). Modified following 390 administrative 




Variable Definition Source 
Distance to 
Jakarta 
Calculated by measuring 
straight line distance (in 
km) between each district 
and Indonesia’s Presidential 
Palace in Jakarta. 
Shapefile administrative district data from Indonesia 
GeoSpatial Portal (Geospatial Information Board of 
Indonesia). Modified following 390 administrative 
districts in 2003. 
Landlocked 
Dummy status = 1 if district 
is landlocked, = 0 
otherwise. 
Shapefile data from Indonesia GeoSpatial Portal 




The difference in mining 
dependence between 2015 
and 2006 
 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The 




The difference in oil and gas 
revenue shares, between 
2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
∆Coal Revenue 
(Coalrev) 
The difference in coal 
revenue shares, between 
2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The 




The difference in mining 
revenue shares, between 
2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
oilgasabundance 
The number of major and 
minor oil and gas fields in 
the 1970’s production 
period in all Islands of 
Indonesia. Major oil and 
natural gas fields are 
weighted by 1, and all minor 
fields are weighted by 0.25. 
So, if district A has a 10 
minor oil/gas fields 
location, therefore: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐴 = 10 × 0.25
= 2.5 
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
coalabundance 
The share of coal deposit 
areas (shown by first 
generation coal agreement 
contract introduced by 
Leeuwen (1994, 2017)) in 
the total area of the 
respective district. 
Friederich & Leeuwen (2017) 
∆oilprod 
The change in oil 
production (in barrels) 
between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republic 
of Indonesia 
∆gasprod 
The change in natural gas 
production (in MMBTU) 
between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republic 
of Indonesia 
∆coalprod 
The change in coal land 
rents and royalties between 
2015 and 2006 






Appendix 4.2. Table A2, A3, A3.1. Instrument Summary 
Dependent Variable: ∆GRDP per capita 
Resource Dependence Measure 
Instruments 
Resource Abundance 
Change in physical resource 
production 
∆Mindep - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
 
∆Oilgasrev - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
∆Coalrev - Coal Abundance 1980’s i - Change in coal production  
∆Minrev - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
 
∆Mindep_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i *𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s I *𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
 
∆Oilgasrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s * 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
 
∆Coalrev_neighb - Coal Abundance 1980’s I *𝑊 - Change in coal production * 
𝑊 
∆Minrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i *𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s I *𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆Poverty Rate 
Resource Dependence Measure 
Instruments 
Resource Abundance 
Change in physical resource 
production 
∆Mindep - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
- Change in coal production 
∆Oilgasrev - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s  
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
∆Coalrev - Coal Abundance 1980’s i Change in coal production  
∆Minrev - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
- Change in coal production 
∆Mindep_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i * 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i * 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
- Change in coal production* 𝑊 
∆Oilgasrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s * 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
∆Coalrev_neighb - Coal Abundance 1980’s i * 𝑊 - Change in coal production * 
𝑊 
∆Minrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i * 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i * 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
- Change in coal production* 𝑊 
Notes: 𝐖 indicates spatial weight matrix / spatial definition. When two specified endogenous measures are included in each 
model (e.g. ∆Mindep and ∆Mindep_neighb), all excluded instruments (including instruments designed for spatial lags of 







Table A3.  Instrument Summary (Cont’d) 
Dependent Variable: ∆Educational Attainment 
Resource Dependence Measure 
Instruments 
Resource Abundance 
Change in physical resource 
production 
∆Mindep - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
 
∆Oilgasrev - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s  
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
∆Coalrev - Coal Abundance 1980’s i - Change in coal production 
∆Minrev - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
 
∆Mindep_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i * 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
 
∆Oilgasrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
∆Coalrev_neighb - Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 - Change in coal production* 𝑊 
∆Minrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i* 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆Life Expectancy (log) 
Resource Dependence Measure 
Instruments 
Resource Abundance 
Change in physical resource 
production 
∆Mindep - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
 
∆Oilgasrev - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s 
- Change in oil production 
 
∆Coalrev - Coal Abundance 1980’s i - Change in coal production  
∆Minrev - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
 
∆Mindep_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i * 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production 
 
∆Oilgasrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production 
 
∆Coalrev_neighb - Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 Change in coal production 
∆Minrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i* 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
 
 
Notes: 𝐖 indicates spatial weight matrix / spatial definition. When two specified endogenous measures are included in each 
model (e.g. ∆Mindep and ∆Mindep_neighb), all excluded instruments (including instruments designed for spatial lags of 





Table A3.1.  Instrument Summary (Cont’d) -  All Spatial X Variables 
Dependent Variable: ∆Educational Attainment 
Resource Dependence Measure 
Instruments 
Resource Abundance 
Change in physical resource 
production 
∆Mindep - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
 
∆Oilgasrev - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s  
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
∆Coalrev - Coal Abundance 1980’s i - Change in coal production 
∆Minrev - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
- Change in oil production 
- Change in gas production 
 
∆Mindep_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i * 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
 
∆Oilgasrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
- Change in gas production* 𝑊 
∆Coalrev_neighb - Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 - Change in coal production* 𝑊 
∆Minrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i* 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆Life Expectancy (log) 
Resource Dependence Measure 
Instruments 
Resource Abundance 
Change in physical resource 
production 
∆Mindep - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
 
∆Oilgasrev - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s 
- Change in oil production 
 
∆Coalrev - Coal Abundance 1980’s i - Change in coal production  
∆Minrev - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i 
 
∆Mindep_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i * 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
 
∆Oilgasrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas i Abundance 
1970’s* 𝑊 
- Change in oil production* 𝑊 
 
∆Coalrev_neighb - Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 - Change in coal production * 
𝑊 
∆Minrev_neighb - Oil + Natural Gas Abundance 
1970’s i* 𝑊 
- Coal Abundance 1980’s i* 𝑊 
 
 
Notes: 𝐖 indicates spatial weight matrix / spatial definition. When two specified endogenous measures included in each 
model (e.g. ∆Mindep and ∆Mindep_neighb), all excluded instruments (including instruments designed for spatial lags of 





Appendix 4.3. Fig A1. Map of five major islands of Indonesia and interactions highlighted among districts within the respective island 
 






Appendix 4.4. Table A4-A5. Effects on GRDP and Poverty, OLS and 2SLS Results, All Spatial Lags of the Explanatory Variables Included 
Dep. Var: ∆GRDP Per Capita ∆Poverty Rate 
 SD1 SD1 SD2 SD2 SD3 SD3 SD1 SD1 SD2 SD2 SD3 SD3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES coalrev miningrev coalrev miningrev coalrev miningrev coalrev minrev coalrev minrev coalrev minrev 
Panel A: OLS             
∆Coalrev 0.096  0.102  0.388  -0.035  -0.069  -23.604  
 (0.943)  (1.119)  (1.024)  (0.265)  (0.317)  (20.701)  
∆Coalrev_neighb 0.801  0.558  0.001  0.168  0.157  38.293  
 (1.400)  (1.467)  (1.589)  (0.326)  (0.361)  (33.452)  
∆Minrev  -0.050  -0.041  0.501  -0.097  -0.101  -7.242 
  (0.569)  (0.594)  (0.479)  (0.065)  (0.069)  (6.764) 
∆Minrev_neighb  -0.167  -0.189  -1.335  0.006  0.016  6.032 
  (0.569)  (0.586)  (0.846)  (0.069)  (0.071)  (5.979) 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 385 385 374 374 374 374 385 385 
R-squared 0.115 0.110 0.119 0.116 0.123 0.139 0.322 0.327 0.333 0.340 0.171 0.118 
Panel B: 2SLS             
∆Coalrev -0.723  -0.904  -0.593  -0.182  -0.235  -27.638  
 (1.207)  (1.750)  (1.547)  (0.191)  (0.309)  (25.436)  
∆Coalrev_neighb -0.150  0.009  -0.983  0.139  0.196  41.553  
 (1.390)  (1.779)  (2.132)  (0.214)  (0.325)  (37.603)  
∆Minrev  2.004**  1.684*  2.203**  -0.114*  -0.111*  -6.906 
  (0.968)  (0.924)  (1.123)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (6.597) 
∆Minrev_neighb  -0.752  -0.506  -1.556  0.095*  0.063  12.545 
  (0.846)  (0.857)  (1.389)  (0.055)  (0.049)  (11.709) 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 385 385 23.31 11.63 24.88 9.47 30.83 11.98 
R-squared 0.088 -0.050 0.092 -0.032 0.086 0.002 42.76 35.90 69.79 32.96 69.62 55.69 
First-stage F stat - 1 27.95 20.62 34.08 14.41 38.81 18.49 374 374 374 374 385 385 
First-stage F stat - 2 29.22 26.84 52.04 21.12 55.67 35.81 0.296 0.294 0.285 0.290 0.169 0.100 
Hansen P-val 0.737 0.260 0.694 0.202 0.367 0.156 0.291 0.532 0.112 0.402 0.706 0.996 




Table A5. Effects on Education and Life Expectancy, OLS and 2SLS Results, All Spatial Lags of the Explanatory Variables Included 
 ∆Educational Attainment ∆Life Expectancy (log) 
 SD1 SD1 SD2 SD2 SD3 SD3 SD1 SD1 SD2 SD2 SD3 SD3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES coalrev minrev coalrev minrev coalrev minrev coalrev minrev Coalrev minrev coalrev minrev 
Panel A: 2SLS             
∆Coalrev -0.045  -0.001  0.023  0.107*  0.112*  0.093  
 (0.081)  (0.092)  (0.100)  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.060)  
∆Coalrev_neighb -0.033  -0.068  -0.032  0.060  0.038  0.064  
 (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.143)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.071)  
∆Minrev  -0.081**  -0.080**  -0.072**  0.016  0.012  -0.006 
  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.028) 
∆Minrev_neighb  0.010  0.001  0.005  -0.058*  -0.051  -0.052 
  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.065)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.043) 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 374 374 374 374 385 385 374 374 374 374 385 385 
R-squared 0.372 0.378 0.367 0.374 0.406 0.412 0.547 0.533 0.550 0.536 0.577 0.566 
Panel B: 2SLS             
∆Coalrev 0.408  -0.630  -0.489  0.732***  0.971**  0.937**  
 (0.369)  (0.719)  (0.537)  (0.221)  (0.440)  (0.379)  
∆Coalrev_neighb -0.634*  0.295  0.304  -0.848***  -0.982**  -1.250**  
 (0.338)  (0.631)  (0.580)  (0.306)  (0.452)  (0.552)  
∆Minrev  -0.423***  -0.190**  -0.136  -0.035  -0.062  -0.037 
  (0.134)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.032)  (0.050)  (0.033) 
∆Minrev_neighb  0.354***  0.093  0.031  -0.014  0.018  -0.049 
  (0.123)  (0.077)  (0.126)  (0.044)  (0.054)  (0.061) 
Spatial Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First-stage F stat - 1 8.71 14.87 8.38 11.15 7.69 14.94 12.20 16.97 12.11 16.09 12.00 12.16 
First-stage F stat - 2 11.07 40.34 14.75 38.52 12.87 56.98 10.17 21.93 13.86 22.99 11.60 63.34 
Observations 374 374 374 374 385 385 374 374 374 374 385 385 
R-squared 0.291 0.262 0.311 0.366 0.371 0.408 0.318 0.528 0.286 0.525 0.261 0.563 
Hansen P-val  0.174  0.417  0.153 0.259 0.175 0.265 0.293 0.353 0.144 








This thesis has provided empirical findings regarding the effects of resource 
dependence on local development indicators in the post-decentralisation era in Indonesia. In 
Chapter Two, I find that most measures of resource dependence are positively associated with 
district per capita income in Indonesia. The one exception, coal revenue dependence 
sometimes has a negative effect, but in most specifications is insignificant. Positive effects 
are robust across different measures of resource dependence, to whether analysis is conducted 
using annual fixed effects or first difference estimation to control for unobserved regional 
differences, and to the the use or exclusion of instrumental variables. Indonesia thus joins 
many (but not all) other within-country studies in finding that resource dependence aids rather 
than hinders growth in income. 
Subsequently, Chapter Three investigates some potential causes through which greater 
resource dependence might raise aggregate income per person at the district level. I test the 
causal channels of spillovers to the manufacturing sector, net enrollment rates of high school 
aged children (note that this measure is distinct from high school completion rates), 
institutional capacity within local governments, and the proportion of district government 
spending devoted to capital expenditures. Using a three-step estimation strategy, I find some 
evidence of a positive impact of resource dependence on all channels selected, with the 
exception of public capital spending. However, these channels do not adequately explain the 
causes of district growth, as can be seen from the residual unexplained effects. The causal 
channel I found to best bridge the relationship between resource dependence and growth in 
Indonesia is institutional quality. That is, districts appear to use the revenues provided from 
resource dependence to increase their institutional capacity, which in turn promotes growth 
in per capita income. 
In complementary analysis, Chapter Three also tests the ‘contingent curse’ hypothesis 
of Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006). First, I test whether resource dependence aids the 
growth of districts that initially have good institutional quality, but harms growth for those 




institutional quality for the longer period 2007-2015, I divide my 390 district sample into two 
equal sized groups: districts that initially have stronger institutional quality and those which 
have weaker. The results do not provide evidence that resource dependence weakens growth 
in districts that have weaker initial institutions. Instead, I find that rising resource dependence 
helps per capita income to grow faster in the weaker district sample. In contrast, when I do 
the same process using the shorter period 2010-2015 with a more comprehensive measure of 
institutional qualit. I find weak evidence more in line with Mehlum et al.’s hypothesis, but it 
is not robust. 
I thus also formally test Mehlum et al.’s hypothesis by adding an interaction term 
between each resource dependence measure and initial level of institutional quality. Again in 
my most credible specification, I find the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
significant, suggesting that increased initial district institutional quality actually reduces the 
positive effect of resource dependence on district growth. However, when analysed using a 
better institutional quality measure, the coefficient on the interaction term is still negative but 
insignificant.  
Finally, Chapter Four completes the investigation by examining the (overall) effects of 
resource dependence on broader development outcomes, and by focusing on the spatial 
effects of resource dependence in neighbouring districts on outcomes of interest in home 
districts. Additional controls for district absolute geographical features are also included. For 
robustness, I introduce three spatial definition criteria to determine neighbouring districts: 
simple contiguity, contiguity weighted by border length, and distance between centroids. The 
broader development outcomes considered, with and without spatial lags, are poverty rates, 
the proportion of the adult population with at least high school completion, and life 
expectancy.  
To summarize, I find that the positive effects of resource dependence on per capita 
income remain persistent in some specifications, regardless of whether additional geographic 
factors are included or different spatial definitions used. Perhaps surprisingly, I then find no 
effect of resource dependence on poverty rates in any specifications. Even less optimistically, 
I find that home district resource dependence hinders the education attainment of adults 
whether with or without the inclusion of neighbour resource dependence,  more in line with 
a curse hypothesis. There is suggestive evidence this effect may be working through 




by home resource dependence, with the exception of coal revenue dependence. With regards 
to spatial spillover effects, I find several instances where neighbouring resource dependence 
also affects development outcomes in the home district, indicating the importance of 
including spatial controls. A prime example of this is a curse effect of neighbour coal revenue 
dependence on home district life expectancy when home district coal dependence is positively 
associated with life expectancy. Another example is a positive effect caused by an increase 
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